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Abstract 
This paper considers the political economy of sub-Saharan African petro-states, by specifically 
examining the causal link between recent developments in private military and security provision 
and trends in the allocation and receipt of inward foreign direct investment to the region.  It is 
argued that private military and security companies are playing an increasingly significant role in the 
political economies of these countries, by facilitating transnational oil and mining interests and 
effectively allowing foreign capital to circumvent prior concerns relating to security.  To make these 
claims, this paper assesses a number of cross-national variables relating to institutional quality, 
economic security and political stability vis-‘a-vis inward foreign direct investment.  It is found that 
many of the most poorly governed states in the region are in fact the greatest recipients of inward 
foreign direct investment, on account of their large and exploitable reserves of crude oil.  The 
growth of the international private security industry is then framed as an effective causal mechanism 
in this context.  It is argued that the industry services the institutional deficiencies of such states, and 
therefore privately secures foreign investment, insofar that matters relating to good governance are 
being increasingly minimised vis-‘a-vis global investment patterns to the region. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
 
The emergence of private military and security companies as significant actors in the international 
system are a relatively recent development.  The proliferation of these corporate entities are in 
many ways one of the defining features of the post-Cold War international political economy, and 
have been informed by a number of key geopolitical and ideational shifts in the contemporary 
international system.  The effects of these actors upon the political economies of the countries and 
regions in which they operate are, however, a largely neglected field of study.  This is generally not 
due to a lack of scholarly interest, but rather on account of the very limited information surrounding 
the activities and operations of such companies.  Moreover, most research in this area has been 
largely concerned with legal issues, specifically in terms of transparency, accountability and 
endeavours to define the legal status of such entities.  This preoccupation by academics on the legal 
discourse surrounding the modern international private security industry (PSI) is largely justifiable, 
due to the common, albeit generally misinformed, assumptions that the industry is simply a new 
form of mercenarism. 
 
This paper, however, whilst touching upon these issues, examines modern private military and 
security companies from a political economy perspective.  Specifically, this paper examines the 
potential influence these companies have upon augmenting the locational advantages of sub-
Saharan African petro-states, by allowing these countries to more effectively secure the receipt of 
large sums of inward foreign direct investment (FDI), despite their exceptionally poor 
macroeconomic and institutional policy environments.  The issues of economic security and political 
stability, within the broader framework of institutional theory, are therefore the primary issues with 
which this study deals with, by constituting the central pillars upon which environments conducive 
to foreign investment rest upon. 
 
Noting sub-Saharan Africa’s recent foray into international oil and security politics, and the 
subsequent rise in the international strategic value of the region - which has to a great degree 
coincided with the growth of the international private security industry - the region provides an ideal 
testing ground for this relatively new adventure of capitalist expansion.  To this effect, the idea of 
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the Weberian state maintaining a monopoly over violence is placed at direct odds with the 
increasing growth and evolution of private military and security companies, which can be viewed as 
the imposition of the market to facilitate transnational interests in securing scarce, and strategically 
significant, commodities – such as crude oil.  Furthermore, the findings of this paper credit certain 
ideas within political economy studies of the primary determinants of inward FDI (otherwise 
referred to as the study of locational advantage).  By building upon the notion that institutions are a 
major locational advantage in international business as they represent one the few remaining 
significant and immobile factors in an increasingly globalised marketplace, this paper contends that 
the growth of the PSI in sub-Saharan Africa, over the past two decades, can be understood as the 
manifestation of the market to turn a traditionally immobile factor, which has not been conducive to 
the strategic interests of certain international actors, into something which is mobile.  Whereas the 
security of foreign investments once rested solely upon the practices of good governance by host 
states, this function can now increasingly be outsourced and privatised in order to accommodate the 
interests of asset and resource seeking FDI in the region.   
 
Such developments have had a remarkable effect upon the region in terms of the strengthening and 
proliferation of enclave-based economies as well as numerous associated security and political 
concerns which this has ultimately led to.  Based upon these observations, this paper considers the 
political economy of sub-Saharan African petro-states, by specifically examining the causal link 
between recent developments in private military and security provision and trends in the allocation 
and receipt of inward foreign direct investment to the region.  It is argued that private military and 
security companies are playing an increasingly significant role in the political economies of these 
countries, by facilitating transnational oil and mining interests and effectively allowing foreign 
capital to circumvent prior concerns relating to security.  To make these claims, this paper assesses a 
number of cross-national variables relating to institutional quality, economic security and political 
stability vis-‘a-vis inward foreign direct investment.  It is found that many of the most poorly 
governed states in the region are in fact the greatest recipients of inward foreign direct investment, 
on account of their large and exploitable reserves of crude oil.  The growth of the international 
private security industry is then framed as an effective causal mechanism in this context.  It is argued 
that the industry services the institutional deficiencies of such states, and therefore privately secures 
foreign investment, insofar that matters relating to good governance are being increasingly 
minimised vis-‘a-vis global investment patterns to the region. 
 
 9 | P a g e  
 
In order to study the concept of good governance in opposition to other determinants of locational 
advantage, this paper draws upon a comprehensive dataset inclusive of a number of key aggregate 
indicators which further account for six broad dimensions of governance and institutional and policy 
related variables.  Good governance, therefore, refers to how well sub-Saharan African countries 
score against these measures, whilst employing similar methods to capture all other independent 
and intervening variables relating to locational advantage. 
 
By studying the relationship between key governance indicators and levels of foreign investment, 
this study seeks to question established views on what constitutes a suitable environment for the 
attraction of foreign capital, and the subsequent potential for investment-driven economic growth.  
The motivations underlying this study, stem from prior quantitative analyses whose findings 
contradict the liberalisation-democratisation panacea, by illustrating the fact that countries which – 
in conventional terms – are the most corrupt, least accountable and, in general, score very poorly on 
institutional and policy related matters often attract and secure very large sums of foreign 
investment.  To this effect, this paper employs a mixed methodology inclusive of quantitative and 
qualitative methods, with the latter used to primarily determine the causal effect of the private 
security industry upon the locational advantages of sub-Saharan African petro-states.  By doing so, 
this paper shall explain the emergence, role and impact of the private security industry on 
investment patterns in sub-Saharan African petro-states, as well as assessing the 
contribution of the securitisation of these states to the existing frameworks of the resource-
curse and rentier state hypotheses, as well as the more general political economic 
prescriptions of institutional theory.   
 
The primary aims of this paper are therefore: 
i. To quantitatively examine the statistical association between institutional and policy 
related variables vis-‘a-vis patterns of inward foreign direct investment to the sub-
Saharan African region. 
ii. To quantitatively examine the casual strength of such variables relating to good 
governance, upon inward FDI, in contrast to variables which account for oil-wealth. 
iii. To qualitatively assess the extent to which the growth of the international private 
security industry enables, or contributes to, trends in the allocation of inward FDI to 
institutionally weak, politically unstable and economically insecure oil producing states 
in the region; and lastly, 
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iv. To examine whether the general prescriptions of institutional theory, relating to 
locational advantage, are relevant in explaining the political economies of sub-Saharan 
African petro-states. 
 
There are three key reasons that warrant further research into the issues examined in this paper.  
Firstly, since the end of the Cold War, the privatisation of many core state functions has been on the 
increase.  In Africa, specifically, the proliferation of international non-governmental organisations 
has stepped into almost every sector of the economy, the effects of which have been previously 
studied and reported to exacerbate the weakening of governmental accountability and capacity in a 
number of ways.  Security, it seems is following this trend, with the global private security industry 
rapidly, and consistently, increasing in size over the past twenty years.  The effects of this, however, 
are of much greater significance than other state functions which have been supplanted by either 
the market or other non-governmental actors, as security, and more importantly the state monopoly 
over violence, are issues that speak to the very heart of conventional understandings of the state, 
sovereignty, and the international system.   
 
Secondly, Africa’s continuing economic malaise, despite its natural resource wealth, is an issue that 
is never far off the top of any developmental agenda.  While much literature has been generated, as 
well as countless statistical analyses conducted, around the resource curse and rentier state 
hypotheses, there still exists a vast gap in what is known, and what has been studied, in the political 
economy of resource rich African states vis-a’-vis the trilateral relationship between state, private 
security provider, and mineral-extractive commercial interests.  Thirdly, views of the international 
private security industry are often juxtaposed against a new form of mercenarism.  Such views need 
to be tempered by a greater understanding of private military and security companies, leading to 
better devised policies by governments, non-governmental organisations and the private sector, 
which can work to the benefit of all parties involved.   
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Chapter II 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
 
This chapter shall provide an account of the key strands of literature, as well as the relevant 
theoretical models and paradigms, with which the analysis presented in this paper engages and 
builds upon.  To achieve this, this chapter shall proceed in four parts by means of a review of the two 
distinct literatures which this study aims to reconcile, followed by a discussion on the theoretical 
dimensions which inform the broader aims of this paper.  The first review considers the current 
debate regarding the international private security industry, by examining contemporary 
understandings of what exactly constitutes the provision of private security and military related 
services vis-‘a-vis the industry’s modern corporate guise.   
 
The second strand of literature reviewed in this chapter concerns itself with an understanding of the 
political economy of sub-Saharan African petro-states.  This section shall underscore the defining 
features of such states with regard to basic institutional development vis-‘a-vis the large-scale 
government receipt of oil revenues.  Specifically, this section shall introduce the concept of the sub-
Saharan African ‘enclave’ economy, and the implications of these economies upon domestic and 
regional security concerns.  Through this review, the internal market demand for security will be 
derived in order to not only bolster the growing legitimacy of the international PSI, but to dually 
compliment and emphasise the associated external market demand for private security in SSA – 
which shall be outlined in chapter four.     
 
The third, section of this chapter introduces a theoretical dimension which deals specifically with the 
political economies of developing, resource-rich, states.  The idea of a ‘resource curse’ shall be used 
as the primary framework in which to frame the arguments posited in the prior literature reviews, 
whilst touching upon the many associated theoretical variants of the so called ‘curse’.  The fourth, 
and final, section of this chapter examines the political economy of foreign direct investment inflows 
to the sub-Saharan African region, and provides much of the conceptual basis for the methodological 
choices employed in the following chapter.  This section provides a theoretical insight into the 
certain factors which inform the locational choices of foreign actors, with respect to their investment 
decisions, concerning the SSA region.  In this way, a greater understanding of the general 
prescriptions which inform foreign investment inflows, and the subsequent potential for market-
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driven growth, in SSA countries vis-‘a-vis established institutional and economic theories can be 
garnered – and made quantitatively (and qualitatively) testable.  
 
2.1 A Review of the Debate Regarding the International Private Security Industry in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
This section shall outline the key issues, and current debates, regarding the growth and operation of 
the international private security industry operating in sub-Saharan Africa.  Particular attention shall 
be paid to the nature of the operations of certain private military and security contractors, and the 
implications of these entities with regard to the political economy of the region.  The following 
review shall proceed in three parts: Firstly, a holistic definition which captures the many facets of 
the international private security industry will be discussed and worked toward, by drawing upon 
the ideas and subjective notions of what exactly constitutes, and distinguishes, one form of private 
security (or military) provision from another.  Essentially, a working definition of what shall be 
referred to as the PSI (private security industry) and PMSCs (private military security companies), 
which shall inform the following quantitative and qualitative analyses of this paper, will be outlined 
and elaborated upon.   
 
Secondly, the numerous independent and complimentary, international and regional, trends which 
have spurred the growth and development of the international PSI shall be highlighted, and 
discussed in relation to the growing demand for the services of the industry.  Thirdly, this section 
shall explicate the theoretical grounds for the further legitimisation of the international PSI, through 
greater regulation, and policy development, such that PMSCs operating in SSA act with greater 
accountability and effectiveness.  One of the primary aims of this endeavour will be to build upon 
the working definitions regarding the PSI and PMSCs, and to dually emphasise the distinction 
between these entities in opposition to the historical relationship shared by many of these states 
vis-‘a-vis mercenarism – and the so-called ‘dogs of war.’  The prescriptions put forward in this 
section will, however, be tempered by a concurrent discussion outlining the primary causes for 
concern, with regard to the growth and operation of the industry. 
 
2.1.1 Working Toward a Definitive Understanding of the International Private Security Industry: 
What is a Private Military/Security Company? 
Within the contemporary parlance of international organisations and policy-circles, the international 
private security industry – and more specifically, international private military and security 
companies – remain largely contested and subjective units of analysis, primarily on account of 
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varying definitions which attempt to outline the nature, legitimacy and scope of operations of these 
actors within the international system.  In order to better understand the industry and the effects of 
these actors upon the political economy of the sub-Saharan African region, a holistic definition which 
shall inform of the core aims of this paper shall be worked toward and outlined vis-‘a-vis a review of 
the key divergences which currently exist within the greater debate surrounding the international 
PSI and PMSCs. 
 
Firstly, it must be noted that the international private security industry – as referred to in this paper 
– is a term indicative of all private companies, of a transnational nature, which provide, in whatever 
form, services that offer prospective clients security-related and/or military-related services.  This 
can therefore be understood as a very loose, illustrative, term to refer to the transnational interests 
and operations of all actors associated with the growth, development and evolution of private 
security and military related services.  Subsequently, private military and security companies, or 
PMSCs, fall under the rubric the international PSI within the arguments presented, and prescriptions 
put forward, by this paper – and can be further understood as the key components and tangible 
manifestations of the interests of the international PSI.  Furthermore, a clear distinction between 
PMSCs and the international PSI allows greater insight into the workings of this complimentary unit 
as a whole vis-‘a-vis the effects they pose upon the political economies of sub-Saharan African 
states; as this permits two levels of analysis, one in which more theoretical and lofty arguments can 
be posited – noting certain trends and shifting discourses within the international system – with 
reference to the PSI, and the other allowing more a more detailed and practical of level of analysis 
with regard to PMSCs. 
 
Secondly, much of the discourse surrounding the concept of what constitutes and defines the nature 
of the services provided by the international PSI concerns itself with the distinction between the 
scope and operations of private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs).1  
Whilst this distinction is of notable significance, especially in terms of the debate around the 
legitimacy of the industry and in terms of issues of accountability and regulation, this paper shall 
primarily refer to the nexus of these two seemingly disparate concepts by drawing upon the more 
comprehensive notion of PMSCs.  This shall allow a more nuanced approach to the analysis of 
transnational private security, as a whole, upon the political economy of the SSA region, needless to 
say that the distinctions between PMCs and PSCs will be covered in the following review. 
 
                                                          
1
 Singer, P.W., “Outsourcing War”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, March/April 2005, pp.  120 - 123 
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As posited by Cilliers and Mason, noting the particular divergences in opinion and understanding of 
PMSCs, there does exist some margin of consensus based upon the broader mandates and 
operations of these actors.  Key to this understanding is their acknowledgement that PMSCs offer 
services relating to risk assessment, personal and asset protection, as well as “... the sale, installation 
and maintenance of basic protection equipment, to high-technology protection and surveillance 
measures”.2  This notion is inclusive of both the PMC and PSC, as defined within their capacities as 
agents of the interests of the international PSI - as it is informed by an awareness of their respective 
offensive, intrusive, as well as defensive or passive capabilities.  This distinction is more 
comprehensively captured by Tim Spicer, on the specific attributes of PMCs, on which he elaborates 
that: 
[PMCs] are defined as those organisations which do more than provide passive assistance in areas 
of conflict.  They may provide training and equipment to extend the capabilities of their client’s 
military resources, providing them with the strategic or operational advantage that is necessary to 
suppress their opposition or, going even further, play an active role alongside the client forces as 
force multipliers, deploying their own personnel in the field of conflict, but with the strict caveat 
that they are acting within the chain of command of the client’s military hierarchy.
3
 
 
Building upon the above conception of the PMC, Shearer goes on to elaborate that such entities are 
distinct from other forms of forms of security provision in terms of their design, which primarily 
concerns itself with an ability to have a strategic impact upon the “... security and political 
environments of weak states facing a significant military threat.”4  The core mandate of such actors 
is to therefore enhance a client’s capability when facing a direct military threat, and to deter 
potential conflict.5  PSCs, on the other hand, do not directly engage in warfare alongside a client’s 
military forces (effectively acting as ‘force multipliers’), as they focus upon softer security-related 
services such as pre-deployment training for peacekeepers by international humanitarian 
organisations for example, the protection of physical and economic assets within a foreign country, 
logistics and equipment servicing among many others; however, there is considerable overlap 
between the services offered by both PSCs and PMCs.6 
 
                                                          
2
 Cilliers, J., “Private Security in war-torn African states” in Cilliers, J. & Mason, P. (ed/s) Peace, Profit or 
Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 
1999, p. 2 
3
 Ibid. p. 2 
4
 Shearer, D., “Private Armies and Military Intervention”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi 
Paper 316, London, February 1998, p. 23 
5
 Ibid. p. 23 
6
 Singer, P.W., Op. Cit. p. 120 - 123 
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Subsequently, the PMC and PSC can be understood as the two extremes on opposite end of a 
continuum which represents the nature and scope of services on offer by the international PSI, with 
the PMC arguably offering the most controversial, aggressive and intrusive services, whilst the PSC 
offers far more passive and defensive provisions.  Taken together, this continuum could be 
descriptively understood as a single unit of analysis, captured by the term “private military and 
security companies”, or PMSCs.  Whilst the particular services offered by PMSCs lend, to a 
considerable degree, a greater understanding of these entities, of further interest to the aims of this 
paper is the equally significant nature and behaviour of these actors, with special regard to their 
actions in sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
As noted by a number of academics and commentators, the modern activities of PMSCs can often be 
found within political-economic environments characterised by close network associations between 
heads of state, multinational corporations and the upper management of the PMSCs themselves; 
furthermore, within SSA, these entities can often be found in the service of larger corporate 
interests which specifically revolve around transnational mining interests – and increasingly 
associated with base mineral exploration companies.7  The latter trend is significantly pronounced in 
sub-Saharan Africa, primarily due to the very high-risk nature of the operations of mineral 
exploration companies, often conducting their affairs in politically sensitive and unstable parts of the 
world - subsequently leading to a great demand for security and protection. 
 
Given these observations, a number of prescriptions can be put forward which attempt to highlight 
the role and relevance of the international PSI vis-‘a-vis the political economy of the SSA region.  As 
eloquently posited by Peter Lock: 
The PSI will thrive in the monetarised export-oriented pockets Africa’s economies.  Its services will 
be instrumental in positioning these sectors competitively in the world market, because security is 
a fundamental precondition required to attract the foreign capital required to realise the potential 
wealth of the region.
8
 
This is an especially critical insight, provided by Lock, as it clearly lays the foundation for greater 
inquiry into the idea that one of the key components of the international PSI is that it acts to service 
the interests of transnational corporate entities, specifically within the mining industry and in the 
developing world, by bolstering the international competitiveness of certain economic pockets of 
                                                          
7
 Cilliers, J., Op. Cit., pp. 3 - 5 
8
 Lock, P., “Africa, military downsizing and the growth in the security industry”, in Cilliers, J. & Mason, P. (ed/s) 
Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, Institute for Security 
Studies, Pretoria, 1999, p. 31 
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wealth through the provision of security – which previously rested, solely, upon the shoulders of 
national governments.  In a way, the development and evolution of the PSI, has effectively over-
ridden prior transnational corporate concerns regarding the safety and security of certain financial 
and physical assets and investments within politically unstable, or institutionally weak, offshore 
sovereign territories.  The PSI therefore, works to fill a political-economic void, arguably a ‘market-
gap’, in which otherwise too-risky environments can now be deemed potential hosts for inward 
foreign direct investment, and the ultimate adventure of the consolidation of transnational 
corporate interests, and global capitalism within the former marginal areas of the international 
system. 
 
Indeed, as opposed to misconceptions of the modern PSI vis-‘a-vis the mercenary companies of the 
1960s and 1970s in SSA, certain fundamental features of these entities can be seen to be directly 
informed from the consolidation of global capitalism and transnational corporate interests.  The 
modern PMSC, as elaborated upon by Khareen Pech, is characterised by not only by the 
transnational nature of their operations, but dually by notably complex corporate and military 
organisations – with the latter being indicative of PMCs specifically.9  Furthermore, these entities 
have been consistently involved with international campaigns to gain credibility and effectively 
shake-off any pejorative conceptions of their business, whilst paradoxically maintaining some margin 
of secrecy in lieu of the numerous corporate and political powers which finance their operations.10 
 
2.1.2 Accounting for the key Geopolitical and Ideational Shifts within the International System 
which have informed the Evolution and Development of the PSI 
The international private security industry, as defined by many of the features outlined above, is, to 
a large degree, a very recent entity and actor within the international system.  While forms of 
private-profiteering over conflict, and arms-for-hire type mercenary activity, can be found in texts 
dating to antiquity, private military and security companies, as legitimate providers of military and 
security assistance, in the form of well organised corporate entities with shareholders, managers, 
assets, liabilities and so on, is a very recent phenomenon.  The relatively recent development and 
evolution of the industry can be attributed to a number of distinct shifts within the international 
system, dating, roughly, back to the end of the Cold-War – and the unique state of affairs which 
marked this system as a result.  Specifically, three broad facets of the post-Cold War international 
                                                          
9
 Pech, K., “Executive Outcomes - A Corporate Conquest”, in Cilliers, J. & Mason, P. (ed/s) Peace, Profit or 
Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 
1999, p. 83 
10
 Ibid. p. 83 
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order directly influenced and spurred the development of private military and security contractors, 
which in turn informed the greater industry as it is known today.   
 
The first major impetus for the development of the PSI stemmed primarily from the years of global 
tensions produced by the Cold War itself, and the subsequent downsizing and demobilisation of 
military forces, throughout the world, which followed in its wake.  By one estimate, the global 
number of individuals in national armed forces fell by six million, during the period 1987 to 1996, 
resulting in a flood of military and security related experience and expertise onto the international 
private, non-governmental, marketplace.11  Further informing this situation, and giving rise to the 
development of a historically unique form of private military and security provision, was the 
realisation of many former serviceman that -due to the increasingly technical and managerial nature 
of modern militaries – their expertise and trade no longer became redundant in their transition into 
civilian life but could be applied and exploited in the private sector, which offered remuneration 
rates far above anything that was offered by service in the public sphere.12  This culminated in a 
significant break from previous generations of retiring military personnel, who, due to certain 
historical differences, either lacked these opportunities or never gained the technical and 
managerial expertise to pursue profitable careers within the private sector and within a related field.  
 
The second distinct, yet coinciding, feature of the early post-Cold War international system which 
informed the growth of the international PSI was the, arguable, triumph of the neo-liberal economic 
paradigm – and the subsequent effects that this imposed upon the concepts of statehood and 
sovereignty vis-‘a-vis privatisation and restructuring.13  With specific regard to sub-Saharan Africa, 
the post-Cold War period entailed a cumulative externalisation of state functions, following a decade 
of increasing pressure by, and subjugation to, international financial organisations (notably the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) with regard to the imposition of the now 
notorious structural adjustment policies - which followed the region’s debt crises of the 1970s.14  
The prevailing logic of the time advocated that the many of the woes confronting the developing 
world were directly attributable to large, inefficient and costly state bureaucracies which inhibited 
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the natural growth and evolution of market forces, which needed to operate freely with minimal 
state intervention and influence.15  Remaining cognisant of these trends, much literature has been 
generated surrounding the issue of the African state being effectively hollowed out from within, 
referring to the implications upon governance and institutional development and quality vis-‘a-vis 
the privatisation, outsourcing and externalisation of many functions of the state – which once 
remained the sole reserve of sovereign governments.16   
 
By extending this logic, Lock posits that “... military functions and security services are simply the 
latest additions to the list of state functions that are increasingly being externalised and often 
privatised,” building upon the notion of a ‘project of external governance’ in which there is little left 
for democratically-elected leaders to decide upon vis-‘a-vis pressures emanating from foreign 
powers in the guise of international organisations, other states and even certain non-governmental 
organisations working within their respective countries.17  An interesting argument put forward by 
Richard Cornwell refers to these processes as the ‘reverse side of globalisation’, in which he 
highlights that: “Transnational companies, having demanded a new set of global rules which have 
effectively undermined the state in certain of the world’s margins, are now able to provide just as 
much of the apparatus usually reserved to the state, to carry out their businesses in relative safety 
and at great profit...”18 
 
A third fundamental issue which has spurred the growth and evolution of the international PSI has 
been the failure of legitimate and effective international responses to African crises, with specific 
regard to the arguably ‘lost’ strategic value of the continent by major international powers in the 
aftermath of the Cold War – as well as the failures by international organisations in responding to 
the turbulent security demands of the SSA region.  Mark Malan argues that a niche market for the 
provision of private security has emerged on account of these issues, to the extent that the demand 
for the services of the industry have evolved alongside the growth of the international humanitarian 
sector, in a complimentary fashion, which credits his notion of a growing contract culture and his 
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argument that “... the burden of caring is being privatised”.19  Malan goes on to argue that of key 
concern to developing countries is the concept of stability, more so than security, in which he posits: 
Stability is a condition in which a whole variety of tasks can be executed as part of daily life, without 
undue threat to life and limb.  It is this essential and elementary aspect of law and order that the 
international community has been unable to provide in African countries afflicted by civil strife and 
armed conflict.  It is unlikely that this situation will improve simply through the devolution of 
responsibility to lower level multinational ‘coalitions of the willing’.  When the going gets tough, 
such coalitions become unwilling to take risks, unless their collective core interests are directly 
threatened.
20
 
 
As outlined by Malan’s argument, it is within this context of the failure of effective and legitimate 
international responses, with specific regard to the provision of stability on the African continent, 
that the provision of private security fills a void, and effectively evolves in order to service a niche 
market – one which is unique, in many ways, to the specific needs of the continent, and especially 
the SSA region.  One of the unique aspects of this issue relates to the fact that many of the failures 
of peacekeeping on the African continent by INGOs, in the post-Cold War period, were primarily due 
to the tax imposed upon developing nations (with limited capacities) to provide their own troops 
during such operations – due to the increased reluctance of developed nations to intervene in the 
region’s affairs.21   
 
Such issues have indirectly paved the way for a renewed interest in the further legitimisation and 
acceptance of the crucial roles which PMSCs could potentially play in peacekeeping missions, 
spurring the demand for the services provided by the industry.  Recent accounts of Peace Support 
Operations (PSOs) in Africa, have acknowledged that outsourcing is indeed a common occurrence 
insofar that PMSCs have worked alongside traditional militaries as force multipliers.22  Compounding 
such demands placed upon the services, and relevance, of the international PSI, Malan goes on to 
add that within failing, or already failed, states, the function of stability has essentially been 
‘privatised’ in any case; this is due to the means of violence and orchestrated coercion devolving to a 
factional level, and therefore remaining beyond the ambit of the state to control - thereby creating a 
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situation in which it is extremely difficult for other international actors to intervene beyond the 
framework governed by state-centric international law.23  What has subsequently emerged, 
especially within a sub-Saharan African context, is indeed a move toward peace-keeping and 
humanitarian operations by PMSCs, a trend which has been brought about due to the relatively 
limited capacities of certain states, and INGOs, to provide the necessary security and stability 
required by international humanitarian non-governmental organisations to fulfil their mandates.24  
In other words, the niche market for security, as explicated by Malan, is indeed being serviced by 
private security contractors – whilst dually bolstering the credibility and legitimacy of the PSI.25 
 
2.1.3 The Need for Greater Regulation: Issues surrounding Accountability, Effectiveness and 
Developmental Concerns 
Any attempt to outline the nature, growth and development of the international private security 
industry is never complete without a detailed understanding and discussion of the certain issues 
relating to the greater regulation of PMSCs, and peripheral concerns stemming from issues regarding 
accountability, effectiveness and developmental concerns.  Accordingly, certain academics have 
hinted at a direct association between many of the underlying concerns of the expansion of the PSI, 
particularly within a sub-Saharan African context, and the risks they pose vis-‘a-vis long-term state-
building projects - and human security - to a lack of regulation and informed policy-making.26  With 
specific regard to the SSA region, much of the, arguable, deficiencies of African governments to 
regulate, recognise and effectively account for the operations of PMSCs derives largely from the 
region’s historical relationship with mercenaries in the early post-colonial period, and has 
subsequently informed a sense of hesitancy and negatively misinformed attitudes toward the 
contemporary international PSI.27   
 
Exacerbating this situation is the fact that, in terms of international and regional legislation, notable 
gaps exist which fail to define and account for the contemporary international PSI; as legislation and 
policy is primarily centred upon the specificities of regulating mercenary activity – as highlighted by 
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the 1977 O.A.U. Convention for the elimination of mercenarism in Africa, as well as the 1989 U.N. 
International Convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of Mercenaries.28  
Indicative of this void in PMSC regulation in the SSA region is the case of South Africa which, as of 
December 2011, is the only country on the continent which has put in place legislation to regulate 
the operations of PMSCs operating out of, and within, its borders.29  
 
International efforts to regulate the international PSI have dually been mired by lack of initiative, 
clear leadership and pace.  At present, the most comprehensive document, amongst state 
signatories, which identifies and attempts to account for the operations of PMSCs, albeit in an 
armed conflict scenario and in a non-binding capacity, is the Montreux Document on Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private 
Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict.30  Whilst further attempts at international-
level legislation and policy-making regarding the regulation and control of PMSCs is ongoing, the 
Montreux Document is significant insofar as it specifically delineates the pejorative ideational 
conceptions surrounding mercenarism vis-‘a-vis the contemporary international PSI, by referring to 
PMSCs as legitimate private business entities, whilst further demonstrating that (despite a lack of 
industry-specific regulation at an international level) such entities do not necessarily operate within 
a legal vacuum as international humanitarian law and human rights law do have a bearing upon the 
operations of PMSCs.31 
 
The need for the greater regulation of the international PSI stems primarily from concerns regarding 
the operations of these actors vis-‘a-vis the short and long-term implications they pose upon the 
states they operate within, the risks they pose to human security, as well concerns stemming from 
the legitimacy of these entities, with particular reference to issues of transparency and 
accountability.  The overarching concern for regulation, however, is derived from the crumbling 
philosophical foundations of sovereignty, particularly Max Weber’s notion that the state should hold 
a monopoly on force, which is being steadily eroded by the growth and operation of the private 
sector in security and military related services.32  As opposed to prior notions that the assurance of 
peace, security and democracy were essential, collective, state responsibilities, concerns over the 
concession of these responsibilities – to primarily private profit-driven entities – have multiplied 
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over the last two decades, underscoring a common desire for the effective international regulation 
of PMSCs.33  Cilliers and Mason capture the implications of these developments, with particular 
regard to sub-Saharan Africa, by arguing that: 
... while security outsourcing and even commercialisation are common practices in countries such 
as the U.S., Britain, France and others, it is often the core functions of statehood that are 
contracted out in Africa – due to the inability of the state to fulfil such functions.  The purpose 
therefore is not to enhance cost-effectiveness, but to fill a vacuum left by the effective collapse, 
partisan nature or inefficiency of the national forces – or to make money for a small political 
elite...
34
 
 
Whilst the position of Cilliers and Mason seems appropriate in outlining the dire prospects for the 
long-term national development of African states which play host to international PMSCs, it must be 
noted that while the PSI does indeed fill a void left by the institutional and physical short-comings of 
these states, the fundamental purpose of any PMSC is primarily due to the need of African 
governments and international investors to enhance the cost-effectiveness of their operations.  This 
argument is grounded in the theoretical assumptions of institutional theory, which shall be 
presented at a later stage, needless to say that both arguments essentially underscore similar 
concerns, which inflate the crucial need for regulation and oversight of the PSI - especially in SSA as 
the stakes for long-term political and economic development are arguably much higher than 
anywhere else in the world. 
 
Such concerns are especially pronounced within the humanitarian context as a number of 
international and regional humanitarian nongovernmental and intergovernmental organisations are 
increasingly entering into business arrangements and partnerships with PMSCs.  Such recent 
developments call into question the legitimacy and accountability of these entities, with much 
debate revolving around the issue of the doubtless pragmatic appeal of the NGO/PMSC compact – 
tempered by the argument that the initial political issues which normally lead to humanitarian crises 
are likely to be left unaddressed by such forms of cooperation.35  Indeed, there does exist notable 
agreement by academics that an illusion of governance is catered for by the PMSC supported 
humanitarian space, one which rests upon a short-term, externally imposed and artificially created 
stability, which does little to address long-term substantive issues - specifically relating to domestic 
governance.36  These issues further spur debate regarding the humanitarian ethic vis-‘a-vis the 
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neutrality and impartiality of international humanitarian organisations in conflict zones - by directly 
feeding into the politicisation of aid and assistance, whilst dually underscoring the need for effective 
regulation and definitive policy prescriptions of PMSCs within this context.37   
 
Despite these short-term inadequacies of PMSCs, NGOs continue to rely on the services of the 
international PSI due to the inherent nature of the post-Cold War humanitarian space.  Similarly, 
intergovernmental organisations have called upon the services of these entities, and increasingly 
view PMSCs as viable alternatives to traditional state-sponsored troops in peace and security 
operations.  As posited by Omondi, multiple initiatives have been sponsored by the African Union, 
and various other African regional organisations, which sought to address issues of peace and 
security on the continent, such as the establishment of ‘Regional Standby Forces’ (RSF) within the 
African Peace and Security Architecture.  He notes that, based on the experiences of Darfur and 
Somalia, the RSF agenda has proven to be unsustainable and ineffective due to a lack of troops and 
capacity, and subsequently argues that PMSCs shall find increasing relevance in such INGO and 
regional organisational contexts.38  Furthermore, due to the nature of peace support operations by 
INGOs, PMSCs most often operate within weak states which lack the institutional and legislative 
capacities to hold accountable the actions of these entities, compounding the need for effective 
regulation, at an international level, of the PSI – such that these actors do not abuse their powers 
and operate with impunity.39 
 
Adding to the growing relevance of the regulation debate are the increasingly complex contractual 
challenges, which arise within peacekeeping contexts, due to the additionally outsourced services by 
PMSCs to smaller, or more specialised, companies in order to reduce costs or increase capabilities.40  
As noted by George, the increasing number of actors in such operations subsequently produces 
multiple layers of accountability which may ultimately prove disastrous if not properly regulated and 
monitored.41    
 
Regulation, therefore, becomes a necessity in these situations as PMSCs will have to be regarded as 
legitimate, transparent and accountable international actors, in order to improve the efficacy of 
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certain operations, whilst subsequently negating misguided pejorative conceptions of the use of 
force by non-state actors akin to mercenary activity.  As argued by Spearin, there are indeed many 
beneficial aspects of the international PSI which render vilification unnecessary, due to key 
fundamental differences in the philosophy behind the industry as opposed to mercenarism.42  With 
regard to legitimacy, he notes that it is easy to prejudge non-state force based upon the experiences 
of another historical era, and that there is a need to reconcile long-held negative perceptions of non-
state use of force with military expertise – especially in light of the fact that many NGOs remain wary 
of the impact their relationships with PMSCs have upon the perceptions of their organisation vis-‘a-
vis donors and sponsors.43  Spearin illustrates this point by positing: 
... during the 1990s, the U.N. for fear of criticism, did not engage E.O. [a well established South 
African private military and security company] in negotiation, despite the stability it brought to 
Angola and Sierra Leone, stability that allowed for humanitarian operations to continue.  When E.O. 
was forced to leave, the peace broke down and humanitarian activities were consequently 
restricted to the Luanda and Freetown areas.
44
 
 
A further distinction between the contemporary international PSI and accounts of mercenarism, 
which lend to the need for the regulation of modern PMSCs vis-‘a-vis concerns over legitimacy, is the 
fact that these particular business entities are inherently self-taming – despite the seemingly large 
deficiencies in international, regional and state-level efforts at regulation and monitoring.  Private 
military and security companies are just as susceptible to negative investor and stakeholder 
perceptions as all other business entities are, and it is for this reason that corporate respectability 
and responsibility must be maintained for the sake of repeat clients, and to avoid harmful publicity 
and scrutiny by civil society.45  To this effect, a number of PMSCs have engaged vigorously at the 
state and international levels in the drafting of proposals and crafting of policy regarding the 
regulation of the industry such that it is a responsible, legitimate, accountable and credible actor in 
international affairs, humanitarian spaces and conflict zones.46  
 
These needs, however, extend beyond the humanitarian space and find increasing relevance in the 
operations of transnational oil and mining companies is sub-Saharan Africa, in which a great number 
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of international PMSCs are employed.  Issues of accountability and corruption are paramount in such 
contexts whilst the need for effective oversight and regulatory mechanisms are crucial, due to the 
well-noted close networks of personal and financial connections between PMSCs, multinational 
corporations and home governments, which normally tend to characterise the working relationships 
in this sector.47   
 
The ramifications of these developments upon the political economy of the sub-Saharan African 
region are extremely significant, especially in terms of the potential impact that this could have upon 
the restructuring and development of the social, political and economic fabric of the region.  Lock 
argues that the outsourcing and privatisation of key government responsibilities, specifically 
security, in the SSA region can be reduced to a new mode of political production in which a new 
political economy is being autonomously played out.48  He argues that, in economic terms, accounts 
of political actors seeking to enhance their capabilities through the international leasing of military 
and security services from the private sector, amounts to an essential “... rationalisation and 
restructuring of industrial production in the maelstrom of globalisation.”49  Lock highlights previous 
waves of privatisation and the outsourcing of state functions in SSA, and the subsequent creation of 
“shadow states”, in which incumbent elites, in an attempt to safeguard their interests vis-‘a-vis the 
dictates of certain international financial institutions, abandoned their social responsibilities and 
shifted their activities into informal parallel networks which allowed continued control over 
exploitable resources.50   
 
In this sense, the institutional capacities of the government are weakened in relation to the 
development and expansion of informal networks, spearheaded by elites seeking to safeguard their 
respective economic fiefdoms; whilst the provision of security dually becomes fragmented and de-
stated as numerous, different, security arrangements are made through such informal networks – 
ultimately leading to the informal commoditisation of security which regulates other economic 
transactions.51  The major concerns of this is the possible militarisation of society, as civil actors will 
have to assume their own defences against criminality in the face of weak state provision of rule of 
law and order, the greater internal polarisation of countries in the region, and a preoccupation on 
private and informal security provision vis-‘a-vis the successful conclusion of any economic 
transaction.  Lock argues that the ultimate downfall of such a situation would be rapid economic 
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contraction due to the “cumulative transaction costs [now] related to security.52  The need for the 
effective regulation and monitoring of the growth of the international PSI is therefore of great 
importance given the above arguments, and is something that will be referred to in the qualitative 
case study analysis of this paper. 
 
2.2 The Political Economy of sub-Saharan African Petro-States: Oil Rents and the region’s Internal 
Market Demand for Security 
Whereas the external demand for private security in SSA stems primarily from the renewed 
international geopolitical value of the region (which shall be accounted for at a later stage) the 
internal demand is predominantly attributed to the poor governance, legitimacy and accountability 
of many of the region’s key oil-producing states.  The fifth chapter of this paper shall provide an in-
depth statistical analysis of the region’s governance upon inward foreign direct investment and a 
number of intervening variables, however, it is crucial to mention here that sub-Saharan Africa is 
littered with poorly governed, illegitimate, corrupt and politically unstable states.53  This has 
consequently resulted in producing a significantly inflated market for security, especially when 
taking into account the potential for massive inward FDI, and resource-derived government 
revenues, due to the region’s recent foray into international oil and security politics.  Thus, external 
oil interests and the internal economic and ‘developmental’ interests of the region are inextricably 
woven together by the security concerns of sub-Saharan Africa.  The central pillar of this relationship 
is that a fundamental prerequisite for the effective functioning of high-technology, sophisticated and 
capital-intensive industries (such as the exploration, security and production of crude oil) are stable 
political environments.54 
 
Political, and economic, stability is a crucial element to secure risk-averse flows of inward foreign 
direct investment, and eases the burden placed upon international investors with regard to the 
physical and commercial protection of their property.55  Sub-Saharan Africa, however, presents a 
very unique case vis-‘a-vis such assumptions due to the fact that an extraordinary sum of all inward 
FDI to the region tends to be directed toward recipients who score very poorly on stability and 
security.  These trends in the allocation of inward FDI shall be explicitly examined in the following 
chapters, yet it is fitting to note now that due to the extremely high strategic premium placed upon 
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oil in the international system, traditional political-economic assumptions are effectively overridden 
in order to secure and exploit the region’s oil reserves.   
 
Security, however, must still be accounted for, even in situations in which SSA governments lack the 
legitimacy and capacity to provide conducive political and economic environments for the interests 
of foreign investors – and it is here, specifically, in which the international PSI finds its niche role in 
the political economy of the SSA region.  This argument essentially alludes to the very structure and 
nature of sub-Saharan African petro-states, in which ‘governance’, in many cases, merely 
demarcates city-borders – as opposed to the state as a whole – resulting in major security vacuums 
throughout the region.56  Cilliers and Mason succinctly capture these dynamics by arguing that “... 
the reality of weak African states creates an environment in which companies must provide not only 
their own infrastructure... but also private security forces capable of protecting their property and 
employees.”57 
 
The ways in which such security arrangements are made generally include three sets of actors, 
namely key officials from the host-state government, executive figures stemming from transnational 
oil interests and the members of from interested private military and security companies who 
tender their services.  A key intervening actor, however, are the smaller oil-exploration companies 
which tend to initiate the broader business ties with PMSCs, and which are later incorporated into 
the security arrangements of the larger oil-production companies.  Due to the relatively high risk 
involved in oil exploration operations – commercially and physically – large multinational oil 
companies, who are in many ways financially dependent upon maintaining a decent public profile 
due to investor sentiment, remain reluctant to operate in politically-sensitive, or conflict-prone, 
environments.58  Such risks, however, are attractive to smaller, non-publicly listed, exploration 
companies which thrive in such high-risk high-reward contexts.   
 
Through her assessment of a pioneering, albeit notorious, former South African private military 
company, Executive Outcomes, with regard to their operations in Angola, Khareen Pech asserts that 
the commercial strategies of oil exploration firms generally take the form of a four-tiered approach 
vis-‘a-vis larger production companies, PMSCs and national host governments:  Firstly, oil 
exploration companies focus their efforts on procuring and marketing the concessions they gain as 
best they can in order to be most attractive to larger, transnational, mining interests.  Following this, 
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based upon the attractiveness of a potential investment, established oil multinationals are drawn to 
the host country and begin to the lay the groundwork for their future operations.  Thirdly, the PMSC 
which initially partnered with the exploration company in securing the concession generally wins 
follow-on contracts in the security arrangement of the larger multinational oil-producing company.  
Lastly, the exploration company which would sell the initial concessions secures a percentage of the 
profits of the mining - and in certain instances the security – operations which take place as a result 
of their initial investment.59  Pech sums up her assessment by adding that “... in this way, the 
proprietors of military firms like E.O. [Executive Outcomes]... are paid in cash by major strategic 
resource corporations and [are] given rights to land and mineral concessions by political leaders...”60 
 
It is with respect to the observations of Pech that a relatively new and profound unfolding of the 
political economies of sub-Saharan African petro-states can be understood.  This relatively new 
political economy bears witness to the large-scale imposition of market forces upon the incapacities 
of regional governments to provide the requisite security needed for the exploitation and 
commercialisation of the region’s abundant reserves of scarce, and strategically vital, natural 
resources, specifically crude oil.  Within this scenario, a great internal demand for security is 
generated by regional governments, eager to secure large sums of otherwise unattainable inward 
foreign direct investment – and similarly to enjoy their new found positions of power based upon 
their changing circumstances. 
 
These developments, however, come coupled with a range of potentially disastrous consequences 
with regard to the natural political and economic development of sub-Saharan African petro-states.  
Whilst economic growth could very possibly be spurred by the arrival of large-scale foreign 
investment, noting the cases of countries such as Libya and Malaysia, economic and political 
development may be far more elusive – especially given the political context of sub-Saharan Africa.61  
Historically, the SSA region has had a tragic relationship with the international neo-liberal capitalist 
project, with many of the reforms advocated and imposed by international financial institutions 
resulting in the short-sighted privatisation of public utilities, declining service provision and 
manufacturing, the collapse of real wages and the middle-class and the proliferation of slums 
throughout the region.62   
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Moreover, the most noticeable consequences of these developments have been the rise of enclave 
economies, which have worked to service the international economy through the provision of 
primary commodities, yet have maintained very little linkage with the region’s domestic economies.  
Carmody and Owusu build upon the ideas of Castells and Ferguson in which they outline the 
parameters of Africa’s structural inclusion and exclusion in the global economy, noting the high 
economic linkage and structural relevance of certain ‘enclaves’ on the continent, in opposition to the 
growing disparity and isolation of these centres vis-‘a-vis their own national and regional economies.  
Carmody and Owusu underscore the crux of these issues by positing: 
While Manuel Castells... conceived of much of Africa as a ‘black hole of informational capitalism’, 
structurally excluded from global accumulation, African territory is now being reconfigured as a 
‘space between’ inclusion and exclusion, reflective of the broader dialectics of globalisation.  As 
James Ferguson... notes, global investment does not flow but ‘hops’, linking the oil rich enclave of 
Cabinda in Angola with centres of Western capitalism... to the exclusion of other parts of the 
country.
63
 
 
The international oil industry, as referred to by Watts, is the paradigmatic case of these so-called 
enclaves scattered throughout the SSA region; he notes that, historically, the majority of all inward 
FDI to the continent was essentially monopolised by a handful of mining-energy economies – whilst 
the remainder was left relatively untouched.64  The result, as argued by Watts, is a “bleak world of 
military neo-liberalism”, in which he points to the nature of these enclave economies as heavily 
fortified points of accumulation, with a specific focus upon the centrality of extraction and primary 
commodity production.65  Such economies have had a noticeably deleterious effect upon the 
legitimacy of regional governments, by breeding environments in which youthful populations 
become increasingly disenchanted and disillusioned with the status-quo – on account of the general 
failure of equitable revenue-sharing from the exploitation and commercialisation of their country’s 
natural resources.66  Subsequently, enclave economies have been argued to exacerbate existing 
tensions and conflicts, thereby indirectly working toward undermining political stability, and driving 
up the value of security in regional and state contexts. 
 
Adding to these concerns is the fact that the newly unfolding political economy of sub-Saharan 
Africa is further characterised by the increased bargaining power of the region’s major oil-producing 
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states.  Due to the increased strategic value of the region, in conjunction with the increased global 
competition for the endorsement of regional oil-producers by the global South, the potency of the 
former Western-driven economic model of externally imposed conditionalities vis-‘a-vis good 
governance in exchange for aid, assistance and improved international relations has become 
significantly diluted.67  Sub-Saharan African governments are now increasingly able to acquire 
financial assistance, training and military hardware from international emerging powers (keen to 
improve their relations with region’s oil-producers), and are subsequently increasingly capable of 
fending off pressure from the West regarding political and economic reform.68  Even without the 
competition emanating from the global South, Frynas and Paulo argue that a number of SSA 
countries, such as Equatorial Guinea and Angola, have managed to defy the will of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions for years, due to the finance they were able to obtain from oil rents (or oil-
backed loans) through business arrangements made with Western firms and banks – arrangements 
devoid of any conditionalities whatsoever.69 
 
What these developments have essentially produced is an environment in which authoritarianism in 
the region can far more easily remain entrenched, and one in which regimes come to be increasingly 
less dependent upon their domestic constituencies for support and legitimacy.  Most importantly, 
however, political stability is undermined as excluded domestic actors witness fewer legitimate 
means in which to express their concerns and seek political and economic change.  This 
consequently leads to the proliferation of militias, terrorist activity and a seeming legitimisation of, 
and recourse to, violence as a means to express discontent and political preferences.  To this effect, 
Englebert and Ron posit that in situations with “...few legal economic alternatives, violent resource 
plunder for survival and enrichment becomes a rational recourse for young males.”70  Thus, 
politically motivated violence has arguably become a key defining feature of sub-Saharan Africa’s 
evolving political economy – exacerbating existing regional cleavages and conflict whilst driving up 
the market demand for security by a myriad set of external and internal actors. 
 
By attempting to understand the Nigerian oil complex as a microcosm of the new political economy 
of sub-Saharan African petro-states, Watts highlights the “volatile mix of forces” which gives shape 
to the many features of such conflict-prone states:  On one level, due to the geostrategic interest in 
oil, national military forces are inevitably involved in servicing the interests of regimes vis-‘a-vis the 
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quelling of uprisings, dealing with rebel groups and preserving the status-quo.  Secondly, 
multinational oil groups become involved in the national context through their activities in the 
domestic service sector, with particular regard to issues surrounding corporate social responsibility 
and stakeholder inclusion.  Thirdly, as a result of contentious political issues stemming from the 
control, ownership and rights surrounding oil, a host of local political forces emerge, such as ethnic 
militias and separatist movements, who concern themselves with how their country’s oil wealth is to 
be deployed and used.  Further adding to the equation are the operations of local and international 
civil society, which attempt to draw attention to the plight of the states in which they are concerned 
- and traditionally tend to focus upon transnational advocacy, issues of transparency and human 
rights abuses.  Fifth, International governmental organisations, multilateral development agencies 
and international financial institutions such as export credit agencies and the International Monetary 
Fund are another set of actors which have a major effect upon the nature and structure of the 
political economies of SSA petro states.  Finally, illegal and illicit activities play a significant role in 
this environment, with specific reference to the growth of the regional black economy and 
mercenary activity.71 
 
The interaction of all these forces serve to produce a highly combustible political and economic 
climate and, with reference to the experience of Nigeria, Watts posits that the result has been to 
make the oil-producing region of the Niger Delta much more ungovernable – as numerous local 
political forces have come to assume a much more militant posture in their struggle over oil.72  On a 
more systemic level, however, the role of oil multinationals and external actors are argued to 
reinforce social identities, as their presence often constitutes a challenge to pre-existing customary 
forms of community and inter-ethnic relations – as well as local state institutions.73  These 
challenges often manifest in the form of land and property disputes which lead to popular 
mobilisation over new grievances, as well as political struggles aimed at accessing corporate and 
federal petro-revenues.74  Even in cases in which national oil reserves are located offshore, and in 
deep waters, political stability remains elastic upon local, militant, political forces – and is similarly 
prone to be pulled into conflict.  The only notable difference between onshore and offshore reserves 
of oil vis-‘a-vis politically-motivated violence is that conflict will tend to concentrate within a capital 
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city, as control over the state (as opposed to provincial territories) will ensure the capture of oil 
revenues.75   
 
An interesting argument put forward by Ross contends that in poorly governed national 
environments, the presence and operation of large oil multinationals may actually spur the direct 
formation of private militias and criminal groups for their own ends – as the effective clients of illicit 
violence as opposed to playing victim.76  He suggests that in contexts characterised by great 
insecurity and weak rule of law and property rights, large multinationals deal with their environment 
by offering lucrative opportunities for extortion to illicit groups, thereby directing the formation of 
militia.  This is possible due to the advantage large multinational firms possess in terms of the 
associated profits that accompany resource extraction (as opposed to manufacturing and service 
sector companies) which allow the operations of these multinationals to proceed, by paying off rebel 
groups for the private enforcement of their property whilst still earning a profit.77  Subsequently, 
extralegal organisations – premised upon seeking ‘protection rights’ – proliferate, leading to the 
weakening of whatever little state legitimacy remained in terms of rule of law.78  This results in the 
growing centrality of resource extraction, as a proportion of all local commercial activity, due to 
extraordinarily high transaction costs faced by non-resource firms; whilst, arguably, legitimising the 
illicit role of violence, and threat of force, as a functional alternative to operate in poor legal 
environments.  Ross asserts that such scenarios may help to explain why resource extraction has 
thrived in political-economic contexts in which the rest of the economy and rule of law have 
generally broken down; he provides the examples of Colombia, Congo-Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville 
and Nigeria amongst others to highlight his argument.79 
 
These features of the unfolding political economy of sub-Saharan African petro-states are inevitably 
more characteristic of certain states in the region than they are of others, however, a surprising 
number of these countries have all followed very similar paths akin to the Nigerian experience.  
Equatorial Guinea stands out as prime example in which the effects of oil have resulted in the same 
volatile mix of actors, described above, accompanied by unprecedented rates of economic growth, 
massive sums of inward FDI, the entrenchment of the country’s authoritarian ruling class, and a 
proliferation of local political forces which have become increasingly militant.  Brendan McSherry 
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highlights the fact that by 2006, the phenomenal economic growth experienced by Equatorial 
Guinea – on account of its recent oil boom coupled with its small population - resulted in a gross 
domestic product per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity) of an astonishing $50240 (U.S.) – 
resulting in the country being the second wealthiest country in the world, per person, behind 
Luxembourg.80   
 
These figures could not be more misleading; however, as the Equato-Guinean political- economic 
environment is characterised by immense inequality between the ruling elite and the larger 
population.  Indicative of an enclave economy, the benefits of the country’s recent ‘development’ 
have been concentrated within a very small elite, whilst the country’s deep-water, capital-intensive, 
oil industry generally employs few foreign migrants, maintains very little economic linkage with the 
domestic economy and depends on most of its inputs from abroad – resulting in minimal trickle-
down benefits accruing to the masses.81  Most significantly, however, is the fact that inward FDI to 
the country has paid little attention to the country’s political history of entrenched authoritarianism, 
political instability and ethnic conflict, insofar that one of the world’s ‘quintessential criminal states’ 
managed to attract and secure more investment than many of its better governed, secure and 
politically and economically stable sub-Saharan African counterparts.82   
 
Despite the fact that the country has provided one of the most shocking records of corruption, 
human rights abuses, and poor governance (in all it’s many and varied dimensions), since the mid-
1990s, in which the oil multinational Mobil struck oil at its offshore Zafiro prospecting site, billions of 
dollars of investment have been directed at Equatorial Guinea, dramatically raising it’s commercial 
and geostrategic significance in international oil and security politics.83  Underscoring the relegation 
of governance, democracy and human rights to the forces of strategic and economic Realpolitik, the 
United States has consistently worked to improve its relations with Equatorial Guinea, noting a 
number of high-level bilateral meetings and the reopening of its embassy in Malabo.84  McSherry 
argues that the effects of these trends create an environment in which Equatorial Guinea’s policy-
making and institutional development will remain poor, following in the footsteps of other regional 
oil-producing states such as Nigeria, Gabon and Angola.85   Adding to this, as observed by Ross, is the 
tendency for states, which are heavily dependent upon their leading economic sector, to develop 
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specialised institutions, authorities and mechanisms to tap into the large, concentrated, revenues 
which the sector produces.86  The governance of this sector often results in all other economic 
sectors being disregarded, as political leaders often fail or are discouraged from developing the 
necessary institutions and infrastructure to address the needs, and promote the development, of 
less profitable sectors.87  Ross posits that the end result is often a case in which the state 
erroneously “conflates the narrow short-term interests of the leading sector with the broader long-
term interests of the nation.”88   
  
Thus the strengthening of enclave economies can be seen to weaken government accountability vis-
‘a-vis its citizenry as state revenues become dependent upon the investment and endorsement of 
external actors, as opposed to the development of domestic tax bases.  Indeed, the ruling classes of 
enclave economy-based states do not at all depend on widespread domestic economic activity or 
productivity for their sustenance.89  This has certainly been the case amongst sub-Saharan Africa’s 
oil-producing states, noting the lack of strong state extractive institutions, poor investment in public 
goods and the decline of institutional quality and efforts aimed at state building, national integration 
and economic development.90  Carmody and Owusu add to this argument by noting that: 
Rents generated from enclaves let governments bypass their populations, and militate against the 
construction of tax or social contracts, a key source of state accountability.
91
 
 
Accordingly, oil revenues have served to consolidate the personal rule of many regime’s in the 
region by increasing the repressive capacities of the state by centralising its resources, and thereby 
imposing major costs to the development of democracy and political stability.92  Furthermore 
existing state networks of personalised patronage are strengthened, to the exclusion and 
disillusionment of the deprived and underdeveloped masses.  Subsequently, the causal mechanism 
between the development of enclave economies and civil violence, conflict and stability becomes 
clearer.  Therefore, it can be argued that the subjugation of principle to expediency, on the part of 
external actors, is indeed another key defining element of sub-Saharan Africa’s newly developing 
political economy, which does not in any way bode well for the political and institutional 
development of the region.  These developments, however, serve to reinforce existing trends in the 
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allocation of inward FDI to the region, inflate the market demand for regional security, and 
subsequently bolster the relevance and legitimacy of the international PSI.        
 
Private security will organically evolve and develop to meet the demands of external and internal 
actors within the region, and will come to play a decisive role in the political economies of sub-
Saharan African petro states and the region in general.  Due to the nature of, and linkage between, 
governance, violent conflict and inward FDI to the region’s strategically critical oil-producing enclave 
economies, it can be argued that the imposition of the market upon security will inevitably serve an 
increasingly core role in facilitating the interests of regional governments and multinational oil 
interests; as well as those of all intervening actors stemming from civil society groups to NGOs and 
even international intergovernmental organisations and agencies.  The provision of security can 
subsequently be understood as a critical element of the bedrock of the region’s developing political 
economy, and it is in this way which the internal market demand for private security in the sub-
Saharan African region is derived.  When the overall elements of this demand are viewed holistically, 
by accounting for each of the external and internal elements, the significance of the international PSI 
in SSA can not be overlooked due to the increasingly influential roles that private military and 
security companies will come to play in defining a new regional political economy.  It must be 
provided, however, that before any major assumptions can be made, with regard to any qualitative 
and quantitative analyses, a review of the key theories and paradigms which have sought to 
understand the political economies of resource rich developing states must first be presented. 
 
2.3 Relevant Theoretical and Conceptual Constructs vis-‘a-vis the Political Economy of Resource 
Rich Developing States 
Of the most prominent and influential ideas which have attempted to theoretically frame the ways 
in which natural resource wealth affects the economic and institutional development of developing 
states, the resource curse hypothesis has certainly proven to be one of the most durable conceptual 
constructs.  This aptly titled curse denotes the assertions of many scholars which contend that 
developing countries with abundant natural resources often suffer from poor governance and 
irresponsible economic behaviour.93  The underlying logic behind the resource curse has generated 
countless quantitative studies and qualitative assessments of the political economies of developing 
states, and has further been employed, as a conceptual approach, toward understanding civil wars 
and the linkages between primary commodity dependency and armed rebellion.94  Indeed most 
political economists and social scientists acknowledge the relevance of the resource curse in 
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explaining, to differing degrees, however, the similar political-economic paths followed by many of 
the world’s resource rich developing states – insofar that many other theories essentially fall under 
the greater rubric of the resource curse.   
 
Ross provides critical insight into many of the different, yet seemingly complimentary, dimensions of 
the resource curse discourse in which he distinguishes the most notable economic and political 
explanations for the curse, as well as by commenting on a few relatively recent additions to the basic 
theory.  Ross delineates these explanations further by asserting that the four most prominent 
economic explanations stem from: 
- A decline in the terms of trade for primary commodities 
- The instability of international commodity markets 
- The poor linkages between resource and non-resource sectors, and 
- An economic phenomenon generally referred to as Dutch Disease95 
Building upon the work of Prebisch and Singer, Ross contends that due to the falling international 
prices of primary commodities relative to manufactured goods and services, resource rich 
developing states will find it increasingly difficult to match the growth and development of the rich 
industrialised nations – resulting in wider economic disparities within the international system.96   
 
Exacerbating these concerns is the fact that commodity markets tend to be much more volatile, and 
subject to sharp price fluctuations, increasing the risk and subsequent financial insecurity of 
commodity dependent economies – subsequently leading to exceptionally risky macroeconomic 
environments for private investment.97  Moreover, the resource curse adds to the enclave economy 
debate by accounting for the operations of large resource multinationals, as posited by Ross: 
... Resource industries [are] unlikely to stimulate growth in the rest of the economy, 
particularly if foreign multinationals dominated resource extraction and [are] allowed to 
repatriate their profits instead of investing them locally.  Resource exporters would be left 
with booming resource enclaves that produced few ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ linkages to 
other parts of the economy.98 
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Finally, a peculiar economic affliction experienced by resource rich developing states which has 
come to be termed “Dutch Disease” has further credited the basic premise of the resource curse, by 
underscoring the effects of a resource boom upon a country’s real exchange rate and the rising 
production costs in its non-resource sectors.  What has generally been noted amongst states said to 
be afflicted by Dutch Disease is that the increased export of its primary commodities results is the 
strengthening of its real exchange rate, therefore increasing the costs (and discouraging the growth) 
of its non-resource related exports in the manufacturing and service sectors of its economy.99  
Accompanying this is a tendency for the booming resource sector to draw upon capital and labour 
from other productive economic sectors, effectively working to their detriment as production costs 
in these sectors rise – skewing domestic economic efficiency and productivity.100 
 
Apart from these economic explanations for the poor political-economic performance of resource 
rich developing states, Ross highlights the three most notable aspects of the political dimension of 
the resource curse, namely: 
- Cognitive explanations which revolve around the idea that natural resource wealth, and 
specifically resource booms, in developing states produce a sense of short-sightedness 
among policy-makers 
- Societal explanations which emphasise the fact that resource exports tend to empower 
sectors, classes, or interest groups that favour growth-impeding policies, and 
- State-centred explanations which deal primarily with the way in which resource booms tend 
to weaken state institutions.101 
These political explanations, while less quantitatively testable, are especially important in 
understanding the policy failures of governments in addressing the economic concerns faced by 
resource rich developing states.  Ross asserts that such theories are part of a larger effort to develop 
generalisable theories dealing with “... the proclivity of states to adopt and maintain transparently 
suboptimal economic policies.”102  Specifically, such theories endeavour to establish a conceptual 
framework that remains cognisant of the fact that, in many cases, governments do have the policy 
tools at their disposal to effectively mitigate many economic difficulties, yet very often fail to act in 
this manner. 
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Cognitive explanations for the resource curse, which have largely fallen out of fashion due lack of 
analytical support, were popular in the 1950s and 1960 by development scholars, advocated that 
resource rents produce a sense of myopia amongst policy-makers.103  Accordingly, due to the 
difficulty in constructing a quantifiable and testable theory which takes into account the short-
sightedness of certain actors as a key variable, cognitive explanations have fallen out of favour by 
academics, yet remain an important insight to more descriptive assessments of the resource curse.  
Societal explanations, on the other hand, argue that resource booms tend to increase the political 
clout of actors which often favour policies that impede the growth of their domestic economies.104  
These theories often draw upon the experiences of resource rich Latin American countries which 
maintained their import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) policies, long after they became counter-
productive, vis-‘a-vis a number of East Asian countries which faced little opposition in the 
reorientation of their economic policies toward aggressive export-led growth.105  While these cases 
may support societal-level approaches to the resource curse, based upon the opposition faced by 
Latin American policy-makers by manufacturers and workers who enjoyed resource-based subsidies, 
these explanations face great difficulty in qualifying robust generalisations which can be employed 
as a theory to other cases.106  
 
Finally, state-centred explanations for the resource curse focus specifically upon the way in which 
resource wealth affects state institutions, and the government’s subsequent ability to promote 
economic growth.  These explanations often constitute a hybrid of many other explanations for the 
resource curse, and, arguably, provide the greatest conceptual element to the aims of this paper.  A 
central pillar of state-centred explanations of the resource curse is the concept of the rentier state, 
which denotes a national environment in which the majority of all government revenues are derived 
from external sources - such as resource rents or foreign aid.107  In such scenarios, governments 
depend less upon their citizenry as the need to develop domestic tax bases becomes less pressing 
vis-‘a-vis external externally-derived revenues, leading to governments becoming less accountable to 
those they govern.108  By building upon the ideas of Mahdavy and Shambayati, Ross posits: 
Mahdavy, who first advanced the rentier-state concept, argues that resource rents make state 
officials both myopic and risk-averse: upon receiving large windfalls, he suggests, governments 
grow irrationally optimistic about future revenues and “devote the greater part of their resources 
to jealously guarding the status quo” instead of promoting development.  Shambayati suggests that 
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rentier states face little social pressure to improve their economic policies, since their low taxes and 
generous welfare programs discourage opposition groups from mobilising around economic 
issues.
109
 
 
Basedau and Lacher posit that the rentier effect can further be understood as the figurative carrot 
which state elites use to impede armed opposition and the growth of dissidents, by buying off 
demands and opposition.110  Working in conjunction with the associated figurative stick of the 
repression effect, in which governments utilise their large resource-derived revenues to quell 
opposition through large-scale spending on security, state elites may distribute resource wealth 
through personal ties and networks – often to the detriment of the general population.111 
 
In addition to these aspects of the economic and political explanations of the resource curse, Ross 
asserts that the curse can additionally be understood in terms of the dominance of state-owned 
enterprises, in developing states, which generally govern resource extraction industries, as well as by 
the archetypal poor property rights and rule of law in such states.112  Whilst the latter issue has been 
dealt with in the previous sections of this chapter, it is interesting to note that state ownership of 
the key enterprises involved in the resource extraction of developing states has indeed played a 
major role in influencing the quality of governance and economic policy of these states.   
 
With reference to the wave of nationalisation of resource extractive firms for much of the 1950s 
through to the mid-1970s, Ross contends that developing state governments became much more 
exposed to the risks and shocks of international commodity markets, as foreign oil multinationals 
effectively served as buffers in this regard.113  Sub-Saharan African states certainly do lend credit to 
these arguments, as most regional petro-states maintain a statutory monopoly over mineral 
exploitation and have structured their respective oil industries by means of state oil companies 
which enter into collaborative ventures with foreign oil MNCs.114  The effects of these last two issues 
upon the quality of governance and economic policy are, however, contentious and require a 
greater deal of support from quantitative and qualitative studies – yet should not detract from the 
more established economic and political dimensions of the resource curse.   
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2.4 The Political Economy of Inward Foreign Direct Investment to sub-Saharan Africa 
There have been numerous studies conducted in recent years which have dealt with the social, 
political and institutional factors which possess a significant influence on the determination of 
foreign direct investment.  This area of research has been spurred by many global developments, of 
which the shift toward economic globalisation features most prominently – as international capital 
flows are indeed a fundamental aspect of this phenomenon.115  The ability of host countries to 
attract foreign investment and appear as tempting destinations, to secure and sustain the interests 
of international capital is undeniably a critical feature of globalisation – especially to the countries of 
the developing world.  As far back as the early 1960’s, certain academics such as Basi (1963) have 
attempted to understand the relationship between variables, traditionally not attributed to the 
economic realm, such as political instability upon the determination of foreign investment.116  In 
recent years, the renewed interest in such studies, owing largely to the effects of economic 
globalisation, have further developed with increased specificity, and have grappled with 
understanding the importance of institutions in shaping the incentives necessary to attract foreign 
investment; as well as highlighting the significance of institutional quality upon the investment 
decisions of foreign actors in deciding where to invest.117  
 
The general consensus which emerges from a review of recent studies is that countries which 
possess good institutions will attract more FDI, a prescription which has been vigorously supported 
and advocated by policy reformers across the world.118  Whilst a fair number of studies, however, 
refute this finding, such papers have largely been criticised over their inconclusive evidence on 
account of error, stemming not only from measurement concerns but dually on account of ill-
defined and ill-devised conceptual and methodological frameworks.119  These issues, along with 
controlling for endogeneity, generally point to the major limitations of attempting to map the 
causality of cross-national policy and non-policy, economic and institutional, variables upon 
measures of foreign direct investment.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the statistical observations of this paper are fundamentally premised on the 
findings of much more comprehensive studies which have used much larger global datasets to 
determine this relationship; and as pointed out, this paper supports the finding, as reported by Ali et 
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al that “... institutions are a highly significant and robust determinant of FDI.  [And] that the impact 
of institutions on FDI is comparable to that of macroeconomic stability...”120  In line with this 
hypothesis is the observation that institutions have come to be increasingly understood by foreign 
investors as a vital component of the locational advantages of potential host countries.  As 
elaborated upon by Bevan et al “[Institutions] form part of the ‘created assets’ of countries, and 
have arguably become increasingly significant relative to more conventional ‘natural assets’, like raw 
material or cheap labour.”121   
 
As such, it is generally noted that well governed sovereign territories, with strong institutions - 
despite a lack of more conventional, classical-economic, factor endowments – can shape the 
incentives faced by foreign investors and subsequently influence the magnitude of inward FDI.  This 
paper, however, begs the question of how true is this for sub-Saharan Africa?  Could the region’s 
natural institutional development – specifically regarding good governance – be enough to influence 
the locational choices of the investment decisions of foreign actors, or do more conventional 
‘natural assets’ matter more due to the region’s relative underdevelopment vis-‘a-vis the world 
mean?  The positioning of this exercise in the broader study of the private security industry is 
especially relevant here, given the significance attached to institutions and governance by previous 
studies.  What has been observed in the SSA region over the past two decades has been the 
operations of private military and security contractors, which effectively give rise to small territorial 
‘pockets’ in the region characterised by large inward flows of FDI – and allow these heavily invested 
foreign pockets to be more or less dislocated from the domestic economies of SSA host countries.  
This is a growing trend which could be arguably exacerbated over time, as the PSI essentially fills the 
void created by political instability, lawlessness and weak institutions, subsequently undercutting 
what would otherwise be an urgent need for host nation governments to pursue institutional reform 
and stimulate economic growth. 
 
Remaining cognisant of the operations of the PSI, the above logic could be extended to argue that 
due to the natural resource wealth of SSA, with specific regard to the strategic value of oil in the 
international system, the importance of institutional development vis-‘a-vis inward FDI is somewhat 
mitigated.  This subsequently gives rise to a situation whereby regional adherents of good policy are 
not ‘rewarded’ sufficiently for their efforts through increased inward flows of foreign direct 
investment, in opposition to poorly governed (albeit resource rich and oil producing) countries who 
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facilitate the asset and resource seeking interests of foreign capital.  The extent to which 
institutional quality, and good governance, influence inward FDI therefore matters not only to the 
short term attraction of foreign capital and the potential economic growth this could spur, but more 
importantly regarding the incentives faced by all countries in the region to pursue institutional 
development and practice good governance.  The long-term implications of the latter would 
invariably lead to market sophistication and diversified flows of FDI to the region, which would come 
to seek not only resources but also to gain from in the region’s growing markets, and possible 
region-specific comparative efficiencies.  Thus, the significance of institutions and policy-related 
variables associated with governance, upon inward FDI flows, of the sub-Saharan African region 
cannot be understated, and subsequently informs the cross-national descriptive analysis, and 
methodological choices presented in the next chapter. 
 
The theory that underlies the study of the many policy and institutional variables of this paper has 
been drawn from the growing, and increasingly relevant, literature surrounding institutional theory, 
and more specifically, new institutional economics.  Where the former “... emphasises the influences 
of the systems surrounding organisations that shape social and organisational behaviour”, and is 
inclusive of both the economic and sociological orientations of these institutional forces; whilst the 
latter focuses upon the relations between institutions and firms, which arise from market 
imperfections.122  Due to the emphasis on market imperfections, the new institutional economics 
provides a fitting conceptual framework for the study of institutional and policy-related variables 
upon inward FDI in the sub-Saharan African region, which is characterised by generally 
underdeveloped economic markets.   
 
In his seminal work “Institutions, institutional change and economic performance”, North argues 
that “... institutions provide the rules of the game that structure human interactions in societies... 
[And that]... the role of institutions in an economy is to reduce both transaction and information 
costs through reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable structure that facilitates 
interactions”.123  A key component of North’s argument is his proposition that, due to the 
incomplete information that parties at opposite ends of economic exchange have about each other, 
transaction costs invariably include a risk premium – which he argues is a function of institutional 
quality.124  This argument is premised on the idea that the extent to which such costs contain this 
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risk largely depends on how well contracts or agreements can be enforced, as well as the degree of 
property rights protection, and the odds of defection by either party.125  Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the risk premium dually determines the scale of economic exchange in an economy 
such that “... when property rights are poorly protected and contracts of enforcement is difficult, 
then the risk premium will be high and economic activity will be limited to direct interpersonal 
exchange rather than complex impersonal trade.”126 
 
The theoretical positions outlined above serve well to highlight a number of significant issues 
relating back to the broader study of the private security industry in sub-Saharan Africa.  Firstly, the 
PSI arguably caters to the risk premium, mentioned above, which forms a core component of the 
transaction costs of the mineral and oil extractive industries of sub-Saharan Africa; which, as 
elaborated upon by North, is a function of institutional quality.  Due to the high levels of market 
failure associated with the region’s developing economies, foreign investors looking to capitalise on 
the region’s strategically important oil reserves invariably face much greater uncertainty in their 
economic dealings than would be faced in other regions of the world.  It is within this context that 
the PSI plays a critical role.  Secondly, since many of the business arrangements made in the oil 
industry generally involve foreign interests (in the form of multinational mining corporations) and 
the government of the host country, the PSI would be implicitly mandated to seek to reduce 
economic uncertainty by ensuring that the host government itself does not defect from any 
agreements and contractual obligations.   
 
It would therefore not be too far a stretch of the imagination to extend this logic by equating these 
trends to the effective ‘propping up’ of host nation ruling regimes and governments in order to 
maintain the domestic stability needed to serve transnational economic interests – arguably at the 
expense of the natural institutional development of the host country.  Lastly, North’s proposition 
that the size of the risk premium also serves to determine the scale of economic exchange in an 
economy is an especially interesting observation with regard to the oil industry in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The fact that private security contractors operate in many of these countries underscores the 
fact that the institutional quality of these sovereign territories are characterised by poorly protected 
property rights and a large degree of difficulty regarding contract enforcement.  North predicts that 
the risk premium will be high and economic activity will be limited to direct interpersonal exchange 
as opposed to complex impersonal trade; which, for the most part, is a fairly accurate portrayal of 
many oil-producing sub-Saharan African economies.  This position finds credit in the 
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acknowledgement that these oil-producing economies are largely dislocated from the general 
domestic economies of their respective states, and are further characterised by high levels of direct 
interpersonal economic exchange between government authorities and representatives of foreign 
oil interests and private security companies. 
 
The key issue that emerges from this discussion is that institutions and policy-related variables, 
dealing specifically with governance, impact the profitability of host countries, through the reduction 
of transaction and production costs and their associated levels of business uncertainty, thereby 
representing a notable locational advantage for the operations of multinational corporations and 
inward foreign direct investment.127  The concept of locational advantage essentially points to the 
properties or features of countries which make them attractive destinations for foreign direct 
investment.128  The initial literature on locational advantage was heavily influenced by more classical 
economic concepts such as factor endowments-based theories which stressed the significance of 
labour costs and productivity; this, however, has given way in recent years to a more inclusive 
approach which incorporates many of the key tenets of institutional theory.   
 
As posited by Dunning, certain developments in the contemporary global economy have augmented 
the perceptions of foreign investors with regard to locational advantages such that they increasingly 
prefer territories which boast well developed economic as well as institutional facilities.129  
Furthermore, “... the focus of multinational enterprises has reportedly shifted from traditional 
locational advantages [such as] labour cost or the availability of natural resources to so-called 
creative locational advantages which include knowledge-based assets [such as] infrastructure and 
institutions.”130  The institutional environment has therefore emerged in recent years as critical 
underpinning of a country’s locational advantage, as the success of the expansion of market 
capitalism through out the international system has increasingly come to be understood as being 
hinged upon effective supporting institutions which can provide the formal and informal ‘rules of the 
game’ to facilitate its growth.131   
 
An interesting observation by Bevan et al asserts that: 
Institutions are important locational advantages in international business because they [represent the 
major immobile factors in a globalised market].  Legal, political and administrative systems tend to be 
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the internationally immobile framework whose costs determine [the] international attractiveness of a 
location.  Institutions affect the capacity of firms to interact and therefore affect the relative 
transaction and coordination costs of production and innovation.
132
 
 
By extending this argument, the growth of the PSI in sub-Saharan Africa can therefore be 
understood as a means for foreign capital to circumvent, certain ‘immobile factors’ of the globalised 
market in order to gain hold of strategically significant commodities such as oil.  Specifically, the 
growth and evolution of the PSI, in sub-Saharan Africa over the past two decades, can subsequently 
be viewed as the manifestation of the market to effectively turn a traditionally ‘immobile factor’ 
which has not been conducive to the strategic interests of certain international actors into 
something which is mobile – and better governed by the market forces of supply and demand.  The 
security function of otherwise poorly governed sovereign territories in SSA is essentially outsourced 
and privatised in order to accommodate the international interests of asset and resource seeking 
inward FDI in the region.  Subsequently, the institutional component of locational advantage in sub-
Saharan Africa is diluted and is arguably less significant, as countries with poor institutional 
capacities can still appear to be much more attractive to inward foreign direct investment than their 
better governed counterparts, on account of factor endowments such as oil wealth - in conjunction 
with the operation of private security contractors, to privately secure and service those investments.    
 
In order to gauge the legitimacy of these arguments in relation to the political economy of inward 
FDI in sub-Saharan Africa, the next chapter, employs statistical methods in order to determine the 
relative strength of institutional and policy-related variables (as well as more traditional 
macroeconomic variables) upon the locational choice of inward FDI – for the period 1996 to 2009.  
To this effect, the next chapter shall dually introduce the regression variables under consideration as 
well as descriptively analyse each univariate statistical distribution. 
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
 
 
 
The methods I employed to assess the effects of the international private security industry upon 
trends in the allocation of inward foreign direct investment to the sub-Saharan African region were 
inclusive of an initial quantitative analysis as well as a more descriptive qualitative assessment.  The 
quantitative analysis (presented in chapter 5) provides an empirical account of the strength of 
certain variables in the SSA region, throughout a significant period in the growth and development 
of the international PSI, which constitute the locational advantages of countries in the region.  The 
basic premise of this exercise, however, was to discover the strength of causality between policy and 
institutional variables in the SSA region upon levels of inward FDI, as opposed to variables stemming 
from oil and natural resource wealth.  Therefore, the core question informing this exercise was 
effectively: Which matters more?  Do well-governed SSA countries, who score well on governance, 
stability and security generally receive more inward FDI than their poorly governed, unstable and 
insecure regional counterparts?  Moreover, if this is in fact not the case, then where are foreign 
investments being concentrated within the region, and how are they being secured?  A qualitative 
assessment (presented in chapter 6) was then employed to descriptively assess these prior empirical 
observations and findings, and to further underscore the causal influence of the PSI in facilitating the 
interests of foreign capital into one of the SSA region’s politically unstable and institutionally weak 
petro-states. 
 
By examining the statistical association between key cross-national variables which have, based 
upon previous studies, been deemed to be significant to foreign investment inflows, the methods I 
employed sought to identify which factors, over the past fifteen years, have indeed possessed the 
greatest bearing over the locational choices of foreign actors.  In order to do this, I compiled and ran 
a number of different multivariate regressions (with 14 different model specifications in total) to 
gauge the causal strength of each independent and intervening variable upon inward foreign direct 
investment to all sub-Saharan African countries.  In this way, I aimed to account for whether 
‘traditional’ determinants of FDI, specifically those emphasised by institutional theory, were being 
possibly overridden in sub-Saharan Africa due to the expansion of PMSCs in supplanting the security 
functions of national governments.  Furthermore, this analysis laid the basis for me to answer the 
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question of whether normative economic prescriptions regarding the relationship between issues of 
governance and institutions vis-‘a-vis FDI were somewhat less potent in the region, especially when 
taking into account the vast sums of FDI which have gone to exceptionally poorly governed 
countries.  Moreover, the quantitative analysis along with the qualitative assessment allowed me to 
answer whether, due to these investment patterns, the political economy of the region created an 
investment environment which is far more conducive to the needs of asset (or resource) seeking FDI, 
attributable to powerful transnational oil and mining interests, as opposed to the market seeking 
and efficiency seeking dimensions of foreign investment. 
 
The major limitations of this exercise stem from the relatively small dataset under consideration, as 
well as controlling for endogeneity amongst the many intervening variables included in my study.  As 
with all regression model analysis, the greater the number of observations the greater the 
explanatory power of the model.  This is an especially pressing issue when applying such statistical 
methods to cross-national datasets, as the number of observations will invariably be limited to the 
number of countries one wishes to assess.  In the case of my research, I was limited to the number 
of countries within the sub-Saharan African region.  Due to this, the findings my regression analyses 
do not intend to be in any way suitable for inferred generalisations of the determinants of FDI for 
the larger global market.  Indeed, the analysis presented in chapter five is fundamentally premised 
on the findings and prescriptions of much more comprehensive, prior, analyses on the determinants 
of FDI.   
 
With specific regard to institutional quality, I acknowledge and support the consensus which 
emerges from a review of contemporary institutional-FDI studies, the majority of which posit that 
institutions possess a robust and significant influence on FDI.133  Furthermore, it has been noted that 
previous studies which have rejected any significant influence of institutions upon inward FDI have 
made use of relatively small samples, which pose the problem of underestimating the significance of 
certain variables especially if such variables exhibit limited variation within a particular sample.134  
Whilst the analysis presented in this paper engages the theory surrounding the determinants of FDI, 
it is due to the limitations posed by the aforementioned sampling issue that leads to a reaffirmation 
that my findings do not intend to be in any way suitable for inferred generalisations of the global 
market. 
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The rest of this chapter shall provide an account of my data collection, manipulation and descriptive 
statistical analysis, which informed the different model specifications I structured in my multivariate 
regression analysis.  The following section descriptively examines the statistical associations 
between a host of variables, relevant to the aims of this paper, by drawing from a number of 
legitimate datasets archived on the World Bank’s online dataBank research portal.  The preparation, 
manipulation and analysis of all data provided in this paper has been done so through the use of the 
“Emacs Speaks Statistics” extension of the open-source plain text editor “Emacs” in conjunction with 
the open-source statistical software “R”. 
 
Regression Variables 
3.1 Measures of Foreign Direct Investment 
The dependent variable of the analysis presented in this paper is the average of foreign direct 
investment net inflows, as shown in a country’s balance of payments in current U.S. dollars (for the 
period 1996 to 2009).  While this measure of inward FDI may seem controversial at first, in contrast 
to other measures expressed as a percentage of country’s gross domestic product or as a per capita 
value, the purpose of this exercise is to first and foremost illustrate which sovereign territories in the 
region are significant outliers in absolute terms.  In other words, this study is primarily interested in 
understanding the political economy of inward FDI in the region by identifying which countries 
possess such significant locational advantage that despite market size or GDP (which shall be 
controlled for in any case) are able to influence the locational choices of foreign investors, in 
absolute monetary terms, far more than their counterparts.  This factor shall inform the dependent 
variable of the regression analysis presented in chapter 5; however, measures of FDI expressed as a 
percentage of a country’s GDP will also be included for purposes of the descriptive univariate study 
in this section. 
 
All cross-national data for the region regarding foreign direct investment net inflows (BoP, current 
U.S. dollars) was sourced from the “World Development Indicators and Global Development 
Finance” database, on the World Bank’s online “dataBank” research portal.  This archive was in turn 
sourced from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments database which was further 
supplemented with data from the United Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development, in 
conjunction with official national sources.  The official definition of this variable reads:  
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest 
(10 per cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the 
investor.  It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short 
term capital as shown in the balance of payments.  This series shows net inflows (new investment 
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inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors.  Data are in current U.S. 
dollars.
135
 
 
The data for this variable was compiled into a spreadsheet and averaged for the years 1996 to 2009, 
and shall be referred to from this point onward simply as inward FDI.  Presented in figure 3.1 is the 
statistical distribution of inward FDI, with a simple dot chart generated in figure 3.3 in order to 
better visualise this distribution vis-‘a-vis each respective country in the sub-Saharan African region.  
Due to the shape of the distribution, a transformation of the data was deemed appropriate by using 
the natural logarithm of these values in the regression equations.  The decision to use the log of the 
average of inward FDI in the regression analysis finds a degree of conceptual credit when thinking 
that the change in the value of FDI amongst the observations may be more appropriately thought of 
as a percent change value as opposed to a change in the absolute value.  Figures 3.2 and 3.4 present 
the statistical distribution and a dot chart of the log of inward FDI respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The associated dot charts of these distributions work well with these density plots in roughly 
illustrating the general trends which have characterised inward FDI to the region.  As is indicative of 
the left skew in figure 3.1, the majority of countries in the region received similarly low amounts of 
inward FDI during this period, while a small number received very large amounts relative to the 
mean.  Figure 3.3 illustrates the magnitude of the differences between the greatest net receivers of 
inward FDI in the region, noticeably South Africa, Nigeria, Sudan, Angola and the Republic of Congo 
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Figure 3.2 Density Plot of the log of Inward FDI 
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in relation to all other sub-Saharan African countries, whilst figure 3.4 allows us to better gauge the 
relative differences of the net receipt inward FDI for all other states – the lowest receivers of which 
are illustrated as Burundi, the Comoros and Guinea Bissau.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To better put these finding into perspective, and add a monetary scale to these observations, it was 
calculated that the maximum net receiver of inward FDI during this period was South Africa with an 
average annual receipt of U.S. $3 211 290 704, whilst Burundi – the minimum receiver – netted an 
annual average of U.S. $ 1 377 052, and Namibia – the median observation of the distribution – 
similarly took in U.S. $ 132 111 054. 
Figure 3.3 Dot Chart of Inward FDI 
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For purely descriptive purposes, a dot chart of the annual average receipt of inward FDI expressed as 
a percentage of a country’s gross domestic product was generated for general comparison with the 
preferred measure of FDI discussed above.  This is presented in figure 3.5 in the appendix of this 
paper. 
 
As can be seen, the distribution is still left skewed and characterised by major outliers who attract 
far more FDI than the mean.  While South Africa’s position does not seem as extreme anymore due 
to its large economy, it is interesting to note that Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, and to a lesser extent, 
Lesotho are the major receivers of inward FDI – when considering this measure.  Again, to better 
place these observations in perspective, it was calculated that the greatest recipient of inward FDI as 
a percentage of GDP during this period was Equatorial Guinea with an average annual FDI share of 
its GDP standing at 27.21 percent.  At the other end of the scale is Gabon, whose average annual FDI 
share of GDP stood at 0.02 percent. 
Figure 3.4 Dot Chart of the log of Inward FDI 
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3.2 Institutional and Policy Variables relating to Governance 
The primary set of independent variables relating to measures of governance was drawn from the 
World Governance Indicators (WGI) database, again, archived online on the World Bank’s ‘dataBank’ 
research portal.  The WGI project essentially compiles and reports aggregate and individual 
governance indicators for over 200 economies, covering the period 1996 to 2009, and further 
classifies these indicators into six different dimensions – and subsequent measures – of governance, 
namely: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.136  These aggregate 
measures are compiled from the research and prescriptions of numerous enterprise, citizen and 
expert survey respondents in countries across the world, whilst the data which informs these 
aggregates are sourced from a host of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental and 
international organisations.137  Each dimension of governance captures a country’s score on the 
aggregate indicator which ranges from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.  The data on each of these 
dimensions of governance for all countries in sub-Saharan Africa was compiled and averaged for the 
years 1996 to 2009, whilst each of these dimensions are officially defined as follows:138 
1. Voice and Accountability captures the perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism captures perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism. 
3. Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
4. Regulatory quality captures the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. 
5. Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
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6. Control of Corruption captures the perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
capture of the state by elites and private interests. 
Each of these dimensions of governance were individually coded and analysed, in terms of their 
statistical distributions, by generating individual density plots, and in terms of the relative score of 
each observation (country in SSA) by generating dot charts – which are provided in the appendix of 
this paper.   
Upon closer inspection of the relationship between these dimensions of governance for the sub-
Saharan African region, it was found that the general multivariate correlations were so high that 
they should in turn be combined (through a simple average) such that a single, arguably all-
encompassing, single measure of governance can be used in the regression equations.  The scatter-
plot matrix presented in figure 3.6 visually illustrates these correlations for each respective 
dimension of governance, and justifies to a considerable extent the decision to combine the 
averages of each measure of governance for sub-Saharan African countries (for the period 1996-
2009) into the single ‘governance’ variable which was used in the regression equations. 
Figure 3.6 Scatter Plot Matrix Indicating the Correlations among the WGI dimensions of Governance 
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This created governance variable was then analysed in terms of its statistical distribution by means 
of a density plot – presented in the appendix of this chapter – as well as by studying the position of 
each individual observation, in order to roughly gauge the relative position of each country in the 
sub-Saharan African region with regard to governance.  The findings of this exercise are presented in 
the dot chart below in figure 3.7.  
 
As can be seen, governance in the region – in terms of the six dimensions captured by the WGI 
project – is quite varied, although the distribution is fairly normal, with the majority of countries 
falling not too far from the mean (calculated to be an average score of -0.6712 for governance for 
the period 1996 to 2009).  Notable positive outliers are Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Cape 
Verde which do not correlate too well, with the exception of South Africa, based on the descriptive 
analysis of the two measures of FDI discussed earlier.  Interestingly, the significant positive outliers 
in terms of FDI fare quite poorly on governance, as indicated by the governance scores of Angola, 
Figure 3.7 Dot Chart of the Governance Variable 
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Sudan, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea who generally fall on or short of the 
regional mean – posing serious implications for the relevance of certain aspects of institutional 
theory, in describing the political economy of inward FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
3.3 Macroeconomic Variables relating to Classical Factor Endowments 
Labour and Natural Resources 
The variables included in the study presented in this chapter, which relate to more classical 
economic theories of comparative advantage, competitiveness, and the subsequent locational 
advantage of certain countries are presented here.  With specific regard to factor-endowment based 
theories, labour and natural resources were the first two variables to be considered as the key 
economic variables which could influence the locational advantages of sub-Saharan African 
countries.  While many previous studies have relied on certain proxy measures to gauge the 
influence of labour upon inward FDI - such as secondary school enrolment and average wage rates 
to name a few – the analysis presented here remained cognisant of the fact that foreign investors 
normally pay much greater attention to broader, more inclusive, measures of locational 
advantage.139   
 
Due to this, the measure of labour decided upon was drawn from the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report’s seventh pillar of competitiveness namely, labour market 
efficiency.140  As noted in the report, efficient and flexible labour markets are a vital component of 
competitiveness in order to ensure the most efficient allocation of workers as well as to provide the 
incentives to labour such that their best efforts are given to their jobs.141  As further elaborated: 
Labour markets must therefore have the flexibility to shift workers from one economic activity to 
another rapidly and at low cost, and to allow for wage fluctuations without much social disruption... 
Efficient labour markets must also ensure a clear relationship between worker incentives and their 
efforts to promote meritocracy at the work place, and they must provide equity in the business 
environment between men and women.  Taken together these factors have a positive effect on 
worker performance and the attractiveness of the country for talent...
142
   
 
Furthermore, while the raw data provided by this report only began from 2006, the general lack of 
year-on-year variation observed in the dataset, and further highlighted in past literature, made this 
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the most suitable measure of labour which was dually averaged for the period 2006 to 2009 and 
incorporated into the regression equations.  This aggregate measure of labour was sourced from the 
Africa Development Indicators database on The World Bank’s ‘dataBank’ research portal, and is 
officially derived from the following indicators:143 
1. Cooperation in labour-employer relations 
2. Flexibility of wage determination 
3. Rigidity of employment 
4. Hiring and firing practices 
5. Firing costs 
6. Pay and productivity 
7. Reliance on professional management 
8. Brain drain 
9. Female participation in labour force 
The labour variable was then coded and analysed in terms of its statistical distribution, by means of 
a density plot which appeared sufficiently normal – and is provided in the appendix of this chapter.  
In order to better visualise the labour market efficiency of each observation, a dot chart was 
generated and is presented in figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8 Dot Chart of Labour Market Efficency 
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As can be seen, there is quite a large variation in the scores of labour market efficiency for sub-
Saharan African countries, although it can be visually inferred that the distribution of these 
observations is more or less normal – with the majority of countries being relatively clustered 
toward the mean.  South African and Mauritius immediately stand out as notable outliers with 
strong scores on this variable, arguably pointing to the influence of labour as a locational advantage 
vis-‘a-vis inward FDI, as both of these countries similarly appeared as positive outliers in the prior 
descriptive analysis of the two measure of FDI.  The major limitation of this variable, however, and 
indeed all variables derived from the Global Competitiveness Report, are the missing observations – 
especially regarding key regional FDI outliers such as Sudan and Equatorial Guinea.  This issue, 
however, must be tempered by the comprehensiveness of the methodology and data collection 
used by the World Economic Forum in constructing these measures, which arguably better 
represents the locational advantage of labour in the region than less comprehensive, albeit more 
inclusive, proxy measures such as secondary school enrolment.  Furthermore, such issues are 
accounted for by other indicators used to capture similar effects in the alternate regression models, 
which shall be elaborated upon in the following section. 
 
To capture the effects of natural resources as a locational advantage upon inward FDI, data was 
drawn from the World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance database, which 
was archived on the World Bank’s ‘dataBank’ research portal.  The measure deemed most suitable 
to the aims of this paper was a measure of total natural resource rents, expressed as a percentage of 
a country’s gross domestic product.  The estimates found here were in turn based on sources and 
methods described in “The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the 
New Millennium” (World Bank, 2011).144  The data was compiled into a spreadsheet and averaged 
for the years 1996 to 2009 for all sub-Saharan African countries.  The measure used here is officially 
defined as: “Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard 
and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents”.145  As is given by the definition, this indicator specifically 
captures the rents, or actual hard currency, accruing to a sovereign territory as a result of its natural 
resource factor endowments.  This is appropriate for the study presented here as it is a good 
indication of locational advantage in terms of natural resources which have already been capitalised 
upon, presumably by asset or resource seeking inward FDI, as opposed to other measures which 
capture potential reserves which have not yet been economically exploited.  Furthermore, the fact 
that these rents are expressed as a percentage of GDP helps in determining the extent to which a 
particular economy is dependent upon the extraction of such primary commodities, and arguably 
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the extent to which it will be willing to facilitate and prioritise the interests of foreign extractive 
capital.  
To better gauge the extent, specifically, of oil wealth - in conjunction with the more inclusive natural 
resource rents variable – in influencing the locational choice of inward FDI, an oil-production dummy 
variable was created.  This dummy variable, which simply awards a score of “1” to countries in the 
SSA region who have received rents from their domestic oil industries (for the period 1996 to 2009) 
and a “0” to countries which have not, was included into 
the regression equations alongside the natural resource 
rents variable in order to comprehensively account for 
the locational advantage of such factor endowments. 
 
The natural resource rents variable was then analysed in 
terms of its statistical distribution, and was found to be 
heavily left skewed as in indicated by the density plot 
presented in figure 3.9.  Along the same logic that was 
applied to the inward FDI variable, this justified a case for 
a transformation of the data such that the natural 
logarithm of the natural resource rents variable would be 
taken to be more conceptually relevant – and 
subsequently used in the regression equations.  This new 
distribution is presented in figure 3.10.  As is indicated, 
the distribution of the log of the natural resource rents 
variable is now right skewed, although it does better 
conform to a more normal distribution, as opposed to 
figure 4.9.  Conceptually this makes sense, as natural 
resource rents (expressed as a percentage of a country’s 
gross domestic product) would tend to informed to a 
greater extent by percentage changes as opposed 
absolute unit changes.  Furthermore, by taking the log of 
the distribution, the relative differences between each 
observation (country in SSA) can be better visualised by 
generating a dot chart.  Figures 3.11 and 3.12 present 
these observations for the natural resource rents 
variable, and its respective logarithmic transformation. 
Figure 3.9 Density Plot of Natural Resource 
Rents 
 
Figure 3.10 Density Plot of the log of Natural 
Resource Rents 
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Figure 3.11 Dot Chart of Natural Resource Rents 
 
Figure 3.12 Dot Chart of the log of Natural Resource Rents 
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There are a number of interesting observations which arise from a visual inspection of the natural 
resource rents variable.  As can be seen in figure 3.11, the vast majority of sub-Saharan African 
countries are generally clustered together and have received, on average, an annual receipt of 
between 0 to 10 per cent of their GDP, stemming from natural resource rents.  There are, however, 
very significant positive outliers, in the form of Angola, Nigeria and Gabon, with Equatorial Guinea 
and the Republic of Congo leading the pack with well over 60 percent of their annual GDP being 
derived from natural resource rents, on average for the period 1996 to 2009.  This is especially 
notable as Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Angola and the Republic of Congo were all highlighted as 
significant positive outliers in the previous analysis of inward FDI – pointing to the strong potential 
locational advantage of natural resources, even more so than the institutional and policy-related 
aspects captured by the governance variable, and labour, in sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Furthermore, as these rents are expressed as a percentage of the GDP of these countries, what 
becomes apparent is the extreme economic dependence of these states on foreign, resource-
extractive, inward FDI - which arguably manages to penetrate, support and operate in these 
territories despite their relatively poor performance on governance and labour market efficiency.  
On the other end of the scale, however, is the notable exception of Mauritius which (as illustrated in 
figure 3.12) falls far behind in the regional mean, and yet stood out as a positive outlier in the 
analysis of the inward FDI variable.  Interestingly, Mauritius also stood out in terms of governance 
and labour market efficiency with relatively strong scores on both indicators – leading to the 
assumption that this tiny island nation represents one of the few examples of locational advantage 
in SSA which has influenced market and efficiency seeking inward FDI, as opposed to the primacy of 
asset and resource seeking FDI which characterises the region.  
 
As discussed earlier, an oil-dummy variable was created to be used in conjunction with natural 
resources in the regression equations.  This was done in order to better gauge the specific influence 
that oil prevalence in a sovereign territory has as a component of natural resource rents, and the 
combined effect that this would have upon inward FDI.  For descriptive analytical purposes a dot 
chart was generated in order to list all the oil-rent-receiving countries in the region, such that a 
comparison can be made with the arguments highlighted in the analysis of the natural resources 
variable.  These findings are presented in figure 3.13.  Upon a quick visual inspection of this chart, it 
becomes apparent that all of the significant and positive outliers mentioned with regard to natural 
resource rents are indeed oil producing countries in the region.  The greatest of these outliers, which 
were dually noted to be significantly dependent upon foreign resource seeking inward FDI, namely 
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Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Angola, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, along with Sudan, are all oil-
producing countries in the region, with considerably poor governance scores, and are also significant 
receivers of inward FDI.  Other countries in the region which have received oil rents for the period 
1996 to 2009 include South Africa, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, 
Cameroon and Benin. 
 
 
3.4 Macroeconomic Variables: Inflation 
As investment decisions are further based on considerations of economic risk neither sufficiently 
captured by traditional factor endowments nor institutional and policy-related variables concerning 
governance, a record of price stability is included as another potential source of locational 
advantage – and was subsequently included in the regression equations.  In order to capture the 
effects of this upon inward FDI, data was compiled on all SSA countries (from the World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance database on the World Bank’s ‘dataBank’ 
Figure 3.13 Dot Chart of the Oil Dummy Variable 
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research portal) for the measure of consumer price inflation – expressed as an annual percentage.146  
The official definition of this indicator follows: “Inflation as measured by the consumer price index 
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of 
goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly.  The Laspeyres 
formula is generally used”.147  This archived data was further sourced from the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics and data files.  These were compiled into a 
spreadsheet and averaged for the period 1996 to 2009, for each country in sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
statistical distribution of this variable was then analysed through the use of a density plot, indicating 
a major skew of the distribution due to very significant outliers – most notably the case of 
Zimbabwe.  Following this, the natural logarithm of the variable was taken and subsequently 
incorporated into the regression equation.  
 
The dot chart and density plots for this variable are presented in the appendix of this paper as most 
countries do not fall too far from the median observation (of an annual average rate of consumer 
price inflation of 7.5%) – with the exception of Zimbabwe (2244 %), Angola (394.48) and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (153.53%) as significant positive outliers.  To gauge the significance of 
these positive outliers, the difference between the mean and median values of the distribution was 
calculated to be 62.46.  
 
Macroeconomic Variables: Gross Domestic Product Growth 
A measure of GDP growth, expressed as a percentage of a country’s GDP, was further included as a 
key macroeconomic variable in the regression equation.  Based upon the methodology and 
conceptual framework of a number of influential studies and cross-national projects on locational 
advantage - most notably the Inward FDI Potential Index by UNCTAD – GDP growth rates have 
generally become accepted to be the most appropriate proxy measure for the expected economic 
growth of countries.148  The conclusions of such studies have pointed to positive associations 
between expected economic growth and inward FDI – most significantly for the market seeking 
dimension of inward FDI.  The basic reasoning underlying these trends is based on the argument that 
the locational choices of foreign investors, specifically seeking the expansion of the market share of 
their products, will be significantly influenced by factors emanating from the consistent, stable and 
expanding domestic markets of industrial and developing countries.  Due to this, GDP growth was 
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included in the regression equations of this paper; whilst the specific measure and data was drawn 
from the Word Development Indicators and Global Development Finance database - and is officially 
defined as: 
[The] annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.  
Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products.  It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets 
of for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
149
 
 
This dataset was archived on the World Bank’s ‘dataBank’ research portal and was additionally 
sourced from the World Bank national accounts data and the OECD National Accounts data files.  
This data was compiled into a spreadsheet and averaged for every sub-Saharan national economy 
for the period 1996 to 2009.  An analysis of the statistical distribution of this variable was then 
conducted through the employment of a density plot and was found to be left skewed, leading to 
the natural logarithm of this variable to be taken and included in the regression equation – this plot 
is presented in the appendix of this chapter.  Furthermore, the majority of all observations tended to 
display relatively little variance from the distribution mean, calculated to be a regional average 
annual rate of GDP growth of 4.89 percent for the period 1996 to 2009.  The significant positive 
outliers with growth rates exceeding 10 percent were Angola (10.17%), Liberia (14.91%) and most 
notably the case of Equatorial Guinea (25.64%).  Interestingly in contrast to the above cases, 
Zimbabwe’s economy, on the other end of the scale, actually shrank on an annual average of 3.03 
percent during this period.  These findings are presented graphically an additional dot chart 
presented in the appendix of this chapter.  
 
Macroeconomic Variables: Market Size 
According to past literature, another factor which has proven to be positively associated with the 
determination of FDI – especially market seeking and efficiency seeking FDI – is market size.  The 
economic argument here refers to the increased productivity of firms due to large markets on 
account of their increased ability to exploit economies of scale.150  Traditionally, the effects of this 
variable in prior regression analyses has been captured through the use of a proxy measure normally 
limited to the gross domestic product per capita of a national economy.  Whilst this has been 
relatively sufficient in gauging the magnitude of economic demand, and its constituent components, 
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within countries, a more inclusive measure was deemed necessary for this study, based upon much 
of the same logic applied to the choice of measure of our labour variable (in which labour market 
efficiency was chosen to be most appropriate).  Subsequently, inspiration was drawn again from the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report – specifically, the tenth pillar of 
competitiveness referring to market size.  This indicator is derived from two indices comprising the 
domestic market size index as well as the foreign market size index, and is inclusive of the World 
Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey as well as hard data stemming from a variety of 
different sources.151  The strength of this measure as opposed to the traditional GDP per capita 
proxy, is that it is conceptually geared toward capturing the effects of market size on national 
competitiveness (and the subsequent locational advantage of market size) by accounting for certain 
effects spurred by economic globalisation.  As outlined in the report: 
In the era of globalisation, international markets have become a substitute for domestic markets, 
especially for small countries.  There is vast empirical evidence showing that trade openness is 
positively associated with growth... Thus exports can be thought of as a substitute for domestic 
demand in determining the size of the market for the firms of a country.  By including both domestic 
and foreign markets in our measure of market size, we give credit to export-driven economies and 
geographic areas... that are divided into many countries but have a single common market.
152
 
 
Once again, by including this measure derived from the Global Competitiveness Report, I was faced 
with a number of missing observations for the sub-Saharan African region and was confronted with 
the trade-off between the comprehensiveness of this indicator as opposed to the inclusiveness of 
other, less-broad, non-aggregate proxy measures.  As was the case with the labour variable, 
comprehensiveness was decided upon as the most relevant feature to incorporate into the 
regression equation, and the market size data was dually compiled into a spreadsheet, averaged for 
the period 2006 to 2009 and examined in terms of its statistical distribution.  A further measure of 
market size was incorporated into alternate regression models and shall be discussed in the 
following section.  The density plot and dot chart which were generated for the examination of this 
variable are presented in the appendix of this chapter – noting a relatively normal distribution, with 
the exception of significant positive outliers in the form of South Africa and Mauritius. 
 
Macroeconomic Variables: Goods Market Efficiency 
Past studies on locational advantage and the determinants of inward FDI have, to a great extent, 
acknowledged, and incorporated into their analyses, certain measures which capture the effects of 
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government interventions with regard to trade controls and restrictions on FDI.153  The expected 
association between these factors and inward FDI would logically be negative, although – as 
underscored by the evidence of past studies – the magnitude of which largely depends on the type 
of FDI; with market-seeking FDI actually being positively associated to some trade restrictions.  The 
assumption of this association with regard to sub-Saharan Africa would, however, take into account 
the fact that much of the region’s inward FDI is asset and resource seeking and would therefore 
point to a negative association – especially concerning export-oriented inward FDI.  To capture the 
effects of this, I included a broader, more comprehensive measure – again drawn from the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report – namely, the sixth pillar of competitiveness: 
goods market efficiency.  This aggregate measure is derived from fifteen constituent indicators in 
total (provided in the appendix), the most relevant to the study presented in this chapter being:154 
1. Intensity of local competition 
2. Effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy 
3. Extent and effect of taxation 
4. Time required to start a business 
5. Prevalence of trade barriers 
6. Trade tariffs 
7. Business impact of rules on FDI 
8. Burden of customs procedures 
Goods market efficiency captures the effects of these factors specifically upon the competitiveness 
of a national economy by taking into account the particular issues which affect a country’s ability to 
produce the most appropriate mix of products and services, given the conditions of domestic supply 
and demand – as well as how effectively these goods are traded within the economy.155  As noted in 
the report: 
The best possible environment for the exchange of goods requires a minimum of impediments to 
business activity through government intervention.  For example, competitiveness is hindered by 
distortionary or burdensome taxes and by restrictive and discriminatory rules on foreign direct 
investment – limiting foreign ownership – as well as on international trade.
156
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Figure 3.14 Density Plot of the Exports 
of Goods and Services 
 
Figure 3.15 Density Plot of the log of 
the Exports of Goods and Services 
 
Again, akin to the logic applied to the market size variable, there are a number of missing 
observations – the effects of which are assumed to be somewhat negated given the 
comprehensiveness of this aggregate measure as opposed to other, more inclusive, proxy measures.  
As such, the data for this variable was compiled into a spreadsheet, averaged for the period 2006 to 
2009, and analysed in terms of its statistical distribution.  
A density plot and dot chart was generated in order to 
graphically examine the distribution of goods market 
efficiency in sub-Saharan Africa, and is presented in the 
appendix of this paper – noting a fairly normal distribution 
with significant positive outliers in the form of South Africa 
and Mauritius.    
 
Macroeconomic Variables: Exports of Goods and Services 
Drawing again on the methodology and conceptual 
framework provided by Inward FDI Potential Index by 
UNCTAD, another key factor which is expected to affect an 
economy’s attractiveness to foreign investors is the share 
of a country’s GDP accounted for by exports, in order to 
capture openness and competitiveness.  Furthermore, this 
measure arguably accounts more for locational advantage 
in terms of export-oriented FDI, relevant to the sub-
Saharan African region with respect to the asset seeking 
and resource extractive interests of foreign capital.  The 
data for this variable was drawn from the World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance 
database on the World Bank’s ‘dataBank’ online research 
portal, which was in turn sourced from the World Bank’s 
national accounts data, and the OECD National Accounts 
data files.  The official definition provided follows: 
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all 
goods and other market services provided to the rest of the 
world.  They include the value of merchandise, freight, 
insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and 
other services, such as communication, construction, 
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financial, information, business, personal, and government services.  They exclude compensation of 
employees and investment income... and transfer payments.
157
 
 
This data was then compiled into a spreadsheet, averaged for the period 1996 to 2009, and 
examined in terms of its statistical distribution.  As the density plot indicated a bi-modal distribution, 
a transformation of the data was deemed necessary by taking the natural logarithm of the variable – 
which was subsequently included in the regression equation – resulting in a much better distribution 
– presented in figures 3.14 and 3.15 respectively.  Figure 3.16 presents the dot chart of this variable 
in order to better visualise the value of each observation in the distribution. 
 
As can be seen, the distribution is quite varied with a large number of countries falling far from the 
regional mean calculated to be an annual national average of 33.56% of GDP being accounted for by 
the exports of goods and services – for the period 1996 to 2009.  Significant positive outliers are 
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most notably Angola (73.46%), the Republic of Congo (77.40%), Swaziland (77.79%), Seychelles 
(85.62%) and Equatorial Guinea with just over 90% of its GDP, on average for the given period, being 
accounted for by exports. 
 
Macroeconomic Variables: Infrastructure 
The final variable included in the regression analysis presented in this chapter relates to cross-
national measures of infrastructure – noted in previous literature as a factor with considerable 
influence on inward FDI.  Again, inspiration was drawn from the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report which calculated a broad, comprehensive, aggregate indicator to this effect.  
As was the case with the market size, labour market efficiency and goods market efficiency variables, 
there was a trade-off in terms of selecting this measure – which included a number of missing 
observations – vis-‘a-vis other less comprehensive albeit more inclusive proxy measures such as the 
number of telephone lines per 1000 people to capture the effects of infrastructure upon inward FDI.  
Based upon the same logic applied to our other variables the selection of this measure to capture 
infrastructure was informed by extensive literature which argued the merits of including broad 
aggregate indicators to capture the locational choices of foreign actors in their investment decisions.  
As such, this measure was deemed appropriate despite the missing observations within the broader 
aims of this paper.  As posited by the Global Competitiveness Report: 
Extensive and efficient infrastructure is critical for ensuring the effective functioning of the economy 
as it is an important factor determining the location of economic activity and the kinds of activities or 
sectors that can develop in a particular instance.  Well-developed infrastructure reduces the effect of 
distance between regions, integrating the national market and connecting it at low cost to markets in 
other countries and regions.
158
 
 
On the core components incorporated in this measure of infrastructure, the report elaborates: 
Effective modes of transport... enable entrepreneurs to get their goods and services to market in a 
secure and timely manner and facilitate the movement of workers to the most suitable jobs.  
Economies also depend on electricity supplies that are free of interruptions and shortages so that 
businesses and factories can work unimpeded.  Finally, a solid and extensive telecommunications 
network allows for a rapid and free flow of information, which increases overall economic efficiency 
by helping to ensure that businesses can communicate and decisions are made by economic actors 
taking into account all available relevant information.
159
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The data compiled for this variable was drawn from the Africa Development Indicators database on 
the World Bank’s ‘dataBank’ online research portal, which was in turn sourced from the Global 
Competitiveness Report.  Specifically, the report’s 2nd Pillar of Competitiveness: Infrastructure is an 
aggregate measure derived from the following indicators, namely:160 
1. Quality of overall infrastructure 
2. Quality of roads 
3. Quality of railroad infrastructure 
4. Quality of port infrastructure 
5. Quality of air transport infrastructure 
6. Available airline seat kilometres 
7. Quality of electricity supply 
8. Fixed telephone lines, and 
9. Mobile telephone subscriptions 
The data was then compiled into a spreadsheet, averaged for the period 2006 to 2009, and analysed 
in terms of its statistical distribution through the employment of a density plot and dot chart – 
provided in the appendix – noting a fairly normal distribution, with the majority of observations 
generally falling close to the mean.  Notable positive outliers were observed to be Mauritius and 
South Africa – with Chad, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Angola as notable outliers on the other end of the 
scale. 
3.5 Alternate Regression Model Variables 
Upon closer inspection of the number of missing observations for sub-Saharan Africa in the Global 
Competitiveness Report, it was deemed necessary to use alternative variables to capture similar 
effects as those found in the report.  These variables are used within alternate regression models in 
order to account for missing observations, whilst dually providing for a more in depth analysis of the 
political economy of inward FDI flows to the region.  Each of these measures effectively acts as a 
proxy for one of the variables already discussed, and specifically stemming from the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, namely: market size, goods market efficiency, labour and 
infrastructure. 
 
In order to capture the effects of market size, gross domestic product per capita (in current U.S. 
dollars) was used in the alternative regression models.  This data was drawn from the World 
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Development Indicators and Global Development Finance database, archived on the World Bank’s 
‘dataBank’ research portal – which was further sourced from its national accounts data files.  This 
indicator significantly reduced the number of missing observations, and thereby provides a more 
definitive, albeit more crude, account of the locational advantage of market size in the sub-Saharan 
African region.  This data was compiled into a spreadsheet, averaged for the period 1996 to 2009, 
and examined in terms of its statistical distribution through the use of a density plot and dot chart – 
presented in the appendix of this chapter.  Noting a significant left-skew, the natural logarithm of 
this variable was taken and subsequently incorporated into the alternate regression equations.  The 
dot chart indicated significant positive outliers in the form of South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, 
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Seychelles, with the latter two countries generating a per capita GDP 
of over U.S. $8000 on average for the period – far above the regional mean of $1319. 
 
The locational advantage of goods market efficiency was similarly captured in the alternate 
regression models by creating a unique variable which essentially accounted for the time taken for a 
country in terms of exporting and importing goods and services.  Data was drawn from the same 
database noted above, which was in turn sourced from the World Bank’s Doing Business Project.  
Two different indicators, namely “Time to import (days)” and “Time to export (days)” were 
independently compiled into spreadsheets, averaged for the period 2005 to 2009 (due to data 
constraints), and then combined using another simple average.  This was done on the assumption 
that the time (in days) that it takes a country to export as well as import goods and services is a 
function of certain trade controls, restrictions, customs procedures and the prevalence of trade 
barriers – indicative of goods market efficiency and its subsequent locational advantage vis-‘a-vis 
inward FDI.  The official definition provided follows: 
Time is recorded in calendar days.  The time calculation for a procedure starts from the moment it is 
initiated and runs until it is completed.  If a procedure can be accelerated for an additional cost, the 
fastest legal procedure is chosen.  It is assumed that neither the exporter nor the importer wastes time 
and that each commits to completing each remaining procedure without delay.  Procedures that can be 
completed in parallel are measured as simultaneous.  The waiting time between procedures – for 
example, during unloading of the cargo – is included in the measure.
161
 
 
This variable was then examined in terms of its statistical distribution by means of a density plot and 
dot chart, which are presented in the appendix of this chapter.  Noting a left skew in the distribution, 
the natural logarithm of this variable was taken and incorporated into the alternative regression 
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equations.  The dot chart indicated a relatively varied distribution among all countries in the region, 
with no major outliers apart from the island nations of Mauritius and Seychelles performing the best 
over the period, with Chad on the other end of the scale taking well over 80 days on average to 
export and import its goods and services in contrast to the regional mean of 39 days. 
 
The locational advantage of labour was captured in the alternate regression models by incorporating 
tertiary school enrolment (% gross).  Data was drawn again from the same database noted above, 
which was in turn sourced from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) Institute for Statistics.  Whilst not as comprehensive as the labour variable based upon the 
data provided by the Global Competitiveness Report, there were far fewer missing observations – 
allowing for a much more inclusive analysis.  The assumption here was that tertiary school 
enrolment would capture the competitiveness of a labour force, and its subsequent influence on 
inward FDI, by accounting for the relative disparities in educational attainments of different 
economies.  As officially defined, the gross enrolment ratio: 
... Is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown.  Tertiary education, whether or not to an 
advanced research qualification, normally requires, as a minimum condition of admission, the 
successful completion of education at the secondary level.
162
 
 
This data was compiled into a spreadsheet, averaged for the period 1996 to 2009, and examined in 
terms of its statistical distribution through the employment of a density plot and dot chart – 
presented in the appendix of this paper.  Noting a left skewed distribution, the natural logarithm of 
this variable was taken and incorporated into the alternative regression models.  The dot chart 
indicated a relatively varied, albeit normal, normal distribution with no significant outliers deviating 
too far from the regional mean calculated at 4.05% - with the exceptions of Liberia and Mauritius 
with average gross tertiary school enrolments of well over 10% for the period. 
 
Finally, the locational advantage of infrastructure was captured in the alternate regression models 
by including telephone landlines (per 100 people).  Again, not as comprehensive as the aggregate 
measure used in the Global Competitiveness Report, the number of missing observations was 
significantly reduced, allowing for more inclusive and balanced inferences.  Data was drawn from the 
same database noted in this section, which was in turn sourced from the International 
Telecommunication Union, and is officially defined as: 
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Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public 
switched telephone network and that have a port on a telephone exchange.  Integrated services digital 
network channels and fixed wireless subscribers are included.
163
 
 
This data was compiled into a spreadsheet, averaged for the period 1996 to 2009, and examined in 
terms of its statistical distribution through the employment of a density plot and dot chart – 
provided in the appendix of this paper.  Noting a significant left skew in the distribution, the natural 
logarithm of this variable was taken and incorporated into the alternate regression models.  The dot 
chart indicated a number of very significant positive outliers in the region, deviating far from the 
regional mean calculated at 2.74 telephone lines, on average, per 100 people in SSA for the period 
1996 to 2009.  Most notably, were the cases of South Africa, Cape Verde, Seychelles and Mauritius – 
with the latter two indicating an average of just over 25 lines per 100 people for the period. 
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Chapter IV 
The External Demand for Security in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
Before any statistical assessment can be made with regard to the most prominent determinants of 
inward FDI flows to the sub-Saharan African region, an analysis of the region’s increasing geopolitical 
and strategic international value, on account of oil, in recent years is warranted.  The following 
chapter examines this issue in order to present the externally-derived market demand for the 
services of the international PSI, and to further elaborate upon the nexus between transnational oil 
interests and regional security – as it has been recently unfolding in the political economies of SSA 
petro-states.  Taken together with the internal demand for private military and security provision, as 
discussed in the literature review, the arguments presented in this chapter lay the final foundation 
for a critical assessment of the niche demands the PSI will increasingly service in the political 
economies of many countries in the SSA region. 
 
4.1 Oil Boom or Bust?  Accounting for Sub-Saharan Africa’s renewed international strategic 
significance. 
In recent years sub-Saharan African has attracted significant, and increasing, global attention with 
regard to the region’s large and exploitable reserves of oil and natural and gas.  Remaining cognisant 
of the world’s growing energy demands, and the strategic premium placed upon oil by corporate 
and political decision-makers, sub-Saharan African oil-producers have elevated the region out of a 
state of perceived international insignificance – noting the region’s bearing upon major economic 
interests in the contemporary international system – and thrust it firmly onto the world stage once 
again.164  Indeed, sub-Saharan Africa is in the midst of an oil boom, spanning a period from the late 
1990s up until present – with proven oil reserves increasing exponentially relative to such 
discoveries for every other global region.165  In 2001 alone, West and Central Africa accounted for 
approximately seven billion of the eight billion barrels of crude oil discovered worldwide, leading the 
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Gulf of Guinea to assume the title of the world’s premier oil hotspot – with an estimated 24 billion 
barrels of crude in reserves.166 
 
The figures provided above do well to underscore the definitive turning point of the region’s rise to 
prominence in international oil and security politics in the early 2000s.  The centre-piece of these 
developments, however, arguably stemmed from a critical juncture in U.S. policy-making, following 
the September 11 terrorist attacks and the nation’s subsequent War on Terror.  Following the end of 
the Cold War, and for most of the last decade of the twentieth century, the sub-Saharan African 
region lost major strategic currency in global geostrategic politics, and was largely neglected by the 
major forces of globalisation.  As posited by Carmody and Owusu, for most of the 1990s the United 
States favoured a policy of benign neglect toward the region, with a preferred reliance on 
international financial institutions to liberalise markets and governments, as well as a reliance on the 
country’s multinational corporations to secure resources and forge ties.167  This policy followed the 
logic that Africa was no longer a contested ideological theatre, in which the superpowers played out 
their global competition; leading the U.S. to deem SSA as largely irrelevant to their national security 
interests – marked by tendency to avoid any wholesale military involvement in the region.168   
 
The critical turning point in this policy was marked by the September 11 terrorist attacks which 
underscored an imperative of securitising African oil, in line with the country’s broader national 
interests of diversifying its oil supplies.169  These interests manifested in SSA by an active policy by 
the U.S. Department of Defence, under the Bush Administration, searching for appropriate locations 
for new military bases in the region, which developed alongside the strategy put forward by the 
President’s National Energy Policy Development Group.170  The group, which was effectively a high-
level think tank chaired by the then Vice President Dick Cheney, drafted a report which would 
essentially see a major overhaul of U.S. policy vis-‘a-vis the SSA region, known officially as the 
National Energy Policy (or more famously, albeit informally, as the “Cheney Report”).171  The report 
highlighted, and argued, for the following:172 
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- It was noted that American domestic economic growth was critically dependent upon 
petroleum and other basic fuels insofar that sustaining this growth could not be separated 
from energy concerns 
- The report argued that the balance between sustained domestic economic growth and 
energy demands could be effectively maintained through increased petroleum and other fuel 
imports 
- The report further stressed the need for a diversification of American oil supplies which 
subsequently led Washington to promote increasing reliance on non-Persian Gulf oil-
producing regions. 
Moreover, the report explicitly highlighted Africa’s potential as a growing energy market to fulfil 
America’s growing energy demands, with particular attention payed to the prospects of six sub-
Saharan African oil-producing states, namely: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Chad 
and Equatorial Guinea.173  Whilst these prescriptions are significant in of themselves, the report 
went on to influence the Bush Administration in advocating a position which effectively defined 
African oil as an American national interest, the ramifications of which have had a remarkable effect 
on the region in the years which have followed.174  As posited by Klare and Volman: 
While American interest in Africa’s abundant supplies of critical raw material is not new, the Bush 
Administration’s decision to define African oil as a ‘strategic national interest’ – meaning something 
that requires protection by U.S. military forces – is entirely unprecedented.
175
 
It is specifically this securitisation of oil in the sub-Saharan African region which underscores the 
need for the services of the international PSI by external actors, noting the strategic premium placed 
upon oil supplies by external actors, such as the U.S., as well as in accordance with the internal 
dynamics of the region. 
 
Further adding to the relatively recent international fixation with African oil supplies has been a 
global recognition of a number of advantages the oil supply possesses in terms of logistics, the 
security of its delivery as well as its chemical properties.  For U.S. markets, specifically, oil from the 
West coast of Africa takes approximately four weeks less to reach the East coast of the U.S. as 
opposed to Middle Eastern oil supplies, which saves considerable money in terms of tanker costs – 
an argument which similarly applies to distribution to the European Union.176  Furthermore, African 
oil supplies to Western markets do not ship through potentially hazardous strategic ‘choke points’ 
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such as the Suez Canal.177  Another factor which has bolstered the international attractiveness of 
African oil, relative to the other global oil-producing regions, has been the general 
acknowledgement that exploration and production operations by MNCs in the SSA region are very 
profitable by international standards.  This is based upon the convergence of favourable regional 
fiscal regimes, the high success rate of exploration drilling operations, and the fact that West African 
oil possesses a low sulphur content – making the oil highly prized in terms of its quality in production 
processes.178 
 
These factors have all added to the renewed and growing international significance of the SSA region 
in recent times, with the United States particularly driving this renewed strategic focus of the region, 
with many other Western and emerging powers following suit.  For now, however, it is vital to note 
that, in the last decade, the United States has shifted its stance toward the region vis-‘a-vis possible 
military involvement, and has displayed an increasing willingness to be actively involved in the 
securitisation of oil from the SSA region.  To this effect, the U.S. Department of Defence has become 
an increasingly influential actor in the security of the region through the sale of arms to friendly 
African governments, the provision of military and security training and expertise, as well as joint 
operations with military forces within the region to bolster capability and enhance the capacities of 
American forces to operate in the region.179  Furthermore, a number of diplomatic initiatives have 
taken effect in recent times, all with the sole aim of bolstering U.S. and African military and security 
capabilities in order to deter physical threats to oil fields and other critical installations.180 
 
Despite these developments, however, the U.S. remains wary of being perceived as directly involved 
in the military and security matters of repressive and authoritarian states, as most oil-producing 
nations in the region are.  As noted by Carmody and Owusu, 
  [The current U.S. aim on the continent]... is to guard against resentment at foreign troop 
presence, however; to make the American military footprint so small that it is not 
noticeable... New military programs have been set up with oil-rich allies such as Angola 
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and Nigeria, who receive free arms under the Pentagon’s Excess Defence Articles Program.  
The increased military assistance to governments on the continent is barely noted in the 
U.S. media which tends to present American involvement in Africa as more benign and 
developmental...181 
Furthermore, the U.S. is fully aware of the instability and conflict that often accompanies the 
production of critical strategic resources in developing countries, and despite its best efforts to 
bolster the capacities of friendly governments in the region, it risks international credibility and 
diplomatic currency in the international system should it be seen as fulfilling the role it once did 
during the Cold War, by propping up unaccountable, corrupt and criminal dictatorships.  It is 
therefore no stretch of the imagination to hypothesise that the arguably covert fulfilment of 
American foreign policy, and indeed the policy of many other interested actors, with regard to the 
securitisation of oil could be exercised and executed by PMSCs, at an increasing rate in the years to 
come. 
 
The current oil boom experienced by sub-Saharan Africa has therefore served to greatly increase the 
region’s strategic value internationally, and has influenced a flood of external actors to reorient their 
policies in order to benefit and capitalise upon the region’s vast reserves of oil.  This issue in isolation 
has greatly affected the region in terms of unprecedented flows of inward foreign direct investment, 
and a renewed interest in the governance and security of the region.  Such issues have, however, 
developed in unison with another critical element of the contemporary international system which 
has further reinforced the region’s increasing strategic worth, and the subsequent external demand 
for stability and security, be it private or not, in sub-Saharan Africa: the rise of the global South. 
 
4.2 A New Scramble?  Sub-Saharan African oil in a new global dispensation between West and 
South. 
In the last two decades the international system has witnessed a remarkable shift in the balance of 
power between the industrialised Western nations – which can be loosely referred to as the 
member states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (the OECD states) – 
vis-‘a-vis the rise of many nations from the emerging global South, such as China, India, Brazil, 
Turkey and Indonesia amongst many others.  This has resulted not only in the expanding energy 
demands of developing nations, in order to fuel their economic growth and development, but most 
notably an increase in global competition for the limited supply of non-renewable, scarce, and 
strategically vital supplies of resources such as oil and natural gas.  Arguably leading the pack in 
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terms of global policy to acquire and secure such resources has been the People’s Republic of China, 
which has drastically expanded the footprint of its national oil companies (NOCs) throughout many 
of the world’s oil-producing regions, and especially in the sub-Saharan African region.182  Following a 
zero-sum logic, which is often applied to foreign policy by think-tanks and government strategists 
throughout the international system, such competition has come to be increasingly viewed by 
policy-makers in the West as an erosion of their own interests and influence in the region.183  
Consequently, external actors, caught within this fierce competition for the valuable energy 
resources of SSA, have effectively driven up the market demand for the region’s reserves of oil (and 
natural gas) – and have further staked an interest in the region’s stability and security. 
 
The ramifications of this international geo-economic rivalry upon the political economies of sub-
Saharan Africa’s oil-producers has been substantial, particularly in terms of governance and inward 
flows of foreign direct investment.  Whilst government revenues tend to soar, as most oil-producers 
in the region have a very strong state presence in their oil sectors, markedly different international 
relations now offer SSA governments the privilege of emboldened positions of bargaining power, 
reduced dependence on the West – especially in terms of aid assistance from international financial 
institutions – and a greater overall choice in the number of actors with which they choose to enter 
into agreements with.  Downs succinctly captures Western concerns by positing that the 
conventional wisdom regarding China’s NOCs is that they have come to undermine U.S. and E.U. 
efforts to promote good governance, “punish regimes that egregiously violate human rights” and to 
maintain a fair environment for foreign investors, in the SSA region.184  What has therefore emerged, 
are concerns that such competition in SSA serve to undermine governance, accountability and 
transparency by regional governments, as external actors increasingly prioritise the acquisition and 
security of energy resources at the expense of arguably softer policy issues relating to human rights, 
good governance and transparency.  To this effect, Carmody and Owusu posit: 
 Whereas the neo-liberal mode promoted by the U.S. seeks to embed, constrain, legitimate and 
empower African states along different dimensions, the Chinese merely seek to enable and 
empower them... This is attractive to African state elites, particularly those subject to Western 
sanctions... Meanwhile Chinese companies benefit from the lack of competition from Western 
rivals in these countries.
185
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Whilst the above argument certainly credits the experience of Sudan through much of the early 
2000s, such a perspective must be tempered by cases such as U.S. and Western oil interests in 
countries such as Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo and Nigeria; cases which in no way 
present Western oil interests as any more or less benevolent than their Chinese counterparts in the 
sub-Saharan African region.  Consequently, it can be argued that the increased geo-economic rivalry, 
and strategic hedging strategies, employed by external actors in SSA has spurred the further demise 
of accountability by regional governments, due to many of the issues mentioned above.   
 
As most oil-producing states in sub-Saharan Africa score very poorly on key governance indices such 
rule of law, control of corruption and absence of violence among many others, recent trends in 
inward foreign direct investment to the region have not in any way been deterred.186  In 2004 alone, 
Chinese imports from SSA grew by 87 per cent from the previous year – the bulk of which was 
generated by prior year on year investment in Sudan’s oil industry.187  Even despite the country’s 
appalling recent history of conflict, militia activity and ethic violence, Chinese inward FDI to the 
country in 2005 grew by approximately 40 per cent.188  Following this, by 2007, Sudan was supplying 
China with around seven percent of the country’s total oil imports, with thirteen of the fifteen most 
significant oil multinational corporations operating in Sudan being Chinese.189   
 
Akin to the reoriented American policy of defining African oil supplies as a national security concern 
(and a subsequent willingness to be more greatly involved in the security affairs of the SSA region) 
China has similarly displayed an increasing tendency to be a more direct and influential actor in 
terms of security and military assistance.  In order to guarantee a safe and secure supply of crude oil 
from SSA, and Sudan specifically, China has built small-arms factories in the country, sold weapons 
and military equipment to the ruling regime190, supplied the government with aircraft in order to 
protect valuable oil fields and installations, and has allowed government troops to launch attacks 
from the facilities of its own NOCs.191  The increasing footprint of China’s NOCs are not, however, 
strictly limited to Sudan, as Chinese investment has steadily increased in the oil sectors of almost 
every major oil-producer in the region.   
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Apart from the Heglig and Unity fields in Sudan, China has vested long-term strategic interests in 
Nigeria’s Akpo fields as well as Angola’s greater Plutonio fields.192  Most other African assets held by 
the NOCs are, however, noted to be of a size and quality to pose little concern to established 
Western interests and MNCs in the region.193  As noted by Downs, China’s NOCs in SSA fall behind 
Western oil multinationals in terms of the value and production of their regional assets and holdings 
– with a combined commercial value of only 8 percent of Western oil MNC investments in SSA.194  
Furthermore, China’s NOCs lack the technical capabilities to exploit and subsequently compete for 
the most valuable oil-producing blocks in the region, with specific regard to the deep-water reserves 
found in the Gulf of Guinea.195   
 
Such figures are indicative of larger issues vis-‘a-vis the investment patterns and oil-production of 
emerging country oil multinationals in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically that their impact is still 
relatively minimal.  Frynas and Paulo highlight this by drawing upon the experiences of Nigeria, 
whose oil industry – due to its size and production - could effectively act as a microcosm for the oil 
industry of the region: 
For instance, over 95 percent of the oil produced in Africa’s largest petro-state, Nigeria, is 
generated by only five companies: Shell, Exxon, Chevron, Total, and Agip; this situation is unlikely to 
change soon either in Nigeria or in some other key petro-states.  If a major shift is going to happen 
in future, it will take years to materialise.
196
 
 
While interesting, these findings do not necessarily mitigate the effects of increasing competition in 
the region, emanating from the West and the South, nor does it detract from the region’s increasing 
external demand for security and stability.  In fact, the opposite could be argued by highlighting the 
fact that even sub-Saharan Africa’s marginal oil-producing areas are now being driven up in value by 
many actors from the emerging global South who do not have the necessary technical capacity to 
exploit more valuable offshore oil-producing blocks.  Indeed, Nigeria’s onshore oil fields have come 
under increasing attention in recent years by transnational oil interests stemming not only from 
China, but India and South Korea as well.197  For instance, by 2005 approximately 24 percent of 
India’s crude oil imports came from the SSA region, and the country has revised its foreign 
investment policies in recent years to prioritise Sudan, Angola and Ghana based upon their energy 
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potential – keeping in line with the country’s aims of diversifying its oil supplies and reducing 
dependence upon the Persian Gulf.198  Building upon a number of investment cases by Indian oil 
multinationals in the region, and incidences of Chinese competition, Beri posits that: 
... Energy security issues have brought Africa into India’s strategic map.  India’s ties to Africa are for 
the first time driven by [India’s] national interest.  Realising the importance of Africa, the Indian 
government has launched a number of initiatives.
199
 
 
These diplomatic initiatives, referred to by Beri, underscore the increasing strategic weight of the 
SSA region within Indian policy-circles, and serves to highlight the growing external competition for 
the region’s oil supplies not just between established Western oil MNCs vis-‘a-vis the emerging 
global South, but in and amongst the many varied actors which further fall under this rubric.  
Testimony to this argument are the many similar diplomatic initiatives conducted in the past decade 
by countries such as Brazil, South Korea and Malaysia, all of whom have focused increasing attention 
on West African petro-states, in order to facilitate closer cooperation with the region’s oil-
producers, and to increase their access to the region’s crude oil supplies.200  Many of these states are 
also engaged in fostering business ties akin to India and China with the SSA region which are 
characterised by offerings of credit, assistance and directed FDI into the region’s infrastructure in 
exchange for lucrative exploration rights.201 
 
Therefore, based upon sub-Saharan Africa’s recent oil boom, which has converged with a number of 
changing dynamics within the international system, the region’s geo-political strategic value has 
risen sharply vis-‘a-vis the interests of multiple external actors.  This has subsequently inflated the 
demand for security within the region, such that stable political and economic environments, most 
conducive to foreign investment, guarantee the safe development, production and supply of the 
region’s valuable reserves of crude oil.  It is within this context that the services of the international 
private security industry are especially relevant.  An externally-imposed demand for security, credits 
the PSI as a major potential actor in the unfolding environment of sub-Saharan African petro-states – 
and indeed the region as a whole.  Moreover, private security and military companies offer 
especially attractive services with regard to the arguably covert nature of their operations, allowing 
foreign oil interests to effectively carry out their foreign policy by proxy.  This resonates well in 
politically-sensitive scenarios in which foreign actors wish to distance themselves from possible 
controversy and public scrutiny through their dealings with largely corrupt and illegitimate regimes 
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in the SSA region, yet wish to maintain their access to oil and other valuable resources.  To this 
effect, Lock argues – with respect to American dealings with PMSCs – that: 
... the use of a private military contractor permits Washington to project its influence quite cheaply 
and very quickly to countries where it would be normally difficult to send troops because of 
political sensitivities.  Moreover, the cost of cutting any links with a foreign regime is even less 
expensive, as MPRI [Military Professional Resources, Incorporated – a prominent American PMSC] 
protects Washington behind a potential screen of deniability.
202   
 
These issues highlight the great potential that private military and security provision could play in 
facilitating transnational oil interests, and the subsequent ease with which inward asset and 
resource seeking FDI to the SSA region’s oil enclaves can effectively circumvent prior institutional 
and policy related hurdles concerning security.  Taken together with the arguments regarding the 
internally-derived demand for security in the region, noted in chapter 2, these issues combine to 
produce a fitting context in which to now empirically assess the aims and objectives of this paper, in 
relation to the core arguments and ideas presented in this chapter and the literature review. 
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Chapter V 
Empirical Analysis  
 
 
This chapter builds upon the methodology used in testing the robustness of the variables discussed 
in this paper upon inward FDI, whilst dually presenting the empirical results and discussing the 
implications of my findings – with regard to the broader aims and objectives of this paper.  As 
previously noted in the literature review, theory offers no definitive prescriptions for the 
determinants of inward FDI, and therefore no definitive prescriptions for model specification vis-‘a-
vis empirical work regarding the impact of institutional and policy-related variables upon inward FDI.  
Remaining cognisant of this, in conjunction with the findings of previous studies, it was deemed 
appropriate to begin the analysis from a somewhat frugal model specification which included 
governance, natural resource rents, labour market efficiency and the oil dummy variable.  This was 
done in accordance with the broader aims of this paper, which set out to identify whether 
institutional and policy-related matters – captured by the governance variable – are more positively 
associated to inward FDI in the sub-Saharan African region as opposed to oil wealth, and other 
factor-endowment based variables – captured by the natural resource rents and labour market 
efficiency variables.  Furthermore, noting the concerning number of missing observations in the 
Global Competitiveness Report, other proxy measures are included in each alternate model – 
following the GCR-based variable models (ie. Model 1 – GCR based variables, Model 2 – Alternate 
measures, Model 3 – GCR based variables, Model 4 – Alternate measures; and so on).  Accordingly, 
the alternate base model specification (model 2) excludes labour market efficiency from the 
equation and includes tertiary school enrolment in its place.  Thus, the two base model 
specifications are: 
1.)                                                     
2.)                                                          
Where ‘FDI’ represents the inward FDI variable, ‘Gov’ represents the governance variable, ‘Nat.Res’ 
represents the natural resource rents variable, ‘LME’ represents the labour market efficiency 
variable, ‘Oil.Dummy’ represents the oil dummy variable and ‘T.School’ represents the tertiary 
school enrolment variable.  ‘V’ is a vector of other controlling variables with    set to zero in the in 
the base models.  Subsequent models add different control variables to the two base model 
specifications noted above.  Table 5.1, presented on the page after the next summarises the findings 
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from these models, noting the regression coefficients for each variable, with the respective standard 
error indicated in square brackets below.  Significance codes are indicated by the number of 
asterisks, and periods, alongside the standard error with “***” denoting significance at the 0.001 
(0.1%) level, “**” at the 0.01 (1%) level, “*” at the 0.05 (5%) level and “.” at the 0.1 (10%) level.  
Further analysis is presented toward the bottom of the table, noting the number of missing 
observations and R-squared values, amongst others, for each model. 
 
As can be seen in the table, models 1 and 2 incorporate the base model specifications, and it is 
found that all explanatory variables have the correct signs with the findings for governance, natural 
resource rents, and the oil dummy being significant – whereas both measures of labour (labour 
market efficiency and tertiary school enrolment) in their respective models are not significant.  It is 
clear that countries in the SSA region, on average, benefit from increased inward FDI on account of 
locational advantages stemming from good governance, natural resource wealth, better labour 
markets and skilled workers, and oil wealth.  This finding holds true in both models, despite the large 
disparity in the number of observations between the first and alternate models – the latter 
indicating only three missing observations out of the total of 47 countries within SSA.  It is further 
interesting to note that in both models, the governance and oil dummy variables share quite similar 
positive coefficients, indicating that – at this stage of the analysis – institutional and policy variables 
relating to governance influence inward FDI to the sub-Saharan African region on an almost on par 
basis with whether a country possesses and exploits its domestic oil resources.  In the following 
models, the base specification is further augmented by other potential sources of locational 
advantage, noted in past literature, and discussed in the methodology chapter of this paper. 
 
Models 3 and 4 add their respective measures of market size to capture the influence of this variable 
upon inward FDI in the SSA region.  The effects of this are notably different between the two 
models, pointing to a definite case in which the number of observations in the GCR-based model 3 is 
not sufficient to allow for a conclusive inference.  As is indicated by the table, market size in model 3 
is positively associated to inward FDI flows to the region, and is found to be very significant – with 
the association between governance and natural resource rents upon inward FDI decreasing 
somewhat from model 1, yet still significant at the 10% level.  Of concern, is the fact that the oil 
dummy variable is now negatively associated with inward FDI in model 3, in contrast to quite the 
opposite found in model 4.  The alternate model included GDP per capita as a measure for market 
size, as opposed to the GCR-based variable in model 3, and took into account far more observations 
with only 3 missing observations as opposed to 21.   
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Table 5.1 Summary of Findings from the different Model Specifications 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
               
Governance 1.433 1.014 0.89 1.2 0.544 1.159 0.398 0.886 0.534 0.999 0.397 1.024 0.404 1.217 
 
[0.625]* [0.48]* [0.435]. [0.575]* [0.338] [0.553]* [0.325] [0.531] [0.383] [0.543]. [0.433] [0.519]. [0.441] [0.52]* 
Natural Resource Rents 0.439 0.517 0.28 0.541 0.323 0.417 0.265 0.241 0.243 0.166 0.264 0.175 0.29 0.198 
 
[0.23]. [0.2]* [0.158]. [0.205]* [0.119]* [0.207]. [0.106]* [0.195] [0.112]* [0.209] [0.118]* [0.2] [0.125]* [0.196] 
Labour Market Efficiency 0.673 - -0.521 - -0.234 - -0.041 - 0.08 - -0.112 - -0.096 - 
 
[0.999] - [0.713] - [0.541] - [0.516] - [0.552] - [0.621] - [0.633] - 
Tertiary School Enrolment - 0.117 - 0.133 - 0.104 - 0.067 - 0.073 - 0.146 - 0.134 
 
- [0.073] - [0.078]. - [0.077] - [0.069] - [0.069] - [0.075]. - [0.074]. 
Oil Dummy 1.297 0.996 -0.055 1.139 -0.213 1.192 0.088 1.36 0.117 1.273 0.071 1.177 -0.123 1.287 
 
[0.616]* [0.559]. [0.492] [0.612]. [0.372] [0.592]. [0.34] [0.534]* 0.347 [0.541]* [0.358] [0.519]* [0.462] [0.512]* 
Market Size - - 1.4 - 1.426 - 1.288 - 1.339 - 1.244 - 1.3 - 
 
- - [0.274]*** - [0.206]*** - [0.174]*** - [0.191]*** - [0.236]*** - [0.253]*** - 
GDP per capita - - - -0.167 - -0.5 - -0.583 - -0.339 - -0.521 - -0.428 
 
- - - [0.279] - 0.336 - [0.299]. - [0.386] - [0.38] - [0.376] 
Exports of Goods and Services - - - - 1.125 0.873 1.149 0.93 1.197 0.921 1.177 1.042 1.227 0.862 
 
- - - - [0.278]*** [0.496]. [0.238]*** [0.444]* [0.251]*** [0.444]* [0.256]*** [0.429]* [0.271]*** [0.445]. 
GDP Growth - - - - - - 0.981 0.949 0.867 0.897 0.954 0.892 0.884 0.885 
 
- - - - - - [0.304]** [0.275]** [0.349]* [0.28]** [0.375]* [0.268]** [0.395]* [0.276]** 
Infrastructure - - - - - - - - -0.205 - -0.207 - -0.251 - 
 
- - - - - - - - [0.292] - [0.297] - [0.309] - 
Telephone Lines - - - - - - - - - -0.314 - -0.085 - -0.113 
 
- - - - - - - - - 0.315 - [0.322] - [0.32] 
Goods Market Efficiency - - - - - - - - - - 0.449 - 0.516 - 
 
- - - - - - - - - - [0.627] - [0.645] - 
Export/Import Time - - - - - - - - - - - 1.238 - 0.921 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - [0.612]. - [0.628] 
Inflation - - - - - - - - - - - - -0.169 0.287 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - [0.247] 0.178 
               R Squared 0.337 0.353 0.713 0.359 0.846 0.408 0.906 0.5634 0.909 0.576 0.912 0.624 0.9149 0.654 
Residual Std. Error 1.265 - 21 1.304 - 39 0.854 - 20 1.315 - 38 0.642 - 19 1.264 - 36 0.525 - 17 1.117 - 34 0.534 - 16 1.117 - 33 0.542 - 15 1.068 - 32 0.5516 - 14 1.045 - 30 
Missing Observations 21 3 21 3 21 4 22 5 22 5 22 5 22 6 
Intercept 15.859 17.681 17.405 18.731 12.255 18.264 10.216 17.451 10.213 16.145 9.436 12.221 9.368 12.871 
 
[4.305]** [0.477]*** [2.92]*** [1.816]*** [2.536]*** [1.763]*** [2.284]*** [1.626]*** [2.319]*** [2.087]*** [2.593]** [2.783]*** [2.642]** [2.749]*** 
p-value 6.07E-02 1.63E-03 6.93E-05 3.60E-03 8.67E-07 2.92E-03 1.48E-07 9.25E-05 5.99E-07 1.62E-04 2.22E-06 7.66E-05 7.82E-06 9.75E-05 
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Model 4 indicated a negative association between this measure of market size, though the findings 
were not significant, whilst all other variables remained positively associated with inward FDI, and 
were found to be significant.  Interestingly, the association of the oil dummy upon inward FDI 
strengthened somewhat, as governance weakened, when GDP per capita was controlled for. 
 
Upon inspection of the R-squared values, it becomes apparent that model 3 accounted by far the 
best for the variance exhibited by its observations; however, this must be tempered by the fact that 
there were 21 missing observations – many of which are significant oil-producing countries such as 
Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan - pointing to the merits of model 4 (and indeed all the 
alternate regression models) in more appropriately accounting for the effects of these variables vis-
‘a-vis general regional locational advantage.    
 
Models 5 and 6 control for the exports of goods and services variable, in order to account for 
locational advantages in terms of trade openness.  Again, the results are somewhat mixed with 
respect to the alternate measures used in either model.  It is safe to say, however, that the greater a 
sub-Saharan African country’s GDP is accounted for by the export of goods and services the more 
likely it is, on average, to receive larger sums of inward FDI.  This is apparent as the exports of goods 
and services variable, in both models, was found to be positive and significant (much more so in 
model 5).  Models 7 and 8 add GDP growth to the analysis in order to capture the effects of stable 
and consistently growing economies upon the locational decisions of foreign investors.  Both models 
indicated a strong, positive, and statistically significant association between GDP growth and inward 
FDI, however, the oil dummy still proved to be more robust and positively associated to inward FDI – 
as indicated by the alternate model, model 8, which included far more observations, and accounted 
for many of the oil-producing countries excluded in model 7 due to missing data. 
 
Models 9 and 10 include and control for measures of infrastructure in order to capture the locational 
advantage stemming from this variable upon inward FDI, in the sub-Saharan African region.  Model 9 
follows the base model specification by incorporating data from the GCR, while the alternate model, 
model 10, builds upon the alternate measures used by including telephone lines per 100 people to 
proxy for infrastructure.  As indicated by table 4.1, measures for infrastructure were surprisingly 
negatively associated with inward FDI in the SSA region, a finding confirmed by both models, 
although these were not found to be significant.  Furthermore, controlling for infrastructure in the 
SSA region influenced the locational advantage of all other variables included in the models this far 
to only a marginal extent – with all positive associations slightly decreasing to account for the 
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variance captured in the models by the two infrastructure variables.  Models 11 and 12 include and 
control for their respective measures of goods market efficiency, with model 12 building upon the 
GCR variables, and the alternate model, model 12, including the export/import time variable to 
proxy for goods market efficiency.  Both models indicated a positive association between their 
respective measures upon inward FDI, with the export/import time variable being more positively 
associated and significant.   
 
Finally, inflation was included and controlled for in models 13 and 14, concluding the multiple 
regression analysis.  The findings for the inflation variable were inconclusive as model 13, building 
upon the GCR variables, indicated a negative association – as opposed to the alternate model, model 
14, indicating a positive association between inflation and inward FDI to the sub-Saharan African 
region, with both results not being significant.  Most importantly, however, are the coefficients and 
significance levels of all variables included in these two final models which endeavour to account for 
the relative influence and locational advantage of inward FDI to the sub-Saharan African region.  
There are striking disparities between the two final models, with specific regard to the influence of 
the oil dummy variable and market size.  This can be accounted for by the fact that model 13, based 
upon the GCR variables, excludes from its analysis many oil producing countries in the region, as 
already discussed, due to missing data.  Whilst the GCR variables are far more comprehensive, 
aggregate, measures as opposed to the proxy measures included in the alternate models, the 
number of missing observations – specifically upon oil-producing countries such as Angola, 
Equatorial Guinea and Sudan amongst others – undermines the validity of these findings to too great 
an extent, especially in light of the key aims of this paper.  For this reason, the final alternate model, 
model 14, shall be considered as the most conclusive model of relative locational advantage in this 
chapter.   
 
Upon closer consideration of model 14 in table 4.1, a number of interesting findings, relevant to the 
broader objectives of this paper, becomes evident.  Firstly, all previously discussed potential sources 
of locational advantage in the SSA region were found to be positively associated with inward FDI to 
the region, with the exceptions of the market size proxy, GDP per capita, and the infrastructure 
proxy (the number of telephone lines per 100 people).  Furthermore, the findings on inflation and 
the export/import time variables contradict conventional logic and past prescriptions noted in the 
literature, as model 14 indicated a positive association between these variables upon inward FDI, 
however, these were not significant and supported by model 13.  These observations indicate that, 
on average, countries in the sub-Saharan African region, for the period under consideration, who 
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scored better on key institutional and policy matters related to governance, possessed and exploited 
their natural resources (especially oil), possessed a more skilled and educated labour force, exported 
more, and maintained higher levels of economic growth could have expected greater sums of inward 
foreign direct investment, based upon these notable locational advantages.  Furthermore, the 
governance, labour proxy, oil dummy, exports of goods and services, and GDP growth variables were 
all found to be significant. 
 
The relevance of these findings with regard to the broader aims of this paper are threefold.   Firstly, 
the oil dummy variable is reported to be the most positively associated variable vis-‘a-vis inward FDI 
to the region.  While governance is found to possess a robust influence upon FDI to sub-Saharan 
Africa, the economic exploitation of oil reserves arguably represents a much greater locational 
advantage – further credited by these findings that the magnitude of such inward FDI flows, in 
absolute dollar terms, is much larger for oil rich countries as opposed to well governed states in the 
region.  The implications of this present a situation in which the locational choices of foreign 
investors in the region are more influenced (in terms of locational choice as well as scale of 
investment) by the availability of oil within a sovereign territory, as opposed to institutional and 
policy matters related to governance – a locational advantage in which the host country actually has 
the ability to control via good governance and institutional development.   
 
Secondly, factor endowment-based theories are significant insofar as they account for the significant 
influence of oil within their broader understanding of the locational advantages of natural resources 
– vis-‘a-vis sub-Saharan Africa.  Other potential macroeconomic determinants of inward FDI were 
found to be positively associated, and significant; however, as our measure of inward FDI accounted 
for net inflows in current U.S. dollars, the scale or magnitude of these flows indicated that such 
variables were less influential than oil wealth.   
 
Thirdly, whilst market size was found to be very robust upon inward FDI to the region, the models 
which reported this included a number of missing observations – many of which were oil-producing 
countries such as Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan.  In comparison to the final alternate model, 
model 14, it is noted that the market size proxy, GDP per capita, is actually negatively associated to 
inward FDI, but is not significant.  These findings argue that for much of the inward foreign direct 
investment to SSA, which excludes oil-producing states, market-seeking FDI features prominently, 
with specific reference to countries such as Mauritius; however, when including observations for 
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countries such as Equatorial Guinea - and other oil-producing states - market size becomes much 
less influential vis-‘a-vis oil endowments. 
 
Observations with Regard to the Private Security Industry 
In contrast to the prescriptions of much more comprehensive, global dataset, studies on the 
locational advantage of institutions and policy matters related to governance, it has been noted that 
sub-Saharan Africa does not conform very well to the hypothesis that such variables have necessarily 
become more relevant to inward FDI than more conventional ‘natural assets’ such as natural 
resource (particularly oil) factor endowments.  As discussed earlier, consensus has emerged around 
the idea that ‘created assets’ such as good governance and institutional development have come to 
be viewed as increasingly, if not more, relevant upon the locational choices of foreign investors.  
Based on these findings, however, it is noted that the measure of governance which incorporated 
aggregate data on six key dimensions of governance, namely: rule of law, political stability and 
absence of violence, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, government effectiveness and 
control of corruption was actually less positively associated to inward FDI than were considerations 
related to oil endowment.  Indeed, this was further reported for all other variables included in the 
analysis, indicating the primacy of oil factor endowments upon the locational choices of foreign 
investors vis-‘a-vis the region. 
 
These findings support the idea that, remaining cognisant of the operations of the private security 
industry in SSA over the past two decades, and given the strategic value of oil in the international 
system, the importance of institutional development and good governance vis-‘a-vis inward FDI is 
somewhat mitigated.  As private security and military contractors effectively fill the void left by poor 
governance with regard to lawlessness, weak institutions and political stability, the otherwise urgent 
need for certain host nation governments in sub-Saharan Africa to pursue institutional reform and 
development is subsequently undermined.  These trends may very well lead to long-term 
unsustainability, but dually highlight the fact that the privatisation and outsourcing of the state 
security function results in very significant short to medium term benefits, specifically regarding the 
full economic exploitation of oil factor endowments in certain sub-Saharan African countries.   
Furthermore, the findings of the analysis presented in this chapter support the idea that the growth 
of the private security industry in SSA can be understood as a means for foreign capital to 
circumvent particularly ‘immobile factors’ of the globalised market (with reference to good 
governance and institutional quality) in order to gain hold of strategically significant commodities 
such as oil.  Given the relatively low levels of development of SSA vis-‘a-vis the global mean, the 
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operations of private security and military contractors in the region can be viewed as the 
manifestation of the market to effectively augment a traditionally ‘immobile factor’ which has not 
been conducive to the interests of foreign investors and other international actors into something 
which is mobile – and better governed by the market forces of supply and demand.  As argued 
previously, the security function of otherwise poorly governed sovereign territories in SSA is 
essentially outsourced and privatised in order to accommodate the international interests of asset 
and resource seeking inward FDI in the region.  Subsequently, the institutional component of 
locational advantage in sub-Saharan Africa is diluted and is arguably less significant, as countries 
with poor institutional capacities can still appear to be much more attractive to inward foreign direct 
investments than their better governed counterparts, on account of factor endowments such as oil 
wealth - in conjunction with the operation of private security contractors, to privately secure and 
service those investments.    
What this chapter has provided is a statistical account that the governance and institutional 
component of locational advantage is indeed less influential upon the decisions of foreign investors 
regarding the sub-Saharan African region – while oil factor endowment considerations are more 
significant.  The extent to which the international private security industry has facilitated the 
interests of foreign capital, by providing the services needed such that these investments are secure, 
and thereby allowing foreign actors to circumvent otherwise costly considerations in which host 
country governance and institutional factors would feature more prominently, can only be examined 
in a qualitative manner.  Accordingly, the next chapter shall provide a case-specific account of the 
ways in which private military and security provision has facilitated these developments, by focusing 
on one of the most prominent countries in the region in terms of international oil and security 
politics. 
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Chapter VI 
The Role of the International PSI in the Oil Economy of 
Angola – A Case Study 
 
 
Despite the recent histories of most sub-Saharan African petro-states being characterised by large 
flows of inward foreign direct investment, poor institutional and governance scores, and significant 
periods and incidences of politically-motivated violence, no country in the region better exemplifies 
this political economy typology more so than Angola.  Moreover, where a number of SSA petro-
states have played host to private military and security companies, in the past two decades, Angola – 
by a review of the existing literature – can be argued to be the most prominent regional case in 
which the privatisation of security and military related services has been effectively playing out.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the key arguments of this paper, and to qualitatively assess 
the causal link between the operations of the PSI vis-‘a-vis the magnitude of inward FDI, to a poorly-
governed and institutionally weak sub-Saharan African petro-state. 
 
This chapter shall proceed in three parts.  Firstly, Angola will be discussed in relation to the core aims 
and purpose of this study, in order to underscore the appropriateness and limitations of this case for 
a small-n qualitative assessment – and one in which possible inferences can be applied to a broader 
panel (namely, all oil-producing and/or resource-rich SSA states).  The primary basis for this initial 
assessment will centre upon an engagement with the key arguments and observations of the second 
chapter of this paper.  To this effect, the validity of Angola as an appropriate case shall be gauged by 
means of a review the country’s political economy, specifically focusing upon the country’s renewed 
international geostrategic and economic significance (on account of its oil wealth) and the 
constituent external and internal demand for private security in the country – by a multitude of 
different actors.  
 
Secondly, the experiences of Angola with regard to specific dealings with private military and 
security companies shall be outlined and elaborated upon.  This section will provide a detailed 
timeline of the key operations and dealings of private security and military entities within the 
country, whilst dually accounting for the case-specific actors involved in these dealings.  Moreover, 
this section shall engage the key debates regarding the growth and evolution of the international PSI 
 92 | P a g e  
 
– as discussed in the literature review – and provide insight into the multi-faceted nature of the 
industry, based upon the Angolan experience.  
 
The final part of the second section shall illustrate and determine the strength of causality between 
good governance and inward foreign direct investment, as opposed to oil wealth and inward foreign 
direct investment, by presenting the growth and development of the international PSI as the 
effective causal mechanism between the latter.  The growth and increasing legitimacy and efficiency 
of private military and security provision will then be framed as an enabler to the needs of particular 
external and internal economic and political interests; subsequently allowing inward FDI to the 
country to be much better equipped to circumvent previous security concerns, and mitigate the 
influence of institutional quality upon inward FDI. 
 
6.1 The Political Economy of the Angolan Oil Industry 
Angola provides an ideal case in which to descriptively analyse the activities and influence of private 
military and security companies in the political economies of sub-Saharan African petro states for a 
number of reasons.  Akin to most of the region’s major oil-producers, Angola’s history is deeply 
steeped in violent conflict, massive economic and political grievances by ordinary citizens, and poor 
economic and institutional development.  Moreover, Angola served as a central theatre of Cold War 
superpower rivalry, and is therefore no stranger to the consequences and implications of foreign 
interests and competition within its territory.  Of key interest, however, is the fact that despite one 
of the longest and most bitter civil wars waged in sub-Saharan Africa, and despite the country’s 
persisting economic and institutional underdevelopment, Angola has attracted significant sums of 
inward FDI and has emerged as the second largest crude oil producer in the region, after Nigeria.203   
 
Building upon the statistical observations of this paper, Angola can indeed be classified as one of 
sub-Saharan Africa’s foremost enclave-based petro states, noting that the vast majority of all 
government revenue is derived from the domestic oil industry and that the oil sector has more or 
less been structurally developed in exclusion to the inefficiencies of, and linkages to, the rest of the 
domestic economy.  As argued by a special report on the state of the Angolan oil industry, Global 
Witness – a British based NGO – observed that, throughout the 1990s, the Angolan oil industry 
operated in complete independence of the general domestic economy, one which had been acutely 
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affected by the pains of protracted warfare, and further appeared to make very little contribution to 
the welfare of ordinary citizens.204   
 
Further underscoring the prominence of the country’s enclave-based economy, is the fact that 
throughout prolonged periods of violence, political conflict and economic insecurity, international oil 
companies maintained their productivity and efficiency in the country due to the relative isolation 
they were afforded by their offshore operations, the small number of Angolan nationals which were 
directly employed by these companies, and the dependency these companies had upon 
international – as opposed to domestic – contractors to provide services (due to a lack of domestic 
competency).205  The results of such exclusion vis-‘a-vis the domestic economy led to the domestic 
oil industry, even whilst the country was at the height of its political and economic malaise, to 
fittingly be the only growing economic sector – far more dependent upon international markets – 
whilst the rest of the economy withered under the effects of tight monetary and fiscal policies.206     
 
The roots of this structural exclusion, and the subsequent eminence of Angola’s oil enclave, can be 
traced as far back to 1955 in which onshore oil was first discovered by the multinational Petrofina 
who, together with the then colonial administration of the territory, constructed a refinery in the 
capital city to process the crude.207  By 1973, oil had become the principal export of Angola following 
the expansion of the sector on account of large offshore discoveries off the coast of the Cabinda 
territory by a now subsidiary group of the Chevron oil corporation.208  Following these discoveries, 
the government structured a national oil company, the Sociedade Nacionao de Combustivies 
(otherwise referred to as Sonangol) and enacted certain laws which established that: 
 ... all deposits of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons which exist underground or on the continental 
shelf within the national territory, up to the limit of the jurisdictional waters of the People’s Republic 
of Angola, or within any territory domain over which Angola exercises sovereignty, as established by 
international conventions, belongs to the Angolan People, in the form of free state property.
209
 
 
Subsequently, Sonangol, acting as the state apparatus to oversee the development of the country’s 
oil and natural gas resources (now legally defined as state property), became the sole concessionaire 
for all oil exploration and development, and was further mandated the task of entering into joint 
                                                          
204
 Global Witness, A Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the 
Plunder of State Assets, http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness, London, p. 6 
205
 Ibid. p. 6 
206
 Ibid.  p. 6 
207
 Ibid.  p. 5 
208
 Ibid.  p. 5 
209
 Ibid.   p. 5  
 94 | P a g e  
 
partnerships and economic ventures with foreign oil multinationals to secure and obtain the 
necessary resources needed for the development of the industry.210   By the beginning of the 1980s, 
Angola’s onshore oil-rich areas were divided into 13 blocks, and set aside for investment and 
development.211  The offshore oil-rich areas were then focused upon and subsequently divided into 
numerous blocks with possible regions for development reaching increasing ocean depths over time.  
By the late 1990s the government issued the country’s first ‘ultra-deepwater’ blocks, the most 
lucrative and capital-intensive, to a consortium of multinationals – notably Norsk Hydro, Chevron 
and Shell, in conjunction with Sonangol.212 
 
The collaborative partnerships between the state and foreign oil companies have taken the form of 
two distinct frameworks over the years, namely through joint ventures and production sharing 
agreements (PSAs), with the latter becoming increasingly popular in recent years.  As opposed to 
joint ventures, in which Sonangol and its partners split production and investments costs based upon 
their shareholding powers, PSAs generally involve oil multinationals, which serve as contractors to 
Sonangol, incurring the full initial cost and burden of exploration and development.213  As outlined 
by Global Witness, 
When production starts, the oil is divided into different sections.  First, ‘royalty oil’ accrues to the 
government.  Second, ‘cost oil’ is received by the members of the contractor group, and is 
earmarked to pay for their investments.  This can be up to 50% of the oil that is produced.  The 
remainder is known as ‘profit oil’ and is divided between the foreign oil companies, Sonangol and the 
government according to a complex tax structure.
214
 
 
Most oil multinationals operating in Angola follow arrangements which typically are of the form of 
PSAs with the state oil company Sonangol, however, the lucrative offshore oil producing blocks off 
the coast of Cabinda remain structured according to joint ventures between the state and the 
domestically dominant oil multinationals of the U.S.-based Chevron and French-based Elf oil 
companies – amongst a few others.215  The economic significance of these offshore deepwater 
blocks cannot be understated, and directly speaks to the literature on the increasing global 
competition for sub-Saharan African oil – especially in light of the demand stemming from emerging 
powers from the global South.   
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Remaining cognisant of the technological advantage that Western oil multinationals possess vis-‘a-
vis the exploitation of deepwater reserves of crude oil, it is fitting to note that this has in no way 
acted to ease the fierce competition for the SSA region’s reserves of strategically significant natural 
resources.  In fact, if the Angolan oil industry can be viewed as a microcosm of the broader region, 
quite the opposite has occurred.  Whilst the technological and competitive advantages of Western 
oil MNCs may have sidelined the aspirations of certain powers from the global South, which lack the 
capacity to exploit deepwater deposits of crude oil, competition in and amongst the Western oil 
companies has not, however, eased-off as a result.    Such assertions can be made by observing the 
increasingly costly premium placed upon the securing of exploration and extraction rights of ultra-
deep water blocks off the coast of Angola, by numerous Western oil companies such as BP-Amoco, 
Elf and Exxon.  To this effect, once-off non-recoverable down payments by these companies, in order 
to secure these rights, have now reached sums well into hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars – 
specifically to obtain drilling licences for offshore blocks in excess of depths of 2000 metres.216    
 
The rents captured by the government through these substantial once-off payments for the securing 
of drilling licences, along with the royalties and ‘profit oil’ accruing to the state by the production of 
oil by foreign companies - acting in partnership with Sonangol through joint ventures and PSAs – 
and, offcourse, the certain taxes and levies imposed upon exports and foreign nationals are of 
massive proportions to say the least.  These rents constitute the largest share of all government 
revenue, and are further factored into the country’s yearly receipt of inward foreign direct 
investment.  What is of notable concern, however, is the fact that this receipt of inward FDI is 
marginally dependent, if at all, upon the broader economic and political situation of the country, and 
can therefore be viewed as the defining feature of the country’s locational advantage.   
 
In other words, proven reserves of exploitable crude oil override investment concerns based upon 
political security, economic stability and institutional quality, due to the distinct nature of Angola’s 
oil-enclave based political economy – which affords foreign oil multinationals substantial isolation 
from, and disassociation with, the inherent weaknesses of the country in general.  Due to this, 
investment in the country’s oil industry is neither deterred nor is it constrained by the concerns 
which would confront foreign investors in almost all other sectors of the country’s economy.  This 
has consequently allowed oil-directed inward FDI to circumscribe the numerous variables and 
associated determinants traditionally attached to models of locational advantage.   
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Such arguments can well account for the statistical findings of chapter five, which proved that the oil 
dummy variable in sub-Saharan Africa is indeed more positively associated to inward foreign direct 
investment than any other dependent or intervening variable.  Of particular interest is that Angola 
scored quite poorly, below the mean value and median observation, for the governance variable, 
accounting for six broad dimensions of good governance and institutional quality, which generally 
tends to be positively correlated to inward FDI, and the subsequent locational advantage of host 
countries.  On further inspection it can be seen that this is indeed the case with a number of sub-
Saharan African petro-states, underscoring the relegation of governance and institutional factors to 
the prominence of the oil dummy as the primary explanatory variable for inward FDI to the region.  
On this basis a case can be made for the qualitative validity of Angola as representative of the 
majority of sub-Saharan African petro-states, and therefore lends a certain amount of credit for any 
inferences drawn from this case study to a broader regional panel. 
 
6.1.2 A Review of the Angolan Security Environment 
Angola, like many sub-Saharan African petro-states, has become almost synonymous with political 
conflict, civil war and protracted periods of violence, instability and insecurity.  Arguably more so 
than many states in the region, Angola’s history is characterised by extensive dealings with foreign 
actors, specifically in the area of the country’s internal armed conflicts.  As a key hotspot of Cold War 
rivalry, post-colonial Angola has played host to varying degrees of American, Soviet, Cuban and 
South African influence within its borders, with each respective actor supporting the aspirations of 
armed opposition movements and nationalist groups most conducive to their own ideological 
leanings and foreign policy objectives at the time.  Despite certain short-lived periods of relative 
calm, Angola’s internal battles continued well after the conclusion of the Cold War, persisted 
throughout the 1990s, and has left the country with a fragile, though arguably stable, peace and 
political dispensation since the death of a key opposition leader in 2002.217   
 
In this way, Angola further presents a valuable case in which to examine the role of inward FDI to 
SSA petro-states, as the growth and development of the country’s enclave oil economy occurred 
alongside periods of extremely turbulent political and economic turmoil.  Whereas countries such as 
Sudan, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville have together played host to 
periods of prolonged conflict, dealt with attempted and successful coups, violent militias and rebel 
groups - and general political and economic upheaval - throughout the development of their 
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respective oil sectors, Angola’s civil war coincides most favourably vis-‘a-vis an examination of 
inward FDI to the region’s troubled petro-states. 
 
Angola’s political malaise throughout the 1990s marks a period which not only coincides with 
growing international demand for sub-Saharan African oil, and the consequent renewal of its 
geopolitical strategic value, but dually marks a period in which the international private security 
industry began to emerge as an increasingly legitimate and influential actor in global oil and security 
politics.  The convergence of these two global developments clearly manifested in the politically 
unstable, institutionally weak and otherwise economically unviable, oil-rich states of the region 
through the emergence of private military and security companies.  These companies served 
numerous functions, but of key interest to the aims of this paper is the fact that the combined 
influence of such companies altered the locational advantage of fragile oil-rich sub-Saharan African 
states in ways which greatly facilitated foreign oil interests; and indeed the interests of regional 
elites and ruling parties by servicing the international demand for oil.  This was accomplished by 
better allowing inward FDI to the region to circumvent prior political and institutional concerns, 
through the provision of private services to secure the physical and financial assets of foreign 
investors.  Therefore, such companies served to undercut the risk associated with the dependency 
foreign investors previously had to place upon SSA governments to provide secure and stable 
institutional and economic environments, conducive to foreign investment. 
 
Accordingly, it can now be said that Angola’s rise to prominence in international oil politics, 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, has arguably been accompanied by a case of the SSA region’s most 
noticeable and dynamic relationship with transnational private military and security provision.  With 
reference to the working definition of PMSCs provided in chapter 2, Angola provides an excellent 
case in which to assess the full spectrum of private military and security provision, as most SSA 
petro-states have not generally played host to the operations of the more intrusive and 
controversial elements of this definition, specifically, the dimension which captures the provision of 
private military assistance.  A number of oil-producing, and other resource-rich, states in sub-
Saharan Africa, such as Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, indeed stand out in terms of their recent histories with private military and security 
provision.  Angola, however, presents a case which is far more substantial in terms of the scale and 
scope of this provision, and therefore allows a more robust interpretation of the causal effect of 
such services upon a country’s locational advantage vis-‘a-vis inward FDI.  To this effect, Sean Cleary 
cites David Isenberg in a broadcast by the American Defence Monitor in late 1997 in which Isenberg 
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argued that the provision of private security groups on the African continent numbered around one 
hundred, at the time, of which, he alleged, 80 percent operated in Angola.218 
 
These “security groups” refer to private security companies (the less intrusive and controversial end 
of this paper’s definition of PMSCs) and specifically underscores the operations of a number of 
prominent international security providers such as Defence Systems Limited (DSL), Gray Security 
Limited, and locally-registered public enterprise security companies – controlled by Angolan military 
officials - such as Alpha 5 Lda and Tele Service Sociedada de Telecommunicacoes, Seguranca e 
Servicos (otherwise known as TeleServices).219  These security providers generally offered services to 
local and international clients which paid for asset protection, such as the guarding and associated 
security concerns of embassies, oil refineries, diamond fields, terminals, warehouses and other 
corporate premises; however, this is not to say that these companies did not engage in more illicit, 
or controversial, service provision – akin to private military companies.220  To this effect, Hyder 
Gulam asserts that such companies can easily disguise their activities by claiming to be legitimate 
security providers offering protection services whilst dually engaging in much more coercive military 
operations.221   
 
Such arguments are, however, more speculation than fact with regard to the listed security 
providers named above, yet Angola’s recent history has also witnessed the effective operations of 
private military companies, which did much more than provide mere asset protection, with specific 
reference to the former South African-registered Executive Outcomes (E.O.), the focus of this 
chapter.  Furthermore, a number of prominent American companies such as the Florida-based Air 
Scan company, which provided aerial intelligence gathering services, as well as Military Professional 
Resources, Incorporated (MPRI), amongst a few others, have also operated within Angola for private 
clients, generally oil multinationals, and even for the U.S. government.222  The services rendered by 
these companies are, however, less well documented than those of E.O. and have generally been of 
a less controversial nature. 
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It is in this way that Angola qualifies as a most suitable candidate in which to assess the role of 
PMSCs in sub-Saharan African petro-states, due to its substantial dealings with the full spectrum of 
private military and security provision.  In order to assess the influence of these companies upon the 
locational advantage of the country, the political-economic context in which the demand for PMSCs 
were derived must first, however, be outlined and understood.  Given that a full examination of the 
Angolan Civil War is far beyond the scope of this chapter, the key issues and actors which gave shape 
to the conflict, specifically throughout the 1990s, must be accounted for in order to assess the 
internal demand for private military and security provision within the country, and is provided for 
below. 
 
The roots of Angola’s political impasse, conflict and fragility for the better part of the 1990s and 
early 2000s can be accounted for by the actions of the two primary actors within the Angolan 
political space; namely the Movimento Popular da Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) which is now firmly 
in power, and their main political rivals Uniao para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), which 
has been significantly weakened ever since the death of its founder and leader, Jonas Savimbi, in 
February 2002.223  The attempts by these two former nationalist-struggle movements to gain 
complete control of the state, throughout the better half of the end of the twentieth century, has in 
many ways led to the definitive structure of the Angolan state as it is today.  Most notably, the 
rivalry between these two groups for absolute power and exclusive legitimacy within Angola, speaks 
to the literature provided in the second chapter of this paper regarding conflict, political-
contestation, and the aspirations of local political groups.  Specifically, the Angolan experience 
credits the positions outlined earlier in this paper which relate to the capture of the sovereign 
apparatus in its entirety, within oil-rich SSA petro-states with significant exploitable reserves of 
offshore crude oil, such that political actors can win the necessary international legitimacy to reap 
the financial benefits of substantial oil-based government revenues.   
 
Despite much of Angola’s military battles not being concentrated in the capital city, such ideas go a 
long way in explaining the tenacity with which each side held onto their respective claims for 
absolute legitimacy and control of the state.  Moreover, these arguments apply insofar that one of 
the defining features of modern Angola has been the prominence of identity-based politics, 
premised upon on the development of two states within one – the strongholds and de facto states 
of UNITA and the MPLA throughout most of the Angolan civil war. 
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Due to the lack of either side willing to make any significant concessions, or commitment to 
reconciliation, for the sake of overall national development and state-building, the rise of a parallel 
state, marked by the borders of UNITA control, emerged alongside the development of the MPLA 
within their respective zone of influence within Angola.224  As both groups competed for legitimacy 
within the country, the MPLA failed to make considerable inroads into Angola’s rural-base and 
cumulatively secured legitimacy among the greater sum of the country’s urban enclaves, and, most 
importantly, established itself in Luanda.225  UNITA on the other hand quickly mobilised its support in 
the country side, and established a similarly formidable base of operations far removed from the 
MPLA heartland.226  The nature of these parallel quasi-state entities revolved around the provision of 
civilian services in the form of healthcare, education and the maintenance of supplies of food, which 
either side achieved with some help from their respective foreign sponsors, such as Cuba and South 
Africa in the case of the MPLA and UNITA respectively.227 
 
The effect of this prolonged and deepening bifurcation of Angolan society largely resulted in an 
entrenched either/or political conception of identity by most Angolans, one in which ordinary 
citizens were compelled to label themselves as either ‘government people’ (referring to the now 
internationally acknowledged MPLA government) or as ‘UNITA people’ – with each respective group 
classifying the other as the enemy.228  This understanding of the state by most Angolans largely 
persists up until the present day, due to the substantial role that membership of either movement 
had upon the livelihoods of ordinary Angolans.  This was due to the fact that political identity was 
more often based upon necessity, as opposed to choice; due to the very possible risk of death 
should one profess allegiance to an opposing side, within the confines of the other’s zone of 
influence.229  Pearce goes on to elaborate that these developments led to a paradox of political 
identities in wartime Angola in which he posits that, 
... Identities had to be maintained as a matter of life or death, yet the depth of conviction that 
underlay these identities was questionable, and identities could (and had to) be changed as one 
passed from the control of one armed force to the other.
230
 
 
Illustrating the extent of this politicisation of identity, and the effects of this upon the lives of 
Angolans throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, was the phenomenon of mass forced migration by 
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each of the two political groups, which saw the removal and relocation of peasant populations 
whenever either political group had to retreat or redefine their respective zones of influence.231  
Taken together, the nature of Angola’s civil war throughout this period was marked by the dual 
grievances and aspirations of the country’s two leading political actors, which effectively took 
hostage of the general population, whilst attempting to forge movement-based political identities 
on which the legitimacy of the greater state would come to rest upon.  Furthermore, whilst the 
MPLA and UNITA did play active civil roles through the provision of certain public services to their 
respective constituencies, their legitimacy, for the most part, rested squarely upon coercion and the 
threat of force – as opposed to the will of those they supposedly governed.  It can therefore be 
argued that based on these observations, the actual legitimacy of the MPLA-based government of 
present day Angola is somewhat superficial, and hardly representative of the will of its governed. 
 
When these issues are viewed in conjunction with the vast oil wealth of the country, which the 
government receives as the largest share of its overall revenues, a case can be made which 
highlights the concerning disjuncture between the effective operation of the government vis-‘a-vis 
the state of the country’s general economy and development.  Despite Angola’s remarkable growth 
since 2002, such figures do not capture the growth of the economy as a separate and distinct entity 
from the country’s enclave oil sector.  Whilst the ruling party, along with other state elites, benefit 
from Angola’s booming oil industry, the general population may become increasingly disillusioned 
with the state of the post-war political dispensation – especially as the government becomes 
increasingly less dependent upon broad domestic support and legitimacy.  Moreover, without 
effective institutional and civic development, Angola could very well see its fragile stability fall apart 
as excluded domestic actors will not have the necessary means in which to legitimately express their 
concerns and seek change.  This directly touches upon the arguments of Ron and Englebert outlined 
in chapter three, and subsequently leads one to view the long term stability and security of the 
country with much apprehension. 
 
6.2 The International PSI in Angola: E.O. and Transnational Oil Interests 
Apart from the number of private security companies which operated in Angola throughout much of 
the country’s political disorder in the 1990s, it can safely be said that no company had more of a 
strategic influence upon Angola’s political and security environment than the Executive Outcomes 
group.  As discussed earlier, E.O. was much more than a private security company due to its 
capabilities which extended far beyond asset protection, training and consultation services.  
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Specifically, E.O. offered its clients services which had a direct strategic effect upon conflict zones, 
through its provision of specialised private military forces.  Cleary cites the observations of Howe in 
his assessment of E.O. vis-‘a-vis other PMSCs operating in Africa, in which Howe identifies three 
layers of security and military provision; he posits that:  
One layer is that of training... [and possibly]... guarding military installations, fairly benign operations.  
The second might be combat support; for example, ferrying troops up to the front in transport 
helicopters.  And then the third layer is actual combat.  Executive Outcomes is an incredible, what we 
call ‘force multiplier’.  It can do all three of those.  Most other organisations can do only one, or 
perhaps two, of the three.
 232
 
 
Through its provision of actual combat capability, E.O. distinguished itself from other private security 
providers by constituting the extreme, controversial, and most lucrative, end of the private security 
industry – and can consequently be defined as a private military company within this paper’s 
working definition of PMSCs.   E.O.’s corporate conquest began in 1989 as a front company for the 
operations of the defence force of the former apartheid state of South Africa, and initially served the 
role of an intelligence training unit for the SADF Special Forces.233  By 1995, however, E.O. emerged 
as a completely different entity altogether.  Due to the changing political environment of South 
Africa, E.O. expanded outwards, developing business ties with the mining industry and coming into 
contact with a number of key British businessmen with significant oil interests in Africa.234   
 
Under the leadership of Luther Eben Barlow, a former high-ranking South African military 
intelligence officer, E.O. received its first major contract in 1993 by Anthony Buckingham, a former 
British officer and “senior board advisor to several North American oil companies and the founder 
and chief executive officer of Heritage Oil and Gas in London”.235  The contract marked the beginning 
of E.O.’s expansion into the continent, and, particularly, its dynamic relationship with numerous 
political actors within Angola.  Due to the deteriorating security and political environment of the 
country in the early 1990s, transnational oil interests were subsequently feeling an increasing threat 
to their physical and financial assets within the country.  Due to a lack of faith in the institutional 
capacities of state, Buckingham, indicative of broader transnational oil interests, turned to the 
services of the private market and propositioned Barlow to recruit sufficient numbers of skilled men 
to capture and defend valuable oil tanks (specifically the assets of Heritage oil) in north-western 
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Angola.236  The contract was set for a two month period, which specifically focused upon the towns 
of Kefekwena and Soyo – which had been recently flooded by UNITA forces.237  While certain issues 
regarding the origins of this contract remain contentious, Cleary’s account of this deal corroborate 
the key observations of Pech noted above.  Moreover, with respect to the motivations and mandate 
of Buckingham, Cleary argues that “... the fact that Ranger’s [a Canadian-based oil company] and 
Heritage’s petroleum assets at that time, were apparently concentrated 120 kilometres south of 
Soyo, gave rise to a belief that Buckingham was acting either for a consortium of international oil 
companies, or for the Angolan government.”238 
 
Despite certain setbacks during the operation, and the fact that UNITA did recapture the area upon 
E.O.’s departure, the company succeeded in capturing and holding the area for the duration of its 
contract, and, most importantly, greatly increased the profile of the company – quickly gaining the 
attention of the MPLA.  As noted by Pech, in early 1993 the MPLA-recognised government found 
itself in a position in which it was increasingly willing to accept outside military and security 
assistance, due to UNITA’s steady advancement toward Luanda – placing the state’s oil resources 
under considerable threat.239  Ironically, Barlow’s previous operations for the SADF in support of 
UNITA worked to his favour in the military and security arrangement made between Buckingham 
and the MPLA, due to Barlow’s prior knowledge of UNITA and the Angolan political space.240  The 
deal which was struck involved the state oil company, Sonangol, which would partly finance E.O.’s 
operations in support of the state armed forces (the FAA), subsequently leading to a close 
coordinated working relationship between E.O.’s project leaders and their former enemies.241 
 
The urgency with which the MPLA brokered the deal with Buckingham can be in many ways 
accounted for by the regime’s acknowledgement of its critically vital hold over the state’s oil assets.  
Any threat to these resources would be viewed with immense concern and would subsequently 
drive up the regime’s economic demand for the services of such entities such as E.O.  Within this 
context, the definitive control of the state’s oil reserves meant a number of things.  As Reno 
contends, oil formed the primary component of the MPLA’s “... ability to gain access to political and 
material resources beyond Angola’s borders; not just to markets... but also to diplomatic channels 
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and more politically connected commercial networks that directly advance [it’s] security strategy.”242  
Apart from this, Reno adds that around 87% of the MPLA’s formally recorded revenues (exclusive of 
loans and aid) were provided for through the export of the country’s oil, for the period between 
1993 and 1998.243  Therefore, control of Luanda, and the recognised sovereign apparatus, essentially 
equated to the survival of the regime – through the collection of the country’s oil rents.  
Subsequently, in this way, the regime’s internal demand for the services of the PSI can be 
understood; further crediting the initiative undertaken by the MPLA and Buckingham, in striking a 
deal of the size and scope with which E.O. oversaw.244 
 
Cleary contends that the deal between E.O. and the MPLA spanned a period of twenty four months 
from September 1993 to September 1995, under which E.O. trained approximately 5000 troops from 
the FAA’s 16th Regiment as well as 30 pilots, and further provided support in terms of directing front-
line operations against UNITA.245  As a result, by the time of the Lusaka Peace Accord in late 1994, 
the augmented capabilities of the FAA, on account of E.O.’s support, enabled the MPLA-government 
forces to push back the UNITA onslaught and tip the balance of power in their favour.246  A key factor 
in this turn around had been the assistance E.O. provided to the FAA in terms of defining their 
particular requirements for armour, artillery and fighter and bomber aircraft, which the company 
procured on the FAA’s behalf on the international market.247  Indeed, certain estimates point to a 
figure of around two billion U.S. dollars which was spent on such equipment by the MPLA 
government by late 1994, which consequently led to a considerable tactical advantage over UNITA 
forces.248 
 
Moreover, building upon the notion of E.O. as a force multiplier, the company, throughout this 
period, further increased the operational capacities of the FAA vis-‘a-vis the leadership and technical 
expertise afforded to the FAA by of E.O.’s top military experts.249  The company established three 
facilities located in Lunda Sul, Cabo Ledo and Dondo which served the primary function of providing 
specialised training in combat techniques, weapons maintenance, engineering and reconnaissance, 
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to FAA troops.250  In these ways, E.O. not only entered the country as a PMSC which serviced an 
external international market demand for security, stemming from the institutional deficiencies of 
the state, but dually serviced an internal demand, the state itself - as a client - which sought to 
augment its military and security-related capabilities.   
 
The effects of E.O. vis-‘a-vis the prolongation of the Angolan civil war, and the subsequent effects 
that this had upon ordinary Angolan citizens is, however, a highly contentious issue.  Whether the 
relationship between the MPLA government and E.O. was conducive to the safety, security and 
development of the country’s citizens, as well as the natural political and institutional development 
of the nation, falls beyond the scope of this paper.  These issues should naturally be dealt with by 
studies which specifically examine PMSCs in terms of the regulation and accountability debates, 
touched upon in the second chapter of this paper; and build upon the idea that already weak states 
risk further weakening as a result of hiring these companies.251  It should be noted, however, that 
Angola, which generally specifies private security as a precondition for all MNCs to enter their 
domestic market, is certainly a prime candidate for studies which wish to assess the claims that such 
short-term reliance on PMSCs tend to crowd out the security apparatus of the state, thereby risking 
longer-term state authority for short-term investment and financial gain.252  Furthermore, based 
upon the number of government officials which are dually shareholders in the prominent Angolan 
TeleServices PMSC, the country would provide an ideal case to test the implications of such joint 
ownership upon issues of accountability and regulation.253 
 
What is clear, however, is that E.O. within the context provided, underscores a notable, albeit 
extreme, example of the ways in which the international PSI has come to increasingly define the 
political economies of sub-Saharan African petro-states – by facilitating transnational oil interests, 
and the subsequent primacy of the region’s enclave-based economies.  The contract with the MPLA 
allowed E.O. to consolidate itself financially, and catapulted the company onto a level of 
sophistication very rare among most other PMSCs operating on the continent.  Pech asserts that this 
two and half year contract had secured E.O. over forty million U.S. dollars per year amongst several 
other valuable oil and diamond concessions, allowing the company the opportunity “to diversify and 
establish a range of related companies”.254  By 1995, E.O. was registered as private limited company 
in South Africa, as well as having its British component registered by Buckingham in London (E.O. 
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U.K.).255  Moreover, Barlow established and registered a South African holding company by the name 
of Strategic Resources Corporation (SRC), controlled by E.O.’s directors, and which further spurred 
the corporate diversification strategy of the group – subsequently leading to a web of interrelated 
companies.256  E.O. (U.K.), controlled by Buckingham and other directors of Heritage Oil, followed 
suit and immersed their operations within a complex corporate structure, whilst notably forming a 
new company which served as “E.O.’s mineral counterpart until late 1996”, known as Branch 
Energy.257 
 
The benefits of this interrelated corporate structure allowed E.O. to further provide services such as 
the procurement of aircraft, weapons, surveillance equipment and a host of logistical measures 
through, for lack of a better term, outsourcing to the specialised business entities that fell under the 
corporate umbrella of the group.  Pech contends that there have been at least thirty to fifty affiliated 
or subsidiary companies of the E.O. group – ranging into industries as diverse as tourism, medical 
services, media and exploration equipment.258  Such business schemes underscore the arguments 
noted by George, in the second chapter of this paper, which highlighted the fact that the regulation 
of the international PSI faces considerable challenge from these types of complex contractual 
arrangements, which have come to define the industry.  Due to the multiple layers of accountability 
which stem from these business dealings, companies such as E.O. could effectively buffer 
themselves from numerous legal risks and public scrutiny, due to the controversial nature of its 
services, by spreading its operations across the web of interrelated companies within the broader 
group’s corporate structure. 
 
The inter-linkage between E.O., its U.K.-based agents, the numerous companies which fell under the 
Strategic Resources Corporation, and the growing network of the group’s government contacts 
throughout Africa culminated in the massive growth of the London-based Branch Energy group, 
which won multiple lucrative oil and mineral concessions - due to the distinct competitive advantage 
it maintained over its rivals.  As opposed to the operation of other mineral and oil extraction 
companies operating in the region, the corporate convergence of private military and security 
services in conjunction with international oil interests, rendered Branch Energy as one of the more 
competent players in the political economy of sub-Saharan Africa.  The company’s 1996 prospectus 
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certainly highlights the nature of its competitive advantages over its rivals in Africa, by asserting that 
it’s pan-African business network:   
 “... enables it to bypass the logistical problems of operating in Africa.  This includes the ‘... provision 
of aircraft for the transport of personnel and supplies and an established procurement infrastructure 
for the distribution of equipment and consumables.”
259
  
 
Moreover, Pech cites the prospectus by further adding that “the mineral group is capable of 
operating in ‘... politically sensitive and high risk security environments [and] has the ability to secure 
its own and other’s assets in extremely confrontational situations.’”260  These statements succinctly 
capture the specific ways in which the evolution of the international PSI, through a corporate 
structure, melds with transnational oil and mineral interests, services an arguable market gap left by 
the institutional capacities of host states, and ultimately augments the locational advantage of these 
states vis-‘a-vis inward foreign direct investment.   
 
In this way, Branch Energy effectively managed to acquire and secure lucrative oil and mineral 
concessions, and arguably allowed many other oil and mineral multinationals to operate in countries 
as turbulent as Angola throughout the 1990s.  Even despite the harrowing institutional deficiencies 
of the state during the period, the oil industry, and the mineral-security complex (as indicative of the 
E.O. group) flourished, relative to almost every other economic sector.  Again, this qualitatively 
underscores the robustness of the oil dummy variable in chapter five vis-‘a-vis its positive 
association with inward FDI to the SSA region – as opposed to variables relating to institutional 
quality and government capacity. 
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Chapter VII 
Conclusion  
 
 
By examining the relatively recent developments of transnational private military and security 
provision, this paper has outlined and observed a number of key features of the contemporary 
political economies of sub-Saharan African petro-states.  As discussed in chapter five, inward foreign 
direct investment to the SSA region, over the past fifteen years, has most greatly been associated 
with countries in the region that possess exploitable reserves of crude oil.  Whereas variables 
relating to institutional quality, political stability and economic security were indeed positively and 
significantly associated with inward to FDI to the region, the locational advantage of oil endowments 
has featured most prominently.  Moreover, oil endowments were far more positively associated 
with inward FDI to the region than all other macroeconomic variables included in the quantitative 
analysis of this paper.  Through this analysis, it was further noted that many of the region’s oil-
producing states, which have secured the receipt of massive sums of inward FDI, have also featured 
as some of the most politically unstable, institutionally weak and economically insecure countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Noting the significant premium international investors have traditionally placed upon the security of 
their investments, the nature of such investment patterns to the SSA region seems at direct odds 
with many of the key tenets of institutional theory, with specific reference to the ideas which inform 
the concept of locational advantage.  To account for this somewhat paradoxical state of affairs, in 
which many of the most poorly governed states in the region have managed to secure more inward 
FDI than their better governed counterparts, this paper has framed the growth of the international 
PSI as the effective causal mechanism in this context.  By examining the role of a significant private 
military and security company in Angola, it was observed that despite protracted periods of political 
and economic turmoil, and despite the very shaky legitimacy of the country’s primary political 
actors, oil-seeking transnational capital throughout the 1990s remained secure. 
 
Due to these trends in the privatisation and outsourcing of state security functions, it has been 
observed that transnational asset and resource seeking interests become less dependent upon 
domestic institutional, political and economic contexts, as foreign investments can now be 
increasingly serviced by the international private security industry.  In this way, recent developments 
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in private military and security provision can be understood to effectively augment the locational 
advantages of states playing host to inward FDI, by mitigating concerns relating to the practice of 
good governance.  Furthermore, these developments have better allowed transnational commercial 
interests to more efficiently circumvent otherwise costly considerations, whilst allowing better 
access to the exploitation of strategically significant commodities.  In this way, it has been observed 
that the growth of the international PSI can be viewed as the manifestation of the market to 
augment traditionally immobile factors, which have not been conducive to transnational commercial 
interests, into something which is mobile and better governed by the forces of supply and demand. 
 
Whilst sub-Saharan African petro-states have provided a good framework in which to examine these 
developments, it must be noted that this was primarily due to the international geopolitical and 
strategic value of oil in the contemporary international system.  In this way, these countries 
essentially provided easy cases in which to test some of the assumptions of this paper.  Moreover, 
the choice of Angola to qualify the statistical findings of this paper was another easy case, due to the 
country’s rich recent history with private military and security provision.  Due to this, the strength of 
causality between private military and security provision vis-‘a-vis inward FDI to the region remains 
weak, and requires much greater information and data on the operations of PMSCs in countries 
throughout the region.  Despite this, however, the quantitative findings of this paper provide the 
basis for such further examination, based on the fact that the greater sum of all foreign investment 
to sub-Saharan Africa is being secured by institutionally weak, politically unstable and economically 
insecure countries.  The growth of the international PSI could very well account for these 
developments, based upon the literature and qualitative analysis of this paper, yet this requires far 
more in depth reports of the elusive industry itself in order to make any solid generalisations which 
can be applied to all regional petro-states, and possibly all resource rich, developing, countries. 
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Appendix A 
Density Plots and Dot Charts of Variables Examined, but not presented, in Chapter 5 
A.1 Control of Corruption 
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A.2 Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
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A.3 Regulatory Quality 
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A.4 Rule of Law 
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A.5 Government Effectiveness 
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A.6 Voice and Accountability 
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A.7 GDP Growth 
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A.8 Market Size 
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A.9 Goods Market Efficiency 
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A.10 Infrastructure 
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A.11 GDP per capita 
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A.12 Time to export and import 
 
 
 
 
 122 | P a g e  
 
A.13 Tertiary School Enrolment 
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A.14 Telephone landlines 
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A.15 FDI as a percentage of a country’s GDP 
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Appendix B 
Macroeconomic and Institutional Data Used in this Paper261 
Table B.1 
Country Name Country 
Code 
OIL 
PRODUCI
NG 
EXPORTS 
OF GOODS 
AND 
SERVICES 
NATURA
L 
RESOUR
CE 
RENTS 
GDP PER 
CAPITA 
GDP 
GROWTH 
FDI NET 
INFLOWS AS 
PERCENT OF 
GDP 
FDI NET 
INFLOWS IN 
TERMS OF BOP 
Angola AGO 1 73.4633799
2 
53.1727
668 
1629.7355
66 
10.1683441
4 
10.35517462 1105510216 
Benin BEN 1 14.7272725
7 
2.00806
0677 
490.62308
99 
4.55238903
7 
1.774324868 70664293.36 
Botswana BWA 0 47.5741941
7 
2.55380
8698 
4591.1275
94 
5.11162077
5 
3.122722416 295737140 
Burkina Faso BFA 0 10.1714672
2 
3.57893
8138 
338.66254
38 
5.84804291
2 
1.136909085 68252120.67 
Burundi BDI 0 8.374715 10.8345
6718 
121.59355
32 
1.50218631
2 
0.170864534 1377051.931 
Cameroon CMR 1 22.6499282
4 
9.69975
4136 
831.75923
57 
3.85057332
8 
1.322378457 168349111.1 
Cape Verde CPV 0 23.4127259
3 
0.11241
8669 
1842.4103
09 
6.16680455
8 
6.946723765 71562947.26 
Central African 
Republic 
CAF 0 15.0330475
1 
6.01584
4907 
325.33466
23 
1.32702793
4 
1.690892695 26382149.85 
Chad TCD 1 33.3313925
5 
25.5884
162 
379.89495
8 
6.96355936
5 
9.184877628 218281975.3 
Comoros COM 0 15.1999183
1 
1.48521
5631 
556.75684
05 
1.84463650
8 
0.480064301 2113470.536 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
ZAR 1 24.6897190
6 
20.7716
8505 
123.71014
16 
1.51436784
8 
4.999370551 452994615.4 
Congo, Rep. COG 1 77.4046535
6 
63.3702
722 
1481.6713
77 
3.60616634
7 
11.49046355 772715098.7 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 1 44.9429553
7 
5.25776
2837 
814.70382
69 
1.75772617
3 
2.176459512 317221160.2 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
GNQ 1 90.1142989
2 
68.5776
5375 
8535.3163
75 
25.6383966 27.20817554 473696667.9 
Eritrea ERI 0 11.6899224
9 
2.14523
5773 
235.17152
71 
0.97380807
5 
3.881525132 27339132.78 
Ethiopia ETH 0 12.4124116
4 
8.89699
0769 
173.79240
48 
7.01817968
7 
2.558314868 268041176.9 
Gabon GAB 1 59.8835558
4 
46.3776
3374 
5564.3046
19 
1.31276710
1 
0.018687152 42548225.28 
Gambia, The GMB 0 41.2593827
5 
2.74147
1777 
340.32352
68 
4.02830356
7 
8.696845684 46395891.65 
Ghana GHA 0 34.9145796
7 
5.48931
3523 
569.38424
82 
5.19622501 2.850532572 482193571.4 
Guinea GIN 0 27.4471734
9 
9.51441
3435 
396.48899
94 
3.39852064
9 
4.382739419 161614459.1 
Guinea-Bissau GNB 0 23.0065889
2 
4.03614
6982 
304.67178
89 
1.07245960
4 
1.42687151 6591233.864 
Kenya KEN 0 24.4835602
8 
1.69746
2886 
517.19245
38 
3.32562219
6 
0.55320613 111281294.8 
Lesotho LSO 0 45.8929198
8 
2.36823
1051 
545.57539
02 
3.62978689 15.88193021 143793484 
Liberia LBR 0 24.516424 17.5846
5101 
167.48811
81 
14.9135081
8 
23.99961243 138740556.3 
Madagascar MDG 0 25.9659577
6 
2.21449
0871 
312.34595
74 
3.28543976
4 
3.211472124 228431476.5 
                                                          
261
 These tables represent the averages calculated for all variables for the period 1996 - 2009 included in the 
regression equations. 
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Malawi MWI 0 26.0239767
8 
2.87221
3053 
208.18484
15 
4.26055330
9 
1.944424456 55220716.14 
Mali MLI 0 27.0874585
4 
1.79550
7806 
392.75306
03 
5.50053256
6 
2.503502036 104959787.6 
Mauritania MRT 0 40.6052144 18.0252
9167 
632.33852
92 
3.51918630
8 
7.958011349 146226855.3 
Mauritius MUS 0 59.5195508
6 
0.00947
0141 
4744.4259
68 
4.47789660
5 
1.761910233 115980808.3 
Mozambique MOZ 0 24.4805085
6 
7.31925
4272 
284.21247
2 
7.84872979
8 
5.074854794 301197531 
Namibia NAM 0 45.1960816
4 
0.60280
7296 
2857.8599
56 
4.18719206
7 
2.167254111 132111054 
Niger NER 0 16.4072206
2 
2.66576
7552 
236.45050
86 
3.66575115
8 
2.1719975 100368778.3 
Nigeria NGA 1 41.9973502
4 
35.8660
6777 
638.77099
14 
5.14132620
2 
3.44492914 3170562921 
Rwanda RWA 0 9.26188942
1 
3.62510
6038 
298.79609
16 
8.53822958
5 
0.658998742 24995585.94 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
STP 0  1.43072
1734 
806.56554
81 
6.46935919
6 
12.30531574 11798671.03 
Senegal SEN 1 26.9028939
3 
1.63857
7177 
687.68142
77 
4.06707447
8 
1.68678561 134183986.5 
Seychelles SYC 0 85.6179326
3 
 8815.2729
73 
3.32009602
6 
12.5294391 99634072.35 
Sierra Leone SLE 0 18.5349531
5 
5.71114
1894 
232.93198
99 
5.36978684
4 
2.765435438 35897578.29 
Somalia SOM 0      32317142.86 
South Africa ZAF 1 28.3745292
5 
2.52430
8535 
4147.5538
38 
3.30236152
7 
1.684892385 3211290704 
Sudan SDN 1 13.7981466
1 
13.9254
9752 
640.20534
48 
6.52410156
5 
4.794156401 1351887857 
Swaziland SWZ 0 77.7855137
2 
2.15565
0946 
1834.1128
73 
3.16366166
3 
3.027875793 54444260.75 
Tanzania TZA 0 18.6300609
4 
4.05465
1402 
334.68825
56 
6.01017283
6 
3.143844014 387723041.6 
Togo TGO 0 34.0525356
9 
4.23189
8685 
334.71920
06 
3.24261908
2 
2.515957177 45749075.54 
Uganda UGA 0 14.2059397
8 
6.19118
8943 
310.47872
79 
7.06829430
2 
3.668709344 342117143.1 
Zambia ZMB 0 32.2598393
7 
9.44641
5381 
556.51038
81 
4.47958366
1 
5.932084251 416154285.7 
Zimbabwe ZWE 0 36.9044953
9 
4.44400
9193 
502.26537
8 
-
3.03474199
1 
1.260380843 79142857.14 
 
Table B.2 
Country Name Country 
Code 
TERTIARY 
SCHOOL 
INFLATION VOICE AND 
ACCOUNTAB
ILITY 
REGULA
TORY 
QUALIT
Y 
RULE OF LAW POLITICAL 
STABILITY & 
ABSENCE OF 
VIOLENCE 
Angola AGO 1.865337143 394.4790661 -
1.288089489 
-
1.24821
168 
-1.433972761 -1.155021767 
Benin BEN 4.600702 3.429247381 0.271277269 -
0.37780
093 
-0.463963435 0.525760779 
Botswana BWA 6.621047778 8.608452707 0.618779971 0.67123
1312 
0.61168312 0.878914106 
Burkina Faso BFA 1.786059231 3.051925958 -
0.376097451 
-
0.25203
7078 
-0.478629481 -0.059681716 
Burundi BDI 1.866463333 13.14291371 -
1.149445172 
-
1.25733
1783 
-1.246831832 -1.923148734 
Cameroon CMR 5.898080909 2.823210014 - - -1.170604652 -0.618636998 
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1.077562086 0.72535
3418 
Cape Verde CPV 6.525288182 3.092121304 0.698169121 -
0.20657
5887 
0.515100507 0.922610854 
Central African 
Republic 
CAF 1.854924286 2.626782223 -
0.954224235 
-
1.13873
5179 
-1.384657588 -1.480054833 
Chad TCD 1.077643 3.905426994 -
1.191616506 
-
1.00579
621 
-1.23268445 -1.533830186 
Comoros COM 2.511175714 3.310086072 -
0.456079752 
-
1.43378
4606 
-1.046927345 -0.204601425 
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR 4.1372 153.5271329 -
1.608198027 
-
1.78647
999 
-1.895153881 -2.378562318 
Congo, Rep. COG 4.643946667 3.681973405 -
1.079116072 
-
1.16077
8975 
-1.32826916 -1.137265465 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 7.2598325 3.014477553 -
1.204250922 
-
0.69534
4897 
-1.330199675 -1.588332156 
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 3.25893 5.233202851 -
1.729709625 
-
1.44038
0417 
-1.311328647 -0.33153373 
Eritrea ERI 1.142286667  -
1.772294905 
-
1.63046
9446 
-0.71485123 -0.756323063 
Ethiopia ETH 1.974400769 8.354684399 -1.10982148 -
1.11684
3288 
-0.749824313 -1.391599 
Gabon GAB 7.05579 1.712665694 -
0.716321166 
-
0.29108
326 
-0.483934221 0.094393165 
Gambia, The GMB 2.01419 5.376006953 -
0.881776188 
-
0.52093
5437 
-0.13898598 0.27629979 
Ghana GHA 6.3430075 20.44517125 0.145727982 -
0.11392
3976 
-0.107787775 -0.007486387 
Guinea GIN 3.699073333 22.39628968 -
1.270705073 
-
0.88917
7251 
-1.339339818 -1.470055795 
Guinea-Bissau GNB 1.300478 9.795554362 -
0.688400401 
-
0.96931
8001 
-1.384908869 -0.629727955 
Kenya KEN 3.045348333 10.12924022 -
0.432967796 
-
0.25939
9147 
-1.005617475 -1.0827595 
Lesotho LSO 2.6794325 7.886239732 -
0.145502078 
-
0.53800
2307 
-0.166797169 0.094803967 
Liberia LBR 13.218725 10.85055614 -
0.902923261 
-
1.71226
4314 
-1.572308087 -1.690608004 
Madagascar MDG 2.647883571 10.39014227 -0.06318158 -
0.39699
9753 
-0.450936498 -0.038327163 
Malawi MWI 0.422106 18.84260251 -
0.316545194 
-
0.40731
1641 
-0.325452643 -0.106496453 
Mali MLI 2.869275385 2.506898991 0.252737956 -
0.31486
6802 
-0.363100077 0.188152208 
Mauritania MRT 3.616935 5.998931146 -
0.914762545 
-
0.35962
3555 
-0.645319629 -0.160248099 
Mauritius MUS 16.41874917 6.196252627 0.884209193 0.54638
218 
0.955130372 0.865620105 
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Mozambique MOZ 0.881853333 11.9281261 -
0.075681663 
-
0.43699
4596 
-0.68400534 0.086798526 
Namibia NAM 6.5957975 6.353471586 0.378348152 0.17209
1455 
0.216006844 0.549417448 
Niger NER 1.088607143 3.011009981 -
0.502340199 
-
0.65515
5704 
-0.780149534 -0.431765615 
Nigeria NGA 8.73986 12.62336809 -
0.825255863 
-
0.96094
7149 
-1.350616037 -1.706707256 
Rwanda RWA 2.702279091 7.496693821 -
1.337875279 
-
0.78657
5486 
-0.907819316 -1.127201234 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
STP 4.07054 21.34021745 0.199082024 -
0.76734
4303 
-0.484758389 0.582718274 
Senegal SEN 5.9174975 1.956915031 0.030568224 -
0.21640
4174 
-0.16412011 -0.328529838 
Seychelles SYC  7.330249786 0.041921142 -
0.74840
0408 
0.25017815 0.8777377 
Sierra Leone SLE 1.911863333 11.91220898 -
0.707617242 
-
1.12087
5319 
-1.190701137 -0.95661201 
Somalia SOM   -
1.829772493 
-
2.46400
8217 
-2.3217972 -2.692865836 
South Africa ZAF  6.376356324 0.715642315 0.46197
9584 
0.068369788 -0.199443936 
Sudan SDN 5.323713333 21.3703923 -
1.651322727 
-
1.25994
9394 
-1.479428271 -2.233050526 
Swaziland SWZ 4.791853333 7.636820659 -
1.305141089 
-
0.42335
7029 
-0.585309777 -0.002815401 
Tanzania TZA 0.834216667 8.994172222 -
0.331957571 
-
0.32578
7326 
-0.343544914 -0.268334807 
Togo TGO 3.97759 3.054939735 -
1.240358441 
-
0.67040
3569 
-0.934250121 -0.482108087 
Uganda UGA 2.972543 6.1103049 -
0.648834486 
-
0.00480
5514 
-0.580920058 -1.291042659 
Zambia ZMB 2.363326667 20.82907685 -0.37708648 -
0.38796
4486 
-0.510757943 0.028970416 
Zimbabwe ZWE 3.734526091 2243.9207 -1.33362587 -
1.89301
3383 
-1.52556423 -1.299104151 
 
Table B.3 
Country Name Country 
Code 
GOVT 
EFFECTI
VENESS 
CONT
ROL 
OF 
CORR
UPTIO
N 
GOODS MKT 
EFFICIENCY 
INFRASTRUCT
URE 
LABOUR MKT 
EFFICIENCY 
MACRO 
STABILITY 
MKT.SIZE 
Angola AGO -
1.1621
44294 
-
1.309
69948
8 
3.33   3.61 3.76 
Benin BEN -
0.4404
-
0.654
3.778 2.4 3.98 4.5225 2.27 
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18187 18572
7 
Botswana BWA 0.6180
19367 
0.852
18662
6 
4.014 3.7875 4.46 5.09 2.7633333
33 
Burkina Faso BFA -
0.6951
79093 
-
0.183
18180
7 
3.83 2.4275 4.296666667 3.935 2.43 
Burundi BDI -
1.3696
91827 
-
1.091
86797
1 
3.2 2.03 4.08 2.785 1.4233333
33 
Cameroon CMR -
0.8613
97449 
-
1.038
36634
1 
3.632 2.195 3.933333333 5.15 3.0966666
67 
Cape Verde CPV 0.1495
35301 
0.387
31400
9 
3.76     
Central African 
Republic 
CAF -
1.4821
26931 
-
1.111
51502
4 
     
Chad TCD -
1.1619
79296 
-
1.201
26873
5 
2.914 1.665 3.863333333 4.215 2.4 
Comoros COM -
1.5479
7691 
-
0.836
14166
5 
     
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
ZAR -
1.6833
68001 
-
1.601
96569 
     
Congo, Rep. COG -
1.2551
30272 
-
0.974
37510
4 
     
Cote d'Ivoire CIV -
0.9765
65375 
-
0.852
71456
2 
3.673333333 3.42 3.95 4.665 3.035 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
GNQ -
1.4415
1986 
-
1.527
63065
3 
     
Eritrea ERI -
1.1285
81006 
0.041
16147
2 
     
Ethiopia ETH -
0.7856
94313 
-
0.666
74832
7 
3.69 2.63 4.3 3.8 3.3933333
33 
Gabon GAB -
0.6582
90724 
-
0.717
82568
3 
     
Gambia, The GMB -
0.5977
96585 
-
0.498
87860
5 
4.068 3.3525 4.656666667 4.0825 1.38 
Ghana GHA -
0.1199
77399 
-
0.141
96187
8 
3.976666667 3.07 4.03 3.29 3.175 
Guinea GIN -
1.0901
11772 
-
0.842
28348
9 
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Guinea-Bissau GNB -
1.1995
53103 
-
1.061
07276
3 
     
Kenya KEN -
0.6355
29265 
-
0.992
43383 
4.044 2.8425 4.543333333 3.8775 3.35 
Lesotho LSO -
0.2885
01322 
-
0.142
44487
8 
3.74 2.17 4.176666667 5.1625 1.8766666
67 
Liberia LBR -
1.4759
96873 
-
1.114
00274
9 
     
Madagascar MDG -
0.5212
51338 
-
0.046
22529
3 
3.81 2.335 4.34 3.5 2.6433333
33 
Malawi MWI -
0.6104
47813 
-
0.563
60227
6 
3.99 2.465 4.54 3.235 2.405 
Mali MLI -
0.7776
33788 
-
0.482
11693
8 
3.72 2.4975 4.013333333 4.1125 2.47 
Mauritania MRT -
0.4574
70414 
-
0.276
554 
3.518 2.22 3.986666667 3.5275 2.0066666
67 
Mauritius MUS 0.5974
79685 
0.523
87109
6 
4.49 4.1875 4.29 4.045 2.5933333
33 
Mozambique MOZ -
0.3670
11663 
-
0.517
91362
6 
3.45 2.345 4 3.92 2.8066666
67 
Namibia NAM 0.2025
46035 
0.308
41975
2 
4.024 4.455 4.473333333 5.2125 2.4733333
33 
Niger NER -
0.8771
34432 
-
0.854
43812
6 
     
Nigeria NGA -
0.9920
80065 
-
1.156
72131
4 
4.18 2.2375 4.353333333 5.3325 4.3066666
67 
Rwanda RWA -
0.6150
39827 
-
0.425
45750
7 
4.14     
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
STP -
0.6442
49857 
-
0.494
14968 
     
Senegal SEN -
0.1633
76342 
-
0.200
78222
1 
4.1625 2.956666667 3.81 4.576666667 2.7466666
67 
Seychelles SYC 0.1536
3214 
0.313
92415 
     
Sierra Leone SLE -
1.2975
99885 
-
1.041
87575
1 
     
Somalia SOM -
2.0912
94531 
-
1.724
34683 
     
South Africa ZAF 0.6300
54639 
0.365
85492
4.666 4.1975 4.17 4.885 4.85 
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1 
Sudan SDN -
1.2604
23491 
-
1.213
72927
8 
     
Swaziland SWZ -
0.7412
38791 
-
0.304
50886
2 
3.8     
Tanzania TZA -
0.4308
41395 
-
0.719
40927
2 
3.796 2.4825 4.306666667 4.1875 3.1233333
33 
Togo TGO -
1.3114
96692 
-
0.871
92326
8 
     
Uganda UGA -
0.5624
4811 
-
0.798
85929
1 
3.722 2.3375 4.75 4.48 3 
Zambia ZMB -
0.7975
25816 
-
0.778
09331
9 
3.986 2.5225 4.04 3.905 2.4166666
67 
Zimbabwe ZWE -
1.0609
63175 
-
1.171
56178 
3.266 2.7675 3.546666667 1.5175 1.83 
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